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Writer's picturerichard lightner

More from 100 Years of Palestinian history

The Balfour Declaration - describes the period from 1917 to 1939 as the first declaration of war. Before World War I “many prescient Palestinians had begun to regard the Zionist movement as a threat, the Balfour Declaration introduced a new and fearsome element.” (24)

Lord Balfour referred to the Arabs “as the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.” (24)

Zionists such as Chaim Weizmann secured the support of the British during world War I. (24)

Once the British occupied Palestine they would not allow the population to be informed of the Balfour Declaration. Soldiers traveling through Syria or Egypt found out and protested to the British Foreign Office. They were horrified that their home would become a home for European Jews. (26)

Yusuf Diya al-Khalidi understood this danger more than most of the Palestinian population. Believed that the Jews would expel the Arabs. (26)

There were two newspapers which criticized the alliance between the British and the Zionists. “And the danger that it posed to the Arab majority in Palestine.” (28)

A new rail line built in 1929 favored the Jewish settlers and the Palestinians were ignored. Some wrote of the complacency of the Palestinians in the face of this threat. (29)

Palestinians organized and had “a series of seven Palestine Arab congresses which demanded Palestinian independence, “rejection of the Balfour Declaration, support for majority rule, and ending unlimited Jewish immigration and land purchases.” The British dismissed them. (31)


After the Nakba the Palestinians were devastated. 80% of the Palestinians were “forced from their homes and lost their lands and property.” The origins of this disaster can be traced to their defeat in the rear Revolt of 1939.” It did not help that their were internecine conflict among the Palestinians. (58)

Palestinian experience in World War II was fragmented unlike the Jews who served in cohesive units. (59)

President Truman made Israel a part of “the emerging American hegemony in the Middle East. (60)

The Palestinains did not have an established state, effective relationships with other Arab countries and “this proved to be a fatal weakness militarily, financially, and diplomatically.” (62)

“By contrast, the Zionist movement applied a highly developed understanding of global politics.” (70)

From November 1947 to May 15, 1945 the Zionist paramilitary defeated the Arab resistance which was “poorly armed and organized Palestinians and the Arab volunteers who had come to help them.” (72)

“Plan Dalet involved the conquest and depopulation in April and the first half of May of the two largest Arab urban centers, Jaffa and Haifa, and of the Arab neighborhoods of West Jerusalem, as well as of scores of Arab cities, towns, and villages, including Tiberias on April 18, Haifa on April 23, Safad on May 10, and Beisan on May 11. Thus, the ethnic cleansing of Palestine began well before the state of Israel was proclaimed on May 15, 1948.” (72)

Although Jaffa was supposed to be part of the Palestinian Arab state no one challenged Israel’s conquest. Israel argued that this was a spoil of war. (72-73)

As the Jewish forces massacred Palestinians, Dayr Yasin, most notable, “people fled.” Before May 15, 1948, Israel’s date of independence, saw the “expulsion and panicked departure of about 300,000 Palestinians  overall and the devastation of many of the ARab majority’s key urban economic, political, civic, and cultural centers.” (74) None of these refugees would be allowed to return under Israeli law. More Palestinians have been forced out since 1948 so the Nakba is “an ongoing process.” (75)

The Nakba is one of the most significant events in Palestinian history. For over a thousand years there had been an Arab majority; after the Nakba Palestine, or Israel, became a Jewish majority. (75)

The experienced and British led Arab Legion of Jordan “succeeded in keeping Israel from conquering the West Bank and Was Jerusalem.” (77)

One of the Zionist lies is that Israel was outnumbered and outgunned in 1948. The opposite is true. The British would not allow the Arab Legion to attack areas assigned by the UN to the Jews. (77)

The State Department, the Pentagon, and the CIA opposed the Truman Administration’s support for Zionism. However, this would quickly change. (79)

The 160,000 Arabs who remained in Israel were viewed “as a potential fifth column. Until 1966, most Palestinians lived under strict martial law and much of their land was seized (along with that of those who had been forced from the country and were now refugees). (82)

The Palestinians, formerly the majority in their own country, bow found themselves “a despised minority” ruled by outsiders. (82)

King Abdullah of Jordan annexed the West Bank after the 1948 War and gave the Palestinians their Jordanian citizenship. This refutes the Israeli claim that the Arab countries refused to allow the refugees to enter their countries. (84)

The Arabs were not happy with King “Abdullah’s fealty to the hated British colonial masters, his opposition to Palestinian independence, and his widely rumored contacts with the Zionists.” (84)

