Pro-Zionist POV

Anita Shapira. Israel: a history. 

OTTOMAN TURKISH EMPIRE

Palestine was politically fragmented during the late Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, “the first stirrings of an Arab national movement existed in Palestine, led by educated Christian Arabs.” The Muslim Arabs supported the Ottoman Empire and were politically independent. An anti-Jewish newspaper was published but little Palestinian nationalism. The Arabs viewed Jewish settlement as a foreign incursion. In 1891 Arab dignitaries petitioned the Ottoman Sultan “to stop the wave of Jewish immigrants coming to Palestine,” which he did. (53)

THEODORE HERZL

Theodor Herzl is the father of Zionism. “His knowledge of Judaism was meager and, of the Jewish people, superficial.” (16)

Shapira argues that Herzl’s, The State of the Jews, is on par with “the treatise by Abbe Sieyes that helped spark the French Revolution, and Thomas Paine’s Common Sense, which created widespread support for the American Revolution. . . . The Jews were hatred both as capitalist and revolutionary; wealthy and poor; educated and ignorant.” (16)

The Alfred Dreyfus trial spurred Zionism. The French accused Army Captain Alfred Dreyfus of treason stating that he gave military secrets to Germany. Being Jewish, this was significant to Jews. (17) Some Jews came to believe that they were not allowed to assimilate and therefore should settle in their own country. (17)

“Herzl outlined a process of transferring millions of Jews from Europe to Palestine . . . that such a process must be supported by a binding international document.” (18) Herzl hoped wealthy Jews such as the Rothschilds would finance this “but his meetings with these men were unsuccessful.” Wealthy Jews saw in Herzl a “fevered imagination laking roots in reality.” (19)

Perhaps not surprisingly Herzl found more support in Eastern Europe rather than in Western Europe. (20)

ZIONISM

Anita Shapira explores the essence of Zionism in her book, Israel: A History. (3)

“In 1881 Dr. Yehuda Leib Pinsker published a pamphlet titled Auto-Emancipation. Writing in the wake of the wave of pogroms that engulfed Jews in the Tsarist Empire. Pinsker analyzed antisemitism in-depth and concluded by calling for the establishment of a Jewish homeland,” where Jews would be the “masters.” (3)

Attacks on Jews in Eastern followed by “modern anti-Semitism” in "Western Europe.” The new religious hatred added racism against the Jews and employed nineteenth-century Social Darwinism. (13)

Jews were accused of “all of capitalist societies’ ills, inciting to revolution and undermining the existing order. They pictured the Jews as parasites, incapable of establishing a society or culture of their own, who rode on the backs of other peoples and copied or prevented their cultures.” (13)

In the nineteenth century, some Jews argued for a “national movement.”

Theodore Herzl viewed Jews as “one people.” (15) Justification for their nationalism came from the Bible, which presented something of a paradox since until the nineteenth century the Bible was considered secondary to Jewish oral law. . . . It was the Protestants who discovered the Bible and extolled its importance in educating the younger generation. Even the idea of the Jews returning to their ancient homeland as the first step to world redemption seems to have originated among a specific group of evangelical English Protestants that flourished in England in the 1840s.” (15)

This appears to contradict the idea of “Next year in Jerusalem.” (15) However, “instead of passively waiting the coming for the coming of the Messiah, the Jewish people would take their own action. This concept met with bitter opposition from conservative religious circles, who saw it as opposing divine will. The left on the other hand objected that this concept was based upon religion - something enlightened Jews should keep their distance from.” (15)

Russian Zionists “stopped talking about the Land of Israel as a mythical land and began referring to it as a real country that could be settled.” (16)

Teachers were the “heroes” of Zionism in the settlements of Palestine. They “formulated a Hebrew vernacular and teaching language . . . wrote textbooks.” (58)

It was the teachers who changed “the Hanukkah festival . . . to a celebration of the heroism of the Maccabees.” (58)

Zionism relied on the Bible. One Zionist leader described it as a “sort of birth certificate that . . . nurtured the sense of homeland. . . . a Bible in almost every worker’s room.” (58-59)

