The following is an essay about issues involved in the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941
The Rise of Japanese Militarism and Fascism in the 1930s
By the 1930s, Japan experienced a dramatic shift in its political landscape as democracy gave way to fascist and ultranationalist ideologies. Many Japanese leaders viewed fascism as a promising alternative to Western democratic models, particularly as they sought to counter Western dominance in Asia. This period marked the emergence of an aggressive imperial expansion policy backed by a growing military influence that would reshape Japanese society and foreign relations.
However, this shift towards militarism was not without opposition. In 1931, the Japanese secret police arrested over 30,000 leftists, indicating significant resistance to the prevailing militaristic ideology. Nevertheless, the period saw the proliferation of military literature and the emergence of what historians describe as a "culture of fascism" that shaped Japan's politics, culture, and foreign affairs. The decline of party politics and the rise of military governance marked this transformation, accompanied by political assassinations at home and the army adventurism abroad.
The Manchurian Incident of 1931 proved to be a pivotal moment in Japan's militaristic transformation. Middle-grade officers orchestrated an explosion along the Japanese-owned Manchurian Railway, using this manufactured crisis as justification to seize control of Manchuria and establish the puppet state of Manchukuo. This territorial expansion served as a springboard for further Japanese incursions into Inner Mongolia and North China. Ishiwara Kanji, the architect of the Manchurian Incident, along with other young officers, actively anticipated and hoped for an eventual "final war" with the United States, reflecting the growing militant mindset among the military leadership.
The military's influence deeply permeated Japanese society, becoming one of the nation's largest employers and effectively integrating military institutions into civilian life. This integration helped maintain popular support for military initiatives, even as the war with China, which began in 1937, imposed significant hardships on the civilian population. Despite the disappearance of everyday luxuries like caramels, the Japanese public largely accepted these sacrifices as necessary for the state's welfare, demonstrating the effectiveness of government propaganda in maintaining social cohesion.
The culmination of this militaristic trajectory was perhaps most starkly illustrated by the outbreak of war with China in 1937, which was marked by atrocities such as the Nanking Massacre. This event demonstrated the extent to which military aggression had become normalized within Japanese strategic thinking and operational conduct, representing a dramatic departure from earlier periods of Japanese modernization and international engagement.
The consequences of the war for Japanese society were severe. Food scarcity intensified, with rice rationing implemented even before Pearl Harbor. Public health deteriorated with rising tuberculosis rates. The state's control over daily life tightened, with citizens reporting "defeatist behavior" to secret police. While some Japanese citizens grew resentful of military-imposed austerity and restrictions, they were urged to overcome their longing for prewar freedoms by embracing the "Japanese spirit.”
Emperor Hirohito expressed growing concern about military insubordination and unauthorized acts of war in September 1935. These fears were justified when Major General Nagata was assassinated by a young officer claiming to oppose the "control clique." The Justice Minister warned that officers hiding behind emperor worship while suppressing democracy was causing severe social anxiety.
The political situation in Japan continued to deteriorate as the Imperial Way faction claimed to be the faithful interpreters of the emperor's will. The emperor declared martial law when they attacked the Grand Chamberlain, whose wife had been Emperor Hirohito's nanny, effectively pitting army factions against each other in Tokyo. Hirohito, refusing to negotiate with rebels he accused of "trying to put a silk noose around my neck," authorized force against them. The rebel leaders were subsequently executed.
The situation in Manchuria proved increasingly complex. Ironically, the architect of the 1931 Manchurian Incident warned that Japan lacked the resources for an expanded conflict that would drag the country into "an unwinnable war on the Asian mainland." Nevertheless, military leadership determined that Japan "needed Manchukuo, which meant Japan needed China pacified."
The 1937 Marco Polo Bridge Incident, a shooting conflict between Japanese and Chinese forces, provided the pretext for escalation. Japan deployed 20,000 troops and air forces, and the fighting spread to Shanghai. Though Emperor Hirohito supported the China war, Japanese expectations of quick victory proved unfounded as Chiang Kai-shek mounted strong resistance.
By 1939, the war's economic impact led to shopping restrictions in Japan. In 1940, Saito, a conservative politician generally supportive of expansion into Korea and Manchuria, made a remarkable speech in the Diet questioning the purpose of 100,000 Japanese deaths and the economic strain of continued war. His criticism of inconsistent China policies and questioning economic austerity led to heckling and expulsion from the Diet.
Internal power struggles continued as the Army insisted on Lt. Gen. Tojo Hideki's appointment as Army Minister against the Emperor's wishes. Distressed by this and other appointments, Hirohito noted the Army had "sullied our nation's history."