The 1948 defeat of the Arab armies at the hand of Israel caused political turmoil in the nearby Arab nations as well as great fear of Israel’s military. The latter also because the Israelis conducted military reprisals against Arab villages for refugee attacks or they trying to return to their homes. The United Nations reports of these attacks differed from the Israelis view as well as the view in the American press. (87)

An attempt to establish a Palestinian government in exile or in Gaza failed because of lack of support from the Arab countries. (87) This would see the last of the participation of “the Palestinian old guard” in politics. Few Palestinian organizations survived the Nakba. (88)

Most Arab nations “hindered” Palestinian resistance to the Israelis, King Abdullah foremost. One reason, any attacks on Israel by guerrilla forces would result in severe retaliation from Israel. As a result Fatah formed in 1959. (89)

Egypt became a leader in the Arab world with the revolution of 1952. Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt’s president, “sought to avoid in particular to avoid providing Israel.” Years later Yasser Arafat and other Fatah leaders spoke of Egyptian intelligence arresting, torturing, and harassing Palestinians trying to fight Israel. (90)

Israel’s inflicted massive and disproportionate casualties particularly against the Gaza Strip for Palestinian attacks. The West Bank also suffered from Unit 101 commanded by Ariel Sharon who in 1953 “blew up forty-five homes with their inhabitants inside, killing sixty-nine Palestinian civilians.” This in response to a Palestinian attack that killed three Israelis. Jordan did as Egypt by imprisoning and even killing possible Palestinian “infiltrators”. (91)

Ben-Gurion ordered the attacks to force the Arabs to recognize Israel. Interesting Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett believed this counterproductive. Nevertheless, both did not want to allow the “return of Palestinian refugees to their homes.” (91)

Seemingly related, Ben-Gurion proposed a full scale attack on Egypt in 1955. The attack would take place in 1956. (91)

Major military leaders throughout Israel’s history implemented Ben-Gurion’s aggressive policies. These generals were Moshe Dayan, Yitzhak Rabin, and Ariel Sharon. Nothing has changed throughout Israel’s history. (91-92)

Before attacking Egypt in 1956 the Israelis attacked Egyptian police stations and villages killing many Egyptian soldiers and civilians, including Palestinian. This caused the Egyptians to try to build up their military. First, they purchased from the West which refused so they agreed to buy weapons from Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, the Egyptians began helping the Palestinians in their attacks on Israel which most Arab governments did not like. Thus, Israel launched the “Suez War of October 1956.” (91-92)

Israel swept through Gaza killing more than 450 people, “most of them summarily executed.” (93) No one in Israel or America heard of this. (94)

The tensions building before the Six Day War of 1967 caused many American Jews to fear for the Jewish state as Arab leaders shouted what turned out to be empty threats. (96) President Johnson did not believe Israel was in danger as the Pentagon assessed that Israel would win in just a few days. Besides, the Arabs were not ready to attack. And,“Israel’s military was far superior to the militaries of all the Arab Staes combined. . . . Yet, the myth prevails: in 1967, a tiny, vulnerable country faced constant, existential peril, and it continues to do so.” (97) 

Rashid Khalidi addresses causes of the Six Day War. One was the increase in Palestinian commando attacks on Israel. Two, “the Israeli government had recently begun to divert the waters of the Jordan River to the center of the country despite great Arab popular dishes and even greater impotence on the part of the Arab regimes.” (97)

Egypt was fighting in the Yemeni civil war and so had limited soldiers for its own defense. They didn’t help the situation by moving more of their soldiers in to the Sinai Peninsula. Egypt also wanted to aid the Syrians who sponsored Palestinian attacks from their territory. This gave the Israelis the opportunity to attack in self defense. (98)

The Arabs felt tricked by the Americans who claimed they would restrain the Israelis. However, it became known that the Johnson administrations had given the Israelis the “go-ahead for its surprise attack.” (104)

The Americans allowed the Israelis to keep the conquered territory and the United Nations Resolution 242 was ambiguous on the subject. As a result the Israelis have colonized the West Bank and controlled Gaza and the Golan Heights. Again, the Palestinians were never consulted; “instead it contains a bland reference to a just solution of the refugee problem.” (105-106)

This meant that the issue was the Arab refusal to recognize Israel. (106)

In 1969 Israeli Prime Minister claimed that “there were no such thing as Palestinians . . . they did not exits.” However, another writer pointed out that she held Palestinian identity papers while living in Palestine under the British. Khalidi argues that “she thereby took the negation characteristic of a settler-colonial project to the highest possible level: the indigenous people were nothing but a lie.” (106)

