Dien Bien Phu

Ted Morgan. Valley of Death: the Tragedy at Dien Bien Phu That Led America into the Vietnam War.

“The French no longer knew why the war was being fought. For the Americans, it was a war against Communism, as in Korea. The Associated States wanted their independence. But the French? Te said they too were fighting Communism, while in reality they wanted to maintain the French Union. . . . the French were up to their ears in hypocrisy.” (Ted Morgan. Valley of Death: the Tragedy at Dien Bien Phu That Led America into the Vietnam War. 183)

The French “minister of finance, Edgar Faure, said, “Whether we win or whether we lose, we will not remain in Indochina.” (Ted Morgan. Valley of Death: the Tragedy at Dien Bien Phu That Led America into the Vietnam War. (183)

Bickering amongst the French generals over strategy and tactics.

Navarre ordered an attack on the Vietminh which had been stockpiling supplies. “In the ensuing battle, which lasted three weeks, the French, with tanks, artillery, and air support, gave the Vietminh a mauling.” (Ted Morgan. Valley of Death: the Tragedy at Dien Bien Phu That Led America into the Vietnam War. (185)

In preparing for a Vietminh attack one French officer told visitors to Dien Bien Pu that “he had removed every bramble and thicket until Beatrice was as clean-shaven as a Thai whore’s cunt.” (225)

French artillery commander Col. Piroth did not have appropriate maps. The “scale of the maps was 1/100,000” meaning they had to use slide rules. (227)

Navarre was not sure of victory. (228) As a result he ordered preparations for evacuation of Dien Bien Phu. (229) He also let people know that losing at Dien Bien Phu did not mean losing the war against the Viet Minh. So, instead of evacuating he strengthened his forces. (230)

Brothels were established for the soldiers. (232)

There were other signs that the French did not take this seriously as high level visitors from throughout the world came to visit. (232)

Before the actual battle began the French sent out recon patrols which the Viet Minh constantly attacked. (233)

General Cogny did not inspire confidence in the U.S. Consul at Hanoi, Paul Strum. (234)

Much of the French population opposed the war. (234)

President Eisenhower criticized French resolve believing that they wavered in their policies. “If the United States replaced the French in Indochina, the Vietnamese could be expected to transfer their hatred to us.” (235)

Eisenhower did approve the secret sending mechanics to work on aircraft. “Mississippi Democrat John Stennis . . . As always, when we send one group we shall have to send another to protect the first and we shall be fully involved.” (236)

“To some extent, Giap was able to protect his supply lines with 37mm antiaircraft guns from China, placed at choke points such as river crossings. Bombing the supply routes became dangerous for the French, but the strikes nonetheless contributed to keeping Giap behind schedule.” (238)

“Building the artillery emplacements also turned out to be enormously time-consuming. Contrary to Colonel Piroth’s artillery manual, which dictated that cannons must be placed on reverse slopes, with the shells lobbed mortar-style over the crests, Giap placed his big guns on the slopes facing Dien Bien Phu.” (238)

The Viet Minh suffered from non-combat diseases, and accidents. Trees fell on them, there were snake bites, and falls from bridges. Malaria and other diseases took their likes. They had only one surgeon and six medical assistants. (239)

Navarre projected an optimistic facade by saying that, “the Vietminh offensive [in Laos] is slack, or about at its peak. . . . Giap’s offensive is blocked.” He told an ambassador that “Dien Bien Phu is a veritable jungle Verdun which he hopes will be attacked as it will result in terrific casualties to the Vietminh and will not fall.” (246)

American Admiral Radford told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that “there was no danger of the French being driven out of Dien Bien Phu.” He also stated that the Vietminh would not attack has they had limited access to supplies. (247) The opposite was actually the truth.