A 1940 war game revealed Japan's dependence on U.S. trade, but Matsuoka mocked American power despite warnings about resource disparities. He argued that a German alliance would reduce the chance of war with America, causing tension in the Navy Minister, who suffered a nervous breakdown.
The path to war was significantly influenced by American economic pressure. In January 1940, the United States halted sales of aviation fuel and scrap metal to Japan, directly threatening Japan's military capabilities. This created a strategic dilemma: Japan could withdraw from China or seek resources in Southeast Asia. Given that control over China was essential to Japan's survival, Japanese leadership felt compelled to choose the latter option.
By November 1941, Japan's military planners had developed their strategy for Pearl Harbor, driven by a belief that a demonstration of the "Japanese spirit" would force the "decadent materialistic Americans" to acquiesce to Japanese demands. This ideological conviction, however, proved catastrophically misguided.
Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku warned that Japan lacked the resources to conquer the Dutch East Indies without provoking British and American intervention. When the U.S. froze Japanese assets in July 1941, Japan felt it had "little choice" but to go to war. Withdrawing from China was considered "political suicide."
In the months leading up to Pearl Harbor, Emperor Hirohito was deeply involved in Japan's military planning process. However, his leadership style often enabled him to maintain plausible deniability for critical decisions. The emperor's approach to military oversight created a complex dynamic that would ultimately contribute to Japan's eventual defeat in World War II.
By early November 1941, Hirohito actively participated in high-level military discussions, as evidenced by his attendance at the Conference of Military Councillors meeting on November 3rd. This engagement deepened throughout the month, with Hirohito receiving detailed information about the Pearl Harbor attack on November 8th and reviewing the complete war plan by November 15th. However, these plans revealed a critical strategic weakness: while they outlined an initial offensive in the South Pacific to establish economic self-sufficiency, they lacked any concrete long-term strategy for sustaining a protracted war.
The Pearl Harbor plan emerged, with Yamamoto famously predicting six months before the American counterattack. He believed Japan needed to invade the mainland U.S. and "dictate the terms of peace in the White House," though the media omitted this crucial detail.
Emperor Hirohito remained skeptical, challenging army predictions about quick victories by reminding them of similar failed promises about China. The U.S. Ambassador warned that the embargo would turn Japan into "an engine of war." General Tojo became Prime Minister in November 1941 while both navies had spent decades preparing for conflict. Despite opposing war with America, Yamamoto continued planning the Pearl Harbor attack, influenced by British success against Italy at Taranto.
Admiral Yamamoto's strategic approach to conflict with the United States underwent a significant transformation between 1940 and 1941. Initially, he advocated for a defensive strategy focused on securing the Philippines while allowing American forces to exhaust themselves from attacking Japanese positions. However, by 1940, his thinking had evolved dramatically toward a more aggressive posture, culminating in the development of a bold carrier-based strike force plan aimed at delivering a devastating aerial attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. This ambitious strategy included contingencies for engaging American vessels that might have been absent during the initial assault.
The decision-making process leading to war revealed deep divisions within Japan's leadership, as illuminated by Prince Konoe's post-war revelations. According to Konoe, the path to war was marked by a series of actions taken by militarists without proper government oversight or approval. He claimed that the military had initiated the Peking Incident without government knowledge and that war with China might have been avoided had the militarists not acted unilaterally. More significantly, Konoe asserted that war with America was not inevitable, suggesting that he could have prevented it if the militarists had not interfered with his diplomatic initiatives.
The breakdown of proposed diplomatic solutions highlighted the power struggle between civilian and military leadership. Konoe revealed that the military, particularly under Tojo's influence, had deliberately undermined a potential meeting between Konoe and President Roosevelt in the summer of 1941. This diplomatic failure proved crucial, as most of the cabinet had favored accepting American terms for withdrawing from China. However, Tojo, backed by military leadership, strongly opposed these concessions, leaving Konoe with no choice but to withdraw from his position.
Perhaps most telling was Konoe's assertion that neither he nor the Japanese people were aware of the Pearl Harbor attack plans, suggesting a dangerous disconnect between military planning and civilian oversight. This revelation underscores the extent to which military leaders had assumed control over Japan's strategic decision-making, bypassing normal governmental processes and civilian input. The situation revealed a fundamental breakdown in Japan's political system, where military leaders could effectively override civilian authority and pursue their own aggressive agenda, even when it ran counter to the wishes of significant portions of the government and population.