Shapira describes the Balfour Declaration as from a time when “a handful of statesmen in smoke-filled rooms decided the fates of peoples and states and how to divide up declining empires, with no participation by the media or the masses.” (73) 

The Western powers ignored “the opposition of the Arab inhabitants of Palestine.” Balfour stated, “The Four Great Powers are committed to Zionism.” (73)

“The British conquest of Palestine in 1918 did not take place under the banner of the Balfour Declaration. The Declaration was not officially published in Palestine, although its contents were known to both Jews and Arabs.” From the Jewish point of view this was what Herzl wanted; from the Arab point of view the Balfour Declaration undermined “their centuries-old superiority in Palestine.” They understood that they would simply have a new ruler. (74)

The thirty-year transitional Mandate period enabled the Jews to establish a society and economy of their own in Palestine. Without British bayonets, the Jewish community would have been unable to develop in size and strength until it passed the point of no return. 

Two sides developed in Zionism. One point of view, led by Vladimir Jabotinsky believed “that a clash between Jewish and Arab nationalism was inevitable and that Zionism could not be realized without an active British policy establishing a colonial regime in Palestine that would grant state lands to the Jews, enable mass immigration and large-scale settlements, and stop any Arab resistance by force. Brit Shalom, for its part, advocated reaching an agreement with the Arab national movement at any price. Its watchword was binationalism, which neutralized the issue of majority versus minority by agreeing that in Palestine there were two peoples entitled to an equal share in the country, each of which would have an autonomous cultural life (an idea known as cultural Zionism as it related to the Jews).” The British would act as mediators between the Arabs and the Jews. Brit Shalom believed “not a majority but many” but the Arabs were not impressed. “Brit Shalom was now prepared to consider capping Jewish immigration, if only as a way to reach an agreement with the Arabs.” (82)

In the 1920s Russian Jews were inspired by the Balfour Declaration . (104) Hence, Zionism became a mass movement. A “pioneer” movement formed “in the Crimea to train youngsters before they immigrated to Palestine.” There were pogroms in the Ukraine. (104)

Jewish life in Russia changed following World War I and the Russian Revolution. “Religious practice was forbidden and Zionists prosecuted.” (104)

Zionists inculcated in the children arriving in and born in Palestine a love and connection to the land. They instilled “a sense of togetherness . . . They acquired the feeling of being masters of the country from Jewish history and Zionist ideology. . . . If on their field trips, they encountered Arab villages, they perceived these as part of the scenery.” (150) 

WAR OF INDEPENDENCE 1948

The British left Palestine “embroiled in civil war - or a war between national communities - that rapidly evolved in a war between countries.” The Jews survived the war to create the State of Israel. (74)

Shapira cites November 30, 1947 as the date the Arabs began the war against the Jews. “Roads linking Jewish settlements all over the country suddenly became dangerous, since they passed through Arab villages.” (157)

“The Arabs’ fighting capacity appeared serious and their military resources limitless.” (158)

“Palestine Arab society started to disintegrate.” The ruling elites were unable to impose either civil or military authority. The Arab militias were not formed into an army. . . . the wealthy rushed to depart for the neighboring Arab states.” (158)

Arab propaganda declared that they would drive “the Jews into the sea - in other words, total war.” However, the tens of thousands of Arab soldiers ere poorly trained and their armies poorly led. Therefore, they were not coordinated. At first the Arab armies outnumbered the Jews. But the IDF organized to finally recruit enough soldiers to meet the Arabs. (157-158)

Shapira describes a Jewish army just being organized in 1947. They didn’t have proper analysis and made plans on bravado than facts. Consequently, the Israelis remember the war as being “fought for the nation’s very existence . . . endless sacrifice . . . and many casualties.” (158)

She writes of 60,000 Jewish refugees.