Secretary of State Allen Dulles added to this ignorance by stating that “there will probably bot be any major decisive engagements during the remains two months of March and April of the fighting season.” (247)

February 3, 1954 Giap celebrated the Vietnamese New Year of Tet by “firing thirty or so rounds.” The French returned artillery fire but only hit “dummy emplacements.” (248)

After meeting with his staff Giap concluded that “the French could not evacuate” Dien Bien Phu and therefore “had to reinforce it. Giap would maintain the initiative. The longer it took, the more the French would use up their supplies and munitions, and the more casualties they would suffer. The body count was vital to the French, who, unlike the Vietminh, found replacements hard to come by. For the first time, Giap’s divisions would have artillery and antiaircraft guns. They would destroy Dien Bien Phu strongpoint by strongpoint.” (248)

Captured Vietminh soldiers told the French that they were “surrounded by twenty-seven battalions armed with artillery.” (248)

In February, the French War Minister flew to Dien Bien Phu and his plane was attacked by the Vietminh. “Pilots called Dien Bien Phu the chamber pot.” Interestingly, Castries claimed he could “crush four Vietminh divisions” while his officers stated that “it had become too dangerous to go outside the perimeter.” (248-249) Officers were angered with one writing that “the Navarre Plant is a bust. . . . The Viets are on the offensive and all we can do is fight back. Everybody’s fed up.” (249)

In addition, the Vietminh “learned from the Chinese experience in Korea the method of hiding their artillery from air strikes and counter battery fire. The Vietminh dug tunnels in the sides of mountains to conceal their guns, bringing them out to fire twenty rounds and wheeling them back in before they could be spotted.” (260)

Giap originally scheduled the attack for January 26, 1954, however, he cancelled it because of the lack of supplies and the Vietminh had not completed their preparations. One of his aids said Giap lacked “the Bolshevik spirit.” At the same time his troops caught malaria and lived on rice. Nevertheless, he knew that that he outmanned and outgunned the French. (260)

On the other hand the French with erroneous philosophical memes. “The Vietminh have no roads. Cannot must be hauled over roads. Therefore the Vietminh have no cannon. The Vietminh have no experienced gunners. Therefore the Vietminh artillery will fail.” (261) This ignored their own intelligence. (262)

Although the French detested what they referred to as “American inference” U.S. Lieutenant General John W. “Iron Mike” O’Daniel believed that the French could defeat the Vietminh. Nevertheless, he cautioned that he would have taken some of the high ground. (263)

Just before the Vietminh attack on March 13 a French officer noted that they were encircled by the Vietminh. (265)

Giap sent out scouts to collect information on each of the French bases. He “had the initiative, choosing not only the site but the timing and cadence of the battle. His strategy was to pick off the strongpoints one at a time, engaging in a series of small battles, sibling away at the French perimeter rather than taking it in one big but costly bite.” (266)

On March 13, 1954 the Vietminh attacked the French at DienBienPhu. (267)

Colonel Piroth, the French artillery commander “had prepared a series of targets uncovered on the aerial photographs, but as his intelligence officer Lieutenant Verzat pointed out, there were no Vietminh batteries among the targets. The Viets had changed their emplacements.” (269)

Following the war the French established a commission to investigate what went wrong. There were many recriminations. But there was also admissions to the limitations of western analysis. An air force general states “We tortured our brains to find ways to locate their artillery. Some guns were in tunnels six meters from the embrasure. They were moved up to fire, then pulled back.” (272)

“At around 7P.M., the artillery [of the Vietminh] stopped and the infantry assault began upon the four Beatrice strongpoints simultaneously.” Due to the disarray caused by the artillery bombardment the Vietminh were able to take Beatrice.(276) As a result of the failure of his artillery Piroth committed suicide. (288)

Minister of Defense for France Rene Pleven did not believe there were suitable targets for a nuclear attack. (306) “A study was made by the U.S. Army and Air Force on the feasibility of using atomic weapons in Indochina. The army’s Office of Psychological Warfare warned that even if they were effective there would be adverse effects on the reputation of the United States and on existing alliances. Intelligence officers in both services were also opposed to their use, prompting the army chief of staff, Matthew B. Ridgway, and one of his assistants, General James M. Gavin, to order a second study. The planners concluded that any such intervention would eventually lead to the commitment of ground troops and perhaps Chinese retaliation.” (306)

