Miko Peled. General’s Son: Journey of an Israeli in Palestine. 2016.
The following is from the Introduction by Alice Walker.
Peled’s mother recalled the Nakba, the Arabic word for catastrophe” which the Arabs use to describe the 1947-1948 war, which the Israelis describe as the War of Independence. For the Palestinians, Peled’s mother said, the Israeli army drove the Arabs out of their homes “in the hundreds of thousands . . . frequently looting and/or blowing up homes.” However, if the Arabs had nice homes, the Israelis kept those for themselves. “As the invaders moved in, the coffee . . . was sometimes still on the table, still hot, as the inhabitants were forced to flee.” (11)
In the 1967 War, known as the Six Day War, the Israelis took more Arab land: the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank of the Jordan River, from Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, respectively. Israel claimed its very existence was threatened by General Nasser’s military movements on the Sinai Peninsula. But recent research by Israeli historians has found that the Israeli “generals knew that the Egyptian army was too weak at the time to pose a military threat to Israel, [Peled’s father, Mattityahu] and his fellow officers carried out their plan to attack and destroy Egypt as a military power.” (11)
Matti Peled was upset at the treatment of the Palestinians even before the Six-Day War and began to look at his own country as an oppressor. He learned Arabic and became a professor of Arabic Literature in Israel. (12)
Miko Peled spends much of his time trying to “raise funds . . . to ship 1,280 wheelchairs to those maimed and made invalids in Palestine and Israel.” (12)
Miko Peled’s transformation to an anti-Zionist was slow. Although influenced by his father, the death of his niece by suicide bombers in 1997 traumatized him. Smadar was 13 years old. (19)
Peled’s grandfather, Dr. Avraham Katznelson, was supposed to be the first minister of health in the new state of Israel. However, there was a fight for who would be prime minister between the charming, reasonable, diplomatic Chaim Weizmann and the “militant and uncompromising” David Ben-Gurion. Ben-Gurion won. (30) Dr. Avraham Katznelson joined the government as it was “the first independent Jewish government in more than 2,000 years.” He would lead Israel’s United Nations delegation and later be ambassador to Scandinavia. (30)
Peled’s mother taught him “to be a Zionist, but not by being dogmatic.” (33)” The two most prominent men in her life, her father and her husband, dedicated their entire lives to the cause of Zionism, and she shared their stories with me throughout my life.” (33)
His grandmother left Russia after the Russian Revolution. She took a train that stopped in Turkey, “where Jews could wait for the British authorities to issue them permits to enter Palestine.” She would later marry a man who had planned to leave Palestine. (36)
His grandmothers did not like each other. However, “they represent two aspects of the Zionist pioneers: One, an educated Jewish woman with a strong sense of social hierarchy who made it in early twentieth century Europe, and then lent her talents and education to the Zionist enterprise. The other, a working-class woman whose world, the world of the Jewish shtetl, had come to an end and who ended up participating in the Zionist project as a laborer and as a mother, which, in those days, in the height of socialism, was as noble as a position as one could hold.” (38)
Peled’s mother refused to take a Palestinian family’s home in the 1948 war, saying, “That I should take the home of a family that may be living in a refugee camp? The home of another mother? Can you imagine how much they must miss their home?” She stayed with her mother. She was ashamed of the Israelis who looted Palestine homes with beautiful rugs and furniture. “I don’t know how they could do it.” (46). She would have had a “beautiful, spacious home for a family in a choice neighborhood in Jerusalem, and at no expense.” Miko Peled heard this story many times growing up. (46)
In 1953, Moshe Sharett became prime minister. In 1955, Ben-Gurion returned to politics and became defense minister. He and Army Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan planned to attack Egypt. Sharett opposed attacking Egypt, believing it would cause “an unnecessary all-out war.” Ben-Gurion returned as Prime Minister and fired Sharett who was viewed “as the last bastion of moderation.” (48)
Ben-Gurion made a “secret pact with France and Britain to attack Egypt.” The following one-sided war saw Israel conquer the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula. The “Sinai Campaign” lasted one week. “Just as Ben-Gurion and Dayan had anticipated, it was a devastating blow to the Egyptian army.” (48)
Lt. Col. Matti Peled, Miko’s father, became military governor of the Gaza Strip. “This was a defining role for him, and it influenced his entire life.” (48)
Matti Peled’s orders for the Gaza Strip mimicked those of British rule and this was uncomfortable for him having fought the British in 1948. (48)
Looking at his father’s papers in the Israeli archives, Miko Peled found his father “unyielding critical of his superiors and the established military in general.” (49) Matti Peled learned that he knew nothing about the Palestinians. (49) But he did find out that the Gazans “were not seeking vengeance for the hardship we caused them, nor did they wish to get rid of us. They were realistic and pragmatic and wanted to be free.” (50)
In the early 1960s, Israel began developing nuclear weapons. (51)
Toward the mid-1960s 1960s, General Matti Peled believed another war would break out. He listened to Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and other Arab leaders.