For the Arabs the Nakba or Israeli War of Independence in 1948 “made them a minority in their own land. . . . that have become the focus of a national myth [Shapira argues that all nationalities rely on myth] emphasizing their victimhood at the hands of the Zionist state.” (461)

Shapira writes that some scholars that “most Israeli Arabs . . . have accepted Israel’s existence as the Jewish state, and as citizens seek equal opportunities and cultural autonomy.” However, Arab leaders disagree. (462)

The concept of “the Arab problem” came from “internal Jewish attitudes toward the Arabs. Two Jewish writers criticized Zionist “mistreatment of their Arab workers,” and the “dispossession of Arab tenant farmers.”

However, there were too few Zionists in Palestine at the time and they had little to offer the Arabs. (53-54)

Conflicts between Arabs and Jews centered around “land, water, and grazing.” The Jews protected themselves and this was “an inseparable part” of Zionist beliefs. (54)

A Zionist chant, “In fire and blood did Judea fall; in blood and fire Judea shall rise.” (54)

Jewish immigration to Palestine in the early 1930s concerned the Arabs who viewed their country’s domination by Europeans; they were losing their country, “which only a few years earlier had been essentially theirs.” (81)

“Old privileged families” in Palestine formed a modern political party that drew in young, educated, Arabs. They targeted the British, not the Jews. They demonstrated for self-government. (81)

The decision to Partition Palestine was looked at by the Jews as a “divine miracle.” The Arabs believed it a “flagrant wrong, a miscarriage of justice, and an act of coercion. They were being called upon to consent to the partitioning of a country that only thirty years earlier had been considered Arab, and to the establishment of a Jewish state in it. They resorted to “armed resistance.”

The Jews call the 1948 war, the War of Sovereignty” but it is known as the War of Independence although the war was against the Arabs and not the British. (156) “It was not a war of liberation, but a war between two peoples striving for control over the same land. For their part, the Arabs referred to the war with the neutral phrase, “1948 war,” implying that it was just one in a series that had been and would be waged.” Most important was 700,000 refugees. Thus, it was called the Nakba. (156-157)

“The war’s biggest losers were the Palestinians.” The first cause was the “collapse of governmental systems in Palestinian society.” After the Arabs invaded “the IDF expelled the Arab population and destroyed its villages to prevent its return.” (174) Officers of the IDF blamed the Palestinians for the war and abuses. Shapiro claims that both the Jews and the Arabs committed massacres. (174)

“Shapira claims the Israelis were “aghast” at the Palestinians fleeing their villages. This was another miracle for the Israelis. She claims all of the Jewish villages assigned to the Arab area were destroyed. Coupled with the Palestinians fleeing their villages, “a new reality materialized: two ethnically homogeneous states, a mainly Jewish one and a purely Arab one. The conclusion was that the State of Israel could not allow the Arabs to return to their homes.” (174)

Moshe Sharett claimed it was incredulous to believe the Zionists forced the Palestinians to leave their homes. (174) However, the IDF was ordered to “prevent the Arabs from returning to their villages, either by force or by destroying the villages.” (175)

Unfortunately, Shapira cites World War II actions as precedents justifying Israeli behavior. (175)

Shapira also claims that the Palestinians have unrealistic demands to return to their homes “for the war erased the reality to which they wanted to return.” In addition, the Arabs refused to acknowledge the existence of Israel. (175)

Shapira also describes their desire to return as a myth. (176)

Nevertheless, after the War of Independence the best IDF officers left the military and it “experienced a period of disorganization and weakness . . . unsuccessful battle . . . near the Sea of Galilee to destroy a Syrian force that had taken a position in the demilitarized zone.” (275)

SINAI CAMPAIGN

Moshe Dayan became Chef of Staff in 1956 and improved elite units including 101. 

Infiltration from Jordan occurred in 1956 with help from the then lax Jordanian army. Ariel Sharon’s infamous Unit 101 carried out reprisal raids. On one raid many women and children were killed inside their homes. (275)

Just before the Sinai Campaign of  1956, an IDF commander changed the curfew for Arabs without telling field workers. 47 men, women, and children were shot for violating the curfew. The defense establishment was in shock but covered up the atrocity. (197) The Arabs never forgot. (198)

An IDF reprisal raid in the Gaza Strip in Egypt in 1955 is believed to have inflamed Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser took his army’s failure to defend against the attack as a humiliation.