Matthew B. Ridgway, the American army chief of staff, opposed U.S. support for a war which the French did not take seriously, in his mind, and “with no chance of winning?” He also did not believe that Admiral Radford’s reliance on air strikes would not work. (316)

French disorganization became more apparent on the second day of the battle, March 15. The French had not counterattacked because “the forces involved in the counterattack could not be assembled in time.” (333)

Giap recreated the battle at Maastricht in 1673. He surrounded “the fortress. Cut off supples and reinforcements. Prevent sorties by the garrison. Assault the weakest points o defense under cover of artillery.” (355)

“On March 27, Giap summoned his commanders and deliverers his instructions” Destroy the entire eastern sector. Occupy the heights to the west and turn them into attack positions from which we can threaten the centers of resistance Claudine and Huguette on the left back of the Nam Yum. . . . Until now, our army has limited its battles to a single night. . . . The attack on Eliane will be part of a coordinated attack on all easer strongpoints, as well as an indirect attack o the central command post.” (355) The Vietminh were protected by the night from “planes, tanks, and artillery.” (357)

Castries begged for reinforcements which did not come. Until Dien Bien Phu “Giap’s army had never fought a battle for more than a single night. Night meant protection from planes, tanks, and artillery. The goal was to destroy French strongpoints, take the equipment, remove the wounded, and fall back.” (357)

U.S. Marine Corps commandant, General Lemuel C. Shepherd opposed using air forces at Dien Bien Phu. “Air intervention would be an unprofitable adventure. We can expect no significant military result from an improvised air offensive against guerrilla forces. They simply do not offer a target which our Air Force will find remunerative. They are nowhere exposed at a vital point critical to their continued resupply and communications.” The U.S. would have to deal with a failure. (398)

U.S. Admiral Robert Carney, chief of naval operations believed, “American air power would improve the French tactical situation, but not that it would be decisive. Intervention had to be weighed against the potential consequences of U.S. involvement in the Indochina War.”

General Nathan Farragut Twining, air force chief of staff, whose family military history dated back to the French and Indian War. As bomber commander in World War II he was in charge of the unit that dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. He believed in “massive air retaliation.”

In 1965 Twining stated that “three small tactical A-bombs could have saved the day. . . . no great towns there, only Communist and their supplies.” (399)

Admiral Radford and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles argued that, “If Indochina went, America would be forced back to Hawaii.” Dulles wanted Eisenhower to obtain Congressional backing so that he could use air and sea power in the area if he felt it necessary in the interest of national security.” (403)

Other senators opposed this because it meant that the U.S. would provide most of the troops, as in Korea. (403)

Further president and then senator John F. Kennedy that the people of Indochina must be “granted independence. To pour money, material, and men into the jungle of Indochina without at least a remote prospect of victory would be dangerously futile and self-destructive. But the French persisted infusing independence for Indochina.” (417)

Dulles feared that the French would “turn Indochina over to the Communists” at the Geneva Conference of 1954. “If Indochina collapsed . . . Thailand, Malay, Burma, and Indonesia might also be absorbed by the Communists. Dien Bien Phu was at a crucial phase, and the United States did not think much of its chances. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had suggested a naval and air intervention. (In fact, all but Radford had been against intervention.)