“Nasser expelled the United Nations peacekeeping forces that had been monitoring the cease-fire between the two countries from the Sinai Peninsula. He sent Egyptian troops across the Suez Canal and into the demilitarized Sinai Peninsula. He threatened to blockade the straits of Titan and not permit Israeli ships to proceed toward the Israeli port city of Eilat.” This violated the two countries’ cease-fire, and the Israeli army called for war.
They wanted to strike Egypt preemptively. The Israeli cabinet wanted to consider it, and the arguments were fierce. General Matti Peled told all those present that “in no uncertain terms, the Egyptians needed a year and a half or two years to ready for a full-scale war. The other generals agreed that the Israeli army was prepared and that this was the time to strike another devastating blow.” (54)
General Peled added that Nasser continued his warlike talk because he didn’t think Israel would attack. (54)
The continued impasse between the Israeli Army General Staff and the cabinet caused much tension. One concern General Peled gave was that the Israeli economy suffered with reservists called up for a prolonged period. “The army morale is high, and we will be victorious whether we strike today or in three weeks.” However, the Israeli economy can’t wait. General Peled scolded Prime Minister Levi Eshkol. “Why must this army, which had never lost in battle, endure such an insult by the cabinet?” This became known as the General’s Coup. (54) Nevertheless, the cabinet waited for diplomacy. (55)
In 1953, Moshe Sharett invited then Lt. Col. Matti Peled to speak to visiting American Jews and told them that the Israeli army “is preparing for war in order to complete the conquest of the Land of Israel and to push Israeli’s eastern border to its natural location on the banks of the Jordan River.” (58)
The Israelis viewed their victory in the 1967 Six Day War as the “complete return of the historic Eretz Yisrael after 2,000 years to Jewish hands.” (59)
While punishing Egypt for violating the ceasefire agreement was one thing taking the Golan Heights and the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip “was never part of any official plan.” (59)
After the war, at a meeting of the Israeli general staff, General Matti Peled “spoke of the unique chance the victory offered Israel to solve the Palestinian problem once and for all. . . . Now we have a chance to offer the Palestinians a state of their own. . . . holding onto the West Bank, and the people who lived in it was contrary to Israel’s long-term strategy of building a secure Jewish democracy with a stable Jewish majority.” Maintaining these territories “would turn the Jewish state into an increasingly brutal occupying power and eventually into a bi-national state.” (59-60)
“In 1973, Prime Minister Golda Meir . . . claimed that, before 1967, she had never heard of the Palestinian people and that they were somehow invented and had no real national identity - and therefore could have no national claims to the land of Palestine. . . . my father [retired General Matt Peled] immediately wrote a scathing reply to Golda’s speech . . . How do people in the world refer to the population that resides in the West Bank? What were the refugees of 1948 called prior to their exile? . . . in her capacity and then as foreign minister, how did she refer to these people? . . . Truly amazing! (68-69)
Overall, the Israelis did not receive General Matti Peled’s lectures well. (69) General Peled concluded, “If we want to end terrorism, we must end the occupation and make peace.” (70)
He expressed concern “for the nature of the Jewish democracy, and he knew that the occupation would destroy the moral fiber of society and of the IDF.” (70)
“Extremist Jewish groups, most of whom had not served a single day in uniform,” threatened the retired general with death. (75)
For himself, Miko Peled admits he has a “big mouth.” (93)
Immediately following the Six-Day War, Israel built settlements in the Sinai, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and Gaza. “The reasons . . . from Messianic to security - related to the fact that it was a profitable enterprise for many businesses.” (106)
Miko Peled followed his father’s “more liberal views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.” Distance developed between him and his Israeli and Jewish friends. He found that most Israelis were becoming “chauvinistic and constantly shifting to the right.” (132)