“1967 marked an extraordinary resurgence of Palestinian national consciousness and resistance to Israel’s negation of Palestinian identity, a negation made possible by the complicity of much of the world community. In the words of one seasoned observer: A central paradox of 1967 is that by defeating the Arabs, Israel resurrected the Palestinians.” (108)

“Fatah was founded in Kuwait in 1959 by a group of Palestinian engineers, teachers, and other professionals, headed by Yasser Arafat.” (114)

Fatah launched its first attack against Israel by sabotaging a “water pumping station in central Israel.” However, the Egyptians worried that this would provoke Israel. In addition, with this attack “Fatah deliberately tried to show up the Arab states for their lack of true commitment to Palestine. Fatah’s appeal to the Arab population led to “early success of the Palestinian resistance groups.” (115) In the end however, these attacks contributed to Israel attacking Egypt in June 1967. Western countries had the image of tiny Israel against large, hostile Arab nations. The Arabs believed that Israel, especially with nuclear weapons, was incredibly powerful. (116)


The Arabs nations created the Palestine Liberation Organization after the Six-Day War in order to counter Palestinian independent actions. However, “militant resistance groups took over the PLO.” (116)


“Hardline Zionists” believed that Israel replaced Palestine. Mere mention of Palestine or Palestinians “constituted a moral threat to Israel.” Zionists associated Palestinians with terrorism and hatred” in their world wide public relations campaign. (117)


Evidence supporting Miko Peled’s recent arguments that Israel is not an invincible force, Khalidi recounts a March 1968 Israeli attack in Jordan against Palestinian soldiers. This was less than a year after the Israeli victory of 1967. However, the Jordanian army and the PLO forced the Israelis to withdraw. (118)


Overall however, the PLO failed to develop “a successful guerrilla strategy that might have countered the superiority of Israel’s conventional forces or the limitations of being based in Arab countries vulnerable to Israeli military pressure.” (119)

In the 1970s the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked commercial aircraft. In addition, Palestinian arrogance in Jordan led King Hussein to use military force to push them out. (121)


Israel attacked Palestinians in Syria and Lebanon. (121)


The Camp David peace process of 1979 between Israel and Egypt froze out the Palestinians just as Begin designed it to do. It also allowed “unimpeded colonization of the Occupied Territories occupied in 1967, and put the Palestine issue on hold.” (135)

Israeli Likud prime ministers, Menachem Begin, Yitzhak Shamir, Ariel Sharon, and Benjamin Netanyahu “were implacably opposed to Palestinian statehood. . . . Ideological heirs of Ze’ev Jabotinsky, they believed that the entirety of Palestine belonged solely to the Jewish people, and that a Palestinian people, with national rights did not exist.” (136)

More attacks on the PLO occurred. In 1982 the U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig signed off on “Ariel Sharon’s plans for Israel to finish off the organization and with it Palestinian nationalism.” (137)

Currently, New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman does not have a good record of accurate analysis of world affairs. However, in 1982, Village Voice columnist Alexander Cockburn quoted Friedman as telling his editors, “You are afraid to tell our readers and those who might complain to you that the Israelis are capable of indiscriminately shelling an entire city.” (139)

Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon had much more destruction than before. Ariel Sharon did not inform the Israeli leadership of “his real goals and his operational plans.” Defeating the Palestinians in Lebanon would, he believed, destroy Palestinian nationalism. (142)

The New York Times did not print Thomas Friedman’s descriptive of “the Israeli bombardment as indiscriminate.” (147)

The Israelis used car bombs to terrorize and kill civilians, including rescuers of previous Israeli bombings. One Mossad officer described this as “killing for killing’s sake.” (149)

The United States supported Israel’s core war aim: the defeat of the PLO and its expulsion from Beirut.” (149)

“Begin and Sharon, had early on convinced President Reagan and his administration that the PLO was a terrorist group aligned with the evil Soviet empire and that its elimination would be a service to both the United States and Israel.” (149)

Khalidi fiercely criticizes “the capitulation of the leading Arab regimes to American pressure.” (150)

Israel’s invasion of Lebanon could not have occurred without U.S. consent. (151)

The people of Lebanon resented “the PLO’s heavy handed and often arrogant behavior . . . eroded popular support for the Palestine cause in general and especially for the Palestinian presence in Lebanon.” In one instance a senior PLO official killed a Lebanese couple he felt disrespected him. (151)

PLO attacks on Israeli civilians also damaged their cause. (152)

The Israelis pressured the Reagan administration to ignore concerns for civilians and block international rules to protect them. (154)