The planning of the Pearl Harbor attack unfolded amid severe complications and time pressures that revealed deeper systemic issues within Japan's military and political leadership. Officers tasked with developing the attack plans struggled under tight time constraints, creating a cascade of problems throughout the military hierarchy as junior officers became overwhelmed with various planning aspects. This pressure was further complicated by the requirement to keep Emperor Hirohito informed - a process that, according to one Army General Staff member, paradoxically contributed to Japan's ultimate defeat. Hirohito's characteristic response to military actions - "as the matter has gone this far, it can't be helped" - exemplified a leadership style that allowed crucial military decisions to advance without clear accountability at the highest levels.
At the center of this unfolding crisis was Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who occupied a unique position in Japanese military history. Having spent time in the United States during the 1920s, Yamamoto clearly understood America's vast industrial capabilities, leading him to conclude that Japan could not win a prolonged conflict with the United States. As Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet from 1939, he balanced strategic preparation with hope for diplomatic solutions. His January 1941 statement about defeating America revealed his strategic realism - he argued that victory would require invading the American West Coast and fighting across the continent to "dictate the terms of peace in the White House." However, Japanese militarists manipulated this statement, truncating it to suggest a more optimistic scenario of simply dictating peace terms in Washington.
By the summer of 1941, Japanese-American relations had reached a critical deadlock centered on fundamental conflicts over China and Japan's alignment with the Axis powers. Japan demanded that the United States cease its support of China, while America insisted on Japanese withdrawal from Chinese territory. Both nations engaged in dangerous diplomatic brinkmanship, believing the other would eventually yield. This mutual miscalculation had devastating consequences when, in September 1941, Japanese officials determined that if no agreement could be reached regarding oil shipments by October, they would pursue war with the United States. This resolve was symbolized by General Tojo's appointment as prime minister and the setting of December 1 for mobilization.
The Japanese military leadership's decision to risk war was influenced by two primary factors: fear of domestic instability if they withdrew from China and strategic calculations about the global military situation. Their war plan centered on a decisive strike against the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, coupled with eliminating American forces in the Philippines. This strategy assumed German victory in Europe would allow Japan to consolidate its gains while the United States remained divided in its military response.
Within Japan, divergent views existed on addressing the crisis. Prince Konoe attempted to persuade the militarist faction to move closer to the American position, but these efforts proved futile as hardliners remained intransigent and dismissed potential consequences. While some Japanese leaders advocated for compromise, their voices were ultimately overshadowed by the military leadership's hardline position. By December 1940, even Yamamoto's private communications revealed his growing concerns about the Japanese government's direction, expressing to a fellow officer his view that the administration was in "complete confusion.”
The Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor resulted from an intricate interplay of economic pressures, strategic military planning, and domestic political considerations. Japan's critical resource constraints lay at the heart of this decision, particularly its dependence on foreign oil supplies. Japanese naval planners had calculated that the nation would exhaust its vital supplies without securing additional resources within just two years. This stark assessment created an atmosphere of urgency that would ultimately drive Japan toward its fateful decision.
The deteriorating relationship between Japan and the United States was crucial in this period. Japan's aggressive expansion in East and Southeast Asia prompted the United States to impose economic sanctions, further constraining Japan's access to essential war resources. This economic pressure intensified the existing tensions between the two nations. By October 1941, the diplomatic impasse had reached a critical point: the United States refused to recognize Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, while Japan viewed any American presence in Asia as a threat to its economic and security interests.
The Japanese leadership's perspective on this conflict was deeply rooted in their view of national survival. The President of Japan's Privy Council expressed a widespread belief among Japanese leaders that the United States sought to undermine Japan's modernization achievements and the legacies of the Meiji period. This perception evolved into a conviction that Japan's very existence as a modern nation was under threat, pushing the country's leadership toward more desperate measures.
In response to these perceived threats, Japan aligned itself with the Axis powers, viewing this alliance as a defensive measure against American influence. Japanese strategists believed that this alignment would deter U.S. intervention as Japan pursued its territorial ambitions in Southeast Asia, particularly its quest for oil resources. However, this calculation and others made during this period would ultimately prove catastrophically wrong, leading Japan into a devastating conflict with the United States.
The Pearl Harbor Attack: Tactical Success and Strategic Failure
On December 7, 1941, Japan launched its surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, employing tactics reminiscent of its 1904 strategy against Russia. While the attack achieved near-complete tactical surprise, unlike the earlier assault on Port Arthur, where Russians had substantial warning, this immediate success masked profound strategic miscalculations and internal disagreements within Japanese leadership about the wisdom of confronting the United States.
The attack's execution starkly contrasted military proficiency and diplomatic incompetence. Although Japanese military planners insisted on maintaining the element of surprise, they conceded to the Foreign Ministry's request to deliver a declaration of war before the attack. This attempt at diplomatic protocol failed spectacularly when technical difficulties delayed the message's delivery, resulting in the Japanese diplomats presenting their declaration to Secretary of State Hull more than an hour after the attack had begun. Adding to the diplomatic embarrassment, U.S. intelligence had already decoded the Japanese message before the Japanese embassy in Washington could do so.