“American Jews, for the most part, wanted to believe that Israel was good and the Arabs were bad.” (132)
Contrary to President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s criticism of PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat's condemnation of the latter as not wanting peace and that Barak compromised more than Arafat, Miko Peled writes, “For the sake of peace, he [Arafat] was willing to give up the dream of all Palestinians to return to their homes and their land in Palestine. . . . He was ready to establish an independent Palestinian state in the West West Bank and Gaza - which make up only 22 percent of the Palestinian homeland - with Arab East Jerusalem as its capital.” (134)
Miko Peled cites Israeli journalist Raviv Duiker’s writing in his book, Harakiri: Ehud Barak - the Failure, “It was clear that what the Israelis had demanded at Camp David was tantamount to total Palestinian surrender.” (134)
Miko Peled learned the Palestinian point of view of the 1948 war. For Miko Peled, this would be the world upside down. He was told, “The Palestinians had barely 10,000 fighters, but the Haganah and the other Jewish militias combined were triple that number if not more. So when the Jews attacked, the Palestinians never had a chance. That was the most outrageous version of history I had ever heard: that the fighting forces of the Jewish militias in 1948 were superior to the Arabs and that the Jews attacked.” (140)
Miko’s political science brother confirmed this version of events. Prof. Yoav Peled of Tel Aviv University recommended books by Benny Morris, Ilan Pappe, and Avi Shalom.” They are the “New Historians” rewriting “the history of the establishment of Israel.” (141)
Miko Peled dismisses the ‘lad swap’ solution as insane. Why would Palestinians give up family land for something in the Negev? (164)
Describing Gaza, Miko Peled describes a literal rate of 90%. (180) “During the days of the Roman Empire, Gaza was a center of learning and culture.” (180)
While living in Japan, Miko Peled met Israeli tourists. An Israeli naval officer bragged about forcing Gaza fishermen off their boats and then blowing those boats up. Then, they forced the fishermen to count from one to one hundred while treading water, and when they were done, they started over again. They did this until the fishermen drowned. This was done to “teach the Arabs who was boss.” (182)
Israel continually confiscated “valuable agricultural land and gave it to settlements. The settlers denied Palestinian access to water. Access to roads is denied to Palestinians so that commutes are ridiculously long.” (205-206)
The Israelis describe areas as war zones. However, Miko writes, “A war means two armies engaged in battle engaged in battle. Is there another army present? Do they have tanks and warplanes? Are they well-armed? Surely you aren’t referring to the boys throwing rocks as an army?” Miko blamed this on the presence of the Israeli military. (206)
“The overwhelming force of the Israeli army can make anyone feel hopeless. And the fact that the world does little for Palestinians can lead to a sense of helplessness.” (223)
“The settlements and the facts on the ground had succeeded in erasing the West Bank as a viable area in which a Palestinian state could be established.” (244)
Although Arab Jews brought a rich culture to Israel, they viewed them as inferior. They “were forced to give up their identity and their culture for fear of being viewed as Arabs.” (248)
“The world Arab is frequently attached to adjectives such as filthy, or is synonymous with stupid, useless, or lazy.” (248)
“Israel has systematically delegitimized any Palestinian leader who was unwilling to accept Israel’s right to total domination of the land and the discourse. This is the primary reason why so many Palestinian leaders have been imprisoned, exiled, or assassinated, and it is the reason Yasser Arafat spent his final days surrounded by Israeli tanks: refusal to accept Israeli superiority and the exclusivity of the Israeli narrative.” (250-251)
“Israel created an entire bureaucracy with the sole purpose of making the lives of Palestinians unlivable so that they will ultimately have no choice but to leave.” (251)
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