American diplomat Ryan Crocker witnessed Israel’s complicity in the Christian Lebanese forces slaughter of refugees in the Sabra and Shatila camps. (158)

Israeli documents released in 2012 demonstrate Sharon’s planning to have the refugees murdered. American diplomats were outmaneuvered by the Israelis. (159)

The 1967 Six Day War the U.S. gave the go ahead for Israel to attack. (161)

As for the Lebanon War “Sharon told Haig exactly what he was about to do in great detail.” The U.S. supplied the weapons. (161) The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon “produced the first significant and sustained negative American and European perception of Israel since 1948.” (164)


Rather than destroying the PLO the invasion relocated them inside Palestine. (165)


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Different Points of View over the future of Atomic weapons.

 

    During the Afghan War, President Donald Trump (GAG!) authorized a General to use the Mother of all Bombs, a bomb just shy of the power of an atomic bomb, on his own. Notice that this had no positive affect for the US in the outcome of the war. (https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/13/world/asia/moab-mother-of-all-bombs-afghanistan.html)

 

    There is a plethora of information about the development and use of the atomic bomb during World War II. Much of the world was astounded that the US used such a bomb on civilians. Others said, drop more.

 

    The atomic bombing of Hiroshima on August 9, 1945, “served as the symbolic coronation of American global power.” Nevertheless, the use of the atomic bomb in World War II brought international condemnation.    At the Tokyo War Crimes Trials of 1946-1948, Justice Pal of India cited the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as war crimes. U.S. President Harry S. Truman responded by publicly saying that the atomic bombs were dropped “in order to shorten the agony of war, in order to save the lives of thousands of young Americans.” However, President Truman in correspondence with John Foster Dulles that his reasons for dropping the atomic bombs were the attack on Pearl Harbor and the murder of our prisoners of war. “The only language they seem to understand is the one we have been using to bombard them.” (Martin Sherwin. “Hiroshima and Modern Memory.” The Nation. October 10, 1981)

 

    “In the summer and fall of 1945, US atomic policy left us troubled and perplexed. Roosevelt, we thought, had been committed to a policy of international understanding and conciliation. . . . Truman’s policy, however, appeared to have the opposite aim: to keep a monopoly of the atomic bomb in U.S. and British hands, and to use it as a strong trump card in tough political bargaining with the Soviet Union.” (Sherwin, Martin. A World Destroyed: the Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance. 1975. xi)

 

    And, well before the bombings FDR and Churchill “rejected steps that might have led to the international control of atomic energy.” (Martin Sherwin. “Hiroshima and Modern Memory.” The Nation. October 10, 1981)

 

    According to nuclear physicist Hans Bethe who worked on the Manhattan Project, “Many of us had been influenced directly or indirectly by Niels Bohr, the great Danish physicist. He argued that only international control of nuclear weapons could save the world from a nuclear arms race, and that such a race would imperil, not enhance the security of the United States and Great Britain. Many other scientists, especially at the University of Chicago Metallurgic Laboratory, at the initiative of Leo Szilard, had come independently to the same conclusion. 

 

    Martin Sherwin, George Mason University History professor who specialized in the history of nuclear weapons, wrote that, this interpretation by physicists and historian is wrong. Roosevelt decided, with Churchill, “that the bomb should remain and Anglo-American monopoly.” (Sherwin, Martin. A World Destroyed: the Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance. 1975. xii) 

    However, this is not mentioned in Hiroshima in America: fifty years of denial, by Robert Jay Lifton and Gregg Mitchell.

 

KOREA

    There are numerous arguments about whether or not the atomic bomb should have been used in Korea, Vietnam, or other existential circumstances.

    In late 1950, following their invasion of Korea, Chinese forces surrounded U.S. Marines. “Distraught himself, the chief executive (Truman), told a press conference on November 30 that nuclear bombsight be used against the enemy and seemed to indicate that the decision would be MacArthur’s.” (William Manchester. American Caesar. 608, 610; Bruce Cumings. The Korean War: a History. 2010. p. 30)

 

    The U.S. developed the ability fire an “atomic shot from a cannon.” (Bruce Cumings. The Korean War: a History. 2010. p. 34)

    

    “In mid-May Ike (President Dwight Eisenhower) told the [American] National Security Council that using nukes in Korea would be cheaper than conventional weaponry, and a few days later the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended launching nuclear attacks against China.” (Bruce Cumings. The Korean War: a History. 2010. p. 34)

    This is interesting since Eisenhower’s reaction to Hiroshima was, we didn’t have to use that awful thing on them. (Lifton, Robert Jay and Mitchell, Greg. Hiroshima in America: fifty years of denial. 1995. 213)