Dulles said that, “Our military leaders say that if Indochina goes, the only effective deterrent measures open to us would be those directed at Communist China itself.” (475)

Many scholars doubt that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles offered the French atomic bombs during the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. However, French sources show that Dulles did offer two atomic bombs to the French. These according to Jean Chauvel, the French ambassador to Switzerland, Maurice Schumann of the French Foreign Ministry. French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault was shocked at the offer.”Schumann could not see how two atom bombs, which could have annihilated both armies, might save Dien Bien Phu.” (478-479)

“General Ely wrote in his diary on April 25 that he had mixed feelings about the offer of two atom bombs. The psychological effect would be tremendous, but the effectiveness was questionable and it carried the risk of generalized warfare.” (479)

In addition, the French received a “document on the history of French requests for aid to Indochina.” However, there was no mention of the US offer of atomic bombs; the US ambassador to France knew nothing of the offer. (479)

Dulles did not remember making the offer. (480) However, Morgan concludes that Dulles used the threat to use atomic bombs. “This was central to his penchant for brinkmanship, which had become the answer to every crisis. It does not seem at all implausible that it would have come to mind with Bidault.” (484)

When presented with “possibilities of using atomic bombs in Indochina” Eisenhower responded that, We can’t use those awful things against Asians for a second time in less than ten years.” (516-517)

“The erosion of mind and body in a situation of permanent combat took its toll in strange ways. Lieutenant Dr. Madelaine of the 2nd BEP recalled that some of the men in his unit had died, though they had no wounds. These were war-hardened Legionnaires who had fought on the Russian front in the German army. You’d be chatting with them in the trenches, and after they’d eaten and rested, without anything seeming wrong, they were unable to finish the sentence they’d begun and they fell to the ground dead.” (461)

The Vietminh experienced similar stress. There were "few doctors.” And, “wounds, such as skull fractures” went untreated. The trenches they had dug turned to mud during the monsoon season. “Their meals were often cold rice. The smoke from artillery shells and the corpses left rotting on the field of battle polluted the atmosphere.” (462)

Giap told his commanders “that nothing could be done about the conditions, for this was the nature of trench warfare. . . . His great advantage was that the wounded did not pile up, and he could send most of them to field hospitals in the back country.” (462)

On April 22, 1954, President Eisenhower invoked the domino theory when he told the American Newspaper Publishers Association that, “If Indochina fell, it would be a mere additional pawn in the machinations of a power-hungry group in the Kremlin and in China.” (465)

A failed French counterattack against the Vietminh frightened Dulles who “cabled Eisenhower, The situation here [Geneva] is tragic. France is almost callusing before our very eyes.” (470)

Admiral Radford believed that “airstrikes would stabilize the military situation, and that a limited Chinese intervention. Could be dealt with.” As the war escalated Radford believed that the Americans would then be in a position to take over the conflict.” Radford also believed that a Vietminh victory at Dien Bien Phu “would lead to growing defections from the Vietnamese army and the possible massacre of French civilians. The only way to stop that was to demonstrate that France had powerful allies on her side.” (475)

Concerns over possible Chinese intervention in Vietnam were accepted as a cost the West should be willing to pay as U.S. air power would destroy their forces. (482)

President Eisenhower lamented that the French displayed inconsistent emotions over Dien Bien Phu. One day they are confident and the next day they are gloom and doom. Eisenhower was concerned that American prestige "would be at stake” if U.S. soldiers were sent to Indochina. Vice President Nixon offered “whether to act without its [U.S.] allies. Eisenhower then suggested that the U.S. may have “to attack with everything we have” if they have to go it alone. (490)

“Giap’s attack force of fourteen thousand men outnumbered Castries’ three thousand able-bodied men by nearly five to one.” (521)

For all the French efforts to build a Vietnamese army to counter the Vietminh and to deflect accusations that this was a French colonial war the French admitted that their Vietnamese army was a “mirage because it lacked the will to fight.” In addition, most Vietnamese hated these soldiers. (531)

Ted Morgan. My Battle of Algiers: A Memoir.

In his memoir of his experiences in the Franco-Algerian War Ted Morgan quotes a French major as saying, “We’ll win battle after battle until we lose the war.” (64)

Morgan, himself concluded that the French would lose the war. (264)