He switched from sponsoring limited raids by Palestinians to training units to go “inside Israeli territory, killing civilians, destroying installations, and undermining security along the border and inside Israel.” (276)

In addition in 1955 Nasser declared his “commitment to armed struggle against Israel.” Consequently, the Israeli General Staff concluded, “a preventative war against Egypt was unavoidable.” (279)

The result would be “Israeli control of the Gaza Strip, open the Straits of Tirana, and perhaps even give Israel control of the Gulf of Eilat coastal strip leading to the straits. The idea of a preventative war was based on Israel’s vulnerability. Because Israel was so small, an attacking enemy “could quickly cut the country in half.” (279)

“Ben-Gurion . . . . proposed that Israel conquer the Gaza Strip.” Interestingly, he had opposed “Yigal Allon’s proposals to conquer the West Bank [in 1949] which was militarily achievable.” He was concerned about “governing hundreds of thousands of Arabs.” (280)

In 1956 nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt led the British, the French, and the Israelis into an alliance. (281)

The 1956 Suez War or Sinai Campaign “was a great Israeli military success.” The Israelis quickly took the Sinai Peninsula just short of the Suez Canal. However, the attack as well as British and French attacks against the Egyptians drew the ire of the Soviet Union and the United States. “Gunboat diplomacy had ended with World War Two.”  (281-282)

The Israelis claimed they wanted to prevent guerrilla attacks on their country. Nevertheless, the U.S. told the Israelis to withdraw. (282) Interestingly, for the next ten years the Palestinian attacks from Egypt stopped. (283)

SIX-DAY WAR

The June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, known to the world as The Six-Day War, but referred to as “the June War” by the Arabs. Shapira writes that it “broke out without premeditation on either side and without anyone having predicted that it would occur when it did.” (295)

The Arabs exchanged accusations with each other and the Arabs and Israelis did the same.  Arab threats concerned Israeli citizens who feared another Holocaust. Also, Western behavior during the crisis left Israel feeling abandoned. “Over and over commentators compared Israel to Czechoslovakia.” (298)

Again, the IDF believed it would win a war against Egypt as long as it could launch a preemptive attack. (299)

While the Israeli government was reluctant to go to war the General Staff “pressed for approval going to war.” (299)

A retired David Ben-Gurion thought Israel needed a powerful ally. He criticized Chief of Staff Rabin for “belligerent statements and mobilization of the reserves. . . . had led Israel into a trap.” (300)

Public pressure led to retired General Moshe Dayan, the Israeli hero of the Sinai Campaign, to be appointed Defense Minister. 

According to Shapira, “Israel was drawn into this war under duress and without preplanned objectives. . . . Israel went to war to defeat the Egyptian army and open the Straits of Titan to Israeli shipping. (301)

In November 1967 the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 242 however the Arabs refused to recognize Israel. Israel in turn refused to withdraw from the territory it had just conquered. 

A consequence of the war Shapira writes “was the reemergence of the Palestinian problem. After the War of Independence, the Arab states and Israel appropriated the territories assigned to the Palestinian state.” (305)

After the Six-Day War Israel could no longer ignore the Palestinians. “The awakening of Palestinian nationalism was a direct result of the Arab states’ failure to destroy Israel militarily.” (305)

Israel’s 1967 victory worsened its relations with the Arabs. (307)

“Rule over new territories became a leading topic in Israeli political discourse.” Are they “bargaining chips”? Are they needed for security? How moral is it to rule other people? (307) Jews fulfilling their views of Israel settled in the newly conquered territories. (307)

Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan and his eye patch symbolized Israeli daring and defiance. He “sought to maintain a soft occupation of the West Bank that interfered as little as possible in the lives of the Arabs.” (310) Furthermore, Dayan opposed annexing the newly conquered territories. (311)

Even “Ben-Gurion spoke openly about returning all the occupied territories, except for Jerusalem, in return for peace.” (312)