 

    Operation Hudson Harbor - flying lone B-29 bombers over North Korea to simulate a dropping of an atomic bomb. North Korean leaders must have had “steel nerves” as this simulation was eerily similar to the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Operation Hudson Harbor concluded that the use of atomic weapons would not be “useful” as it was difficult to identify “large masses of enemy troops.” (Bruce Cumings. The Korean War: a History. 2010. p. 157-159)

 

    The United Nations/United States forces faced defeat in Korea but Truman looked strong because he “threatened to use the atom bomb against China.” However, this “made peace talks virtually impossible.” (Stone, I.F. The Hidden History of the Korean War. 213)

    Major General Emmett (“Rosy”) O’Donnell, commander of the Far East Air Force’s Bomber Command . . . [stated that] “We have never been permitted to bomb what are the real strategic targets, the enemy’s real sources of supply.” He said that the strategic bombing commanded been “designed to deliver the atomic offensive to the heart of the enemy” and indicated very clearly that he thought the bomb should have been used against the Chinese.”” (Stone, I.F. The Hidden History of the Korean War. 245)

 

RICHARD NIXON

    Richard Barnet, former State Department aide, activist and scholar, who founded the Institute for Policy Studies (Wikipedia) warned “of the danger that the United States government might resort to the use of nuclear weapons. Barnet then cites Vice President Richard Nixon speaking to the Executive Club of Chicago on March 17, 1955 as saying, 

    “The weapons which were used during the Korean War and World War II are obsolete. Our artillery and our tactical Air Force in the Pacific are now equipped with atomic explosives which can and will be used on military targets with precision and effectiveness.

    “It is foolish to talk about the possibility that the weapons which might be used in the event war breaks out in the Pacific would be limited to the conventional Korean and World War II types of explosives. Our forces could not fight an effective war in the Pacific with those types of explosives if they wanted to. Tactical atomic explosives are now conventional and will be used against the military targets of any aggressive force.”  

    Of course, we are not aggressors by threatening China or invading Vietnam.

 

VIET NAM

    1964 American Republican Presidential candidate Senator Goldwater of Arizona was a reserve Air Force General and “suggested that the United States could isolate the Vietcong in South Vietnam any bombing the supply routes connecting China and North Vietnam.” He also proposed using nuclear weapons “to clear the jungles where the Vietcong were presumably hiding. The public reaction to those notions was one of horrified alarm.” (Thomas Powers, The War at Home. 2) It turns out that the United States bombed Southeast Asia the equivalent of many atomic bombs through out the war. 

    “Although Goldwater was finally persuaded to stop talking about nuclear weapons.”

    Although Goldwater’s advocacy of atomic weapons scared people his idea to win the war did not. Johnson portrayed himself as “responsible” as opposed to Goldwater who he implied would get us all killed. (Thomas Powers, The War at Home. 9)

    Noted military writer Hanson Baldwin believed that the US should use its overwhelming technological power to counter communism even if that meant nuclear weapons. Of course, only for “defensive purposes.” “If we cannot do this, he says, we had better “call it quits.” (Noam Chomsky, At War with Asia. 52)

 

    General Curtis LeMay advocated the use of nuclear weapons to end the conflict with communism once and for all. “We ought to nuke the chinks. . . . We are swatting flies when we should be going after the manure pile.” (Thomas Powers. The War at Home. 40; Rowland Evans and Robert Novak. Lyndon B. Johnson: the Exercise of Power. 538)

 

    So, there is pretty much agreement that the use of the atom bomb was on the table. The horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki completely ignored.

 

    In 1954 the United States “assuming the Chinese Communists intervene would engage in a “highly selective atomic offensive.” (Pentagon Papers. New York Times. 1971. 46) However, if the “Chinese Communists do not intervene” then the use of atomic weapons would occur if it would aid the US in the war. (Pentagon Papers. New York Times. 1971. 47)

    McNaughton drafted a “Proposed Course of Action” to McNamara. In his long list of actions McNaughton noted risks. One was the “escalation to the use of nuclear weapons.” (Pentagon Papers. New York Times. 1971. 442-445, passim)

    Presidential assistant for national security, Walt. W. Rostow, wrote a memorandum on May 6, 1967, analyzing U.S. bombing strategy in Viet Nam. One of his conclusions was “we do not want a nuclear confrontation over Viet Nam.” (Pentagon Papers. New York Times. 1971. 585, 588)

Atomic Bomb

Viet Nam War
 

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