Within Japan's leadership, significant voices urged caution. Japanese envoys to Washington, Nomura and Kurusu, actively advocated for avoiding war. Even Admiral Yamamoto, who ultimately designed the Pearl Harbor attack, had consistently opposed conflict with the United States. Following signing the Tripartite Pact, he warned Prime Minister Konoe that Japan could maintain naval superiority for only six to twelve months. By late September, Yamamoto had informed Naval Chief of Staff Nagano that fleet commanders unanimously agreed that Japan could not win a prolonged war against the United States, given its limited resources.
The initial response to the attack within Japan revealed complex societal dynamics. While Emperor Hirohito, dressed in his naval uniform, was reportedly in "a splendid mood," and ultranationalist writers like Hayashi Fusao expressed relief, many of Japan's elite viewed the attack as"national suicide." This division reflected a more profound systemic weakness and paralysis within Japan's highest governmental structures.
Despite its tactical execution being praised, the attack had significant strategic shortcomings. The Japanese forces failed to destroy the American aircraft carriers, which would prove crucial in the Pacific war. Additionally, the attack focused on ships rather than permanent installations and oil tanks, a tactical choice that American naval historians later characterized as a "strategic imbecility." Most importantly, the attack failed to resolve Japan's fundamental resource problems, which had been a primary motivation for the expansion into Southeast Asia. As the war progressed, American submarines effectively disrupted Japan's vital resource supply lines. At the same time, its overworked industry struggled to maintain production, ultimately validating the concerns of those who had opposed the war.
The initial success of the Pearl Harbor attack triggered celebrations in Japan, though some, like Chiang Kai-shek, welcomed America's entry into the war. Former Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke realized his German-Italian alliance strategy had failed to prevent war with the United States.
Japanese occupation proved brutal, with Chinese males facing execution in conquered territories. Meanwhile, in America, paranoia against Japanese-Americans flourished with unfounded accusations of espionage and disloyalty. This anti-Japanese sentiment was evident in statements like that of a Salinas Valley agriculture representative who claimed white farmers could easily replace Japanese farmers, adding ominously, "We don't want them back when the war ends, either."
Japan's early military successes proved mixed. A second attempted attack on Pearl Harbor in March 1942 failed, and the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942 saw both sides claiming victory. The Japanese military was overwhelmed by their rapid gains and massive Allied surrenders in Malaya and the Philippines, struggling to manage prisoners they culturally despised for surrendering.
After the Doolittle Raid, Japanese retaliation included attacking Chinese air bases and contaminating food and water supplies with biological agents. General Tojo initially hoped to fight to a stalemate that would allow Japan to retain its conquests. Still, the devastating losses at Midway, including irreplaceable ships and veteran personnel, forced him to shift from expansion to defending existing territory.
Tojo's consolidation of power worried even his allies, with Sugiyama complaining to the emperor that Tojo had become a "Shogun with dictatorial control of Japan in the Emperor's name." After naval failures, Tojo proposed an ambitious but unrealistic push through China and India, but the loss of Saipan ultimately ended his career amid assassination attempts.
The military situation deteriorated rapidly. The army began recruiting psychopaths, pilot training couldn't keep pace with losses, and the military resorted to lying about naval victories off Taiwan in October 1944. When the atomic bomb was dropped, Japanese leaders incorrectly assumed America had only one or two more such weapons.
Some officers proposed retreating to the mountains with the Emperor. Still, Hirohito had been seeking peace since June, having lost faith in victory reports, particularly after learning his subjects were making shovels from bomb shrapnel to dig out their buried families. The Potsdam Declaration's requirement to prosecute war leaders complicated surrender, as "Japanese militarism itself was in a fight to the death."
The war's end marked the dissolution of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy. These organizations had emerged in 1868 and grown "like tumors in the Japanese state, seizing all of its resources and steering its political direction.”
Footnotes
Bix, Herbert. Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan.
Buruma, Ian. Inventing Japan: 1853-1964.
Clements, Jonathan. Japan at War in the Pacific: the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire in Asia, 1868-1945.
Hall, John Whitney. Japan: From Prehistory to Modern Times.
Hane, Mikiso. Japan: A Historical Survey.
Hein, Laura, ed. The New Cambridge History of Japan: vol. III.
Memoir of Prince Konoe.
Peffer, Nathaniel. The Far East: A Modern History.
Prange, Gordon W. At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor.
Reischauer, Edwin. Japan: the story of a nation. 1989
Walker, Brett L. A Concise History of Japan.
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