Nevertheless, following the victory of 1967, Israelis became arrogant and condescending. The victorious generals became celebrities. (312)

However, according to Shapira, the sight of fleeing Arab soldiers during the war, and seeing refugees, left them feeling pity. “They felt no hatred toward the Arabs.” (314)

Not surprisingly conquering areas mentioned in the Bible impressed Israeli soldiers. Some “hoped that the uncompleted mission of 1948 could be fulfilled. But they were the minority.” Israel did not want “to rule these territories.” (314)

A leader of the settler movement stated that Israel is “not permitted to relinquish any part of the Greater Land of Israel: We are bound by loyalty to the integrity of our country . . . and no government in Israel has the right to Surender that integrity.” (316)

The 1967 victory did not impress young Israelis as it did those who experienced the 1948 war and who “still retained the notion of a Greater Israel.” However, messianism captivated “religious-Zionist youth.” (316)

In 1968 Israelis who held these views “flouted” the government and settled in Arab areas. They received government support from “disparate circles” in Israel. (317) 

At first, these Zionists planned to settle “areas thinly populated by Arabs.” Reminiscent of General Yigal Allon’s sincere wish to take the West Bank after the 1948 war, Allon now looked to a more balanced occupation order to avoid “rule over Arabs and what he perceived as the country’s security needs.” (317)

The issue of “defensible borders” for Israel came up. They wanted to keep the Golan Heights, the Jordan Valley, the Rafa approach, and southern Mount Hebron. Israel allowed Jews to settle in those areas. (317)

Although there was hope among Israelis that the Six-Day War would bring peace, it did not. The Israelis and the Arabs dug in. (319)

Israeli and Egyptian forces clashed. The Egyptians had superior artillery against the Israelis Bar-Lev Line. The IDF “raided Egyptian positions on the western bank of the Gulf of Suez. This did not stop the Egyptians so the Israelis bombed military installations and infrastructures. The cities along the canal were turned into heaps of ruins, and hundreds of thousands of Egyptian refugees fled toward Cairo.” (319)

On the Jordanian border in the fall of “1967 Palestinian terror groups began organizing . . . which hoped to rouse the West Bank population into a guerrilla war against the occupation.” (320)

The Palestinians attacked Jewish settlements in the West Bank so the Israelis destroyed settlements in Jordan. (320)

In addition, these conflicts and the wake of the Six-Day War disrupted Israeli society. (321) Exposed was the “psychological difficulty of withstanding a protracted war, the sensitivity to the loss of life, and the longing for peace.” Most Israelis felt they “were in a war of choice.” Also, the Israelis claimed there was no one to talk peace with. (324)

DAVID BEN-GURION

Ben-Gurion stated that in the early 1900s, 90% of the Jews who arrived in Palestine left. (33)

Following Israeli independence Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion disagreed as to whether the IDF should conduct “reprisal raids” against Arab villages for attacks by Palestinians on Israeli villages. Sharett thought the ‘reprisal raids’ could “fan the flames of hatred.” (176)

While Sharett put his faith in the United Nations, Ben-Gurion used derogatory terms describing the organization. (276)

Ben-Gurion believed television “corrupted the public.” Although Israel claims it has a free press the “Broadcasting Authority” approves or disapproves stories.” (199)

ARABS

Ben-Gurion and others believed the Arabs “were descendants of the ancient Jews who had converted first to Christianity and then to Islam; now, with Jewish settlement, they would assimilate among the Jews.” (53)

Prior to the War of Independence “Arab nationals were developing far more rapidly than the rate of Jewish immigration to Palestine.” (82) “The Arabs refused to recognize any Jewish right whatsoever to the country. They were prepared to allow Jews who had come to Palestine before the Balfour Declaration to remain, but not recognize them as a collective with a historical connection to the country.” (82) 

Arab public opinion in response to “Jews’ alleged brutality” caused pressure on the Arab countries to aid the Palestinians. (162)

The Jordanian Arab Legion was the best-trained Arab army. (162)