THE FRENCH WAR

The problem as DeGaulle saw it was the indecision on the part of the French government in Paris. DeGaulle looked at the decline of the European powers’ control over their empires as an opportunity for the United States. They would need the support of the people they ruled to continue ruling them. (DeGaulle, Charles: Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor. Trans. Terence Kilmartin. 11)

However, the decline of the European imperial powers led to the revolutionary and independence movements of Arica and Asia. There was, “the dissemination of doctrines which, whether liberal or socialist, equally demanded the emancipation of races and of individuals; and the wave of envious longing aroused among theses deprived masses by the spectacle of the modern economy . . . It was clear that the distant domination on which the empires were founded had had its day. But might it not be possible to transform the old dependent relationships into preferential links of political, economic and cultural co-operation?” (DeGaulle, Charles: Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor. Trans. Terence Kilmartin. 11-12)

In January 1944 the Free French met in Brazzaville, the capitol of then French Equatorial Africa. The World War had yet to end. The Allies had yet to invade France. However, the Free French, under the leadership of Charles DeGaulle, planned the future of their declining empire.

At some point DeGaulle sent Leclerc to “Indochina with considerable forces” to occupy only southern Vietnam and leave northern Vietnam to Ho Chi Minh’s forces. Sainteny would negotiate with the Viet Minh. (DeGaulle, Charles: Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor. Trans. Terence Kilmartin. 12) “Although I did not delude myself that a community based on a free and contractual association could replace our empire overnight without clashes and difficulties, I nevertheless considered this great undertaking possible. But it would have to be carried out with determination an d continuity, by a government which appeared to the peoples concerned to be really representative of that generous and vigorous France which seemed to have emerged at the time of the Liberation.” (DeGaulle, Charles: Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor. Trans. Terence Kilmartin. 12)

DeGaulle had no interest in war as he left office “the use of force had been allowed to prevail. . . . the final result was a grave military reverse followed by an inevitable but humiliating settlement.”(DeGaulle, Charles: Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor. Trans. Terence Kilmartin. 13)

Vietnamese negotiations with the French began in 1946 but ended in failure.

“There, in the Viet Bac, the revolutionaries lived primitively, changing their headquarters frequently to escape capture.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 294)

Half of Vietnam was under Vietminh control and they controlled more at night. They began attacks on the French in 1950. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 317) The Vietminh had pockets of troops in various places in Vietnam which the French were unable to eliminate. This “was mainly responsible for France’s losing the war. Whenever the French, after long preparation, moved against their elusive foe, he disappeared, and the French found that they had conquered empty marshes, jungles, and mountains. The guerrillas meanwhile, having dispersed, would reassemble at another base some distance away and repeat their maneuver. Sooner or later the pursuing French, far away from their own bases, out of supplies and ammunition, were left no choice but to return to their base, usually followed closely and harasses by the reappearing guerrillas. It would have been pointless for the French to occupy permanently sites which they had won, for wherever they did so, it meant that a contingent of their army was pinned down in a hard-to-supply, isolated outpost, doomed to inaction, and in control of only a small surrounding area.” This is just what the Vietminh wanted. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 319)

“Guerrilla control of territories in the south, center, and delta region, which nailed down increasing numbers of French troops, rather than political acumen was the reason that de Lattre, Salan, and Navarre, the generals commanding the Expeditionary Corps between 1950 and 1954, insisted on the creation of a Vietnamese national army. Only if a Vietnamese army could free their troops from the task of defending and pacifying French-held territories would they be able to dispose of the manpower necessary for invading Vietminh-held territory, destroying Giap’s army, and thus end the war.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 320)

Unfortunately, the French depended on the roads which did not lead to Viet Bac. They were stuck in “narrow, densely wooded passes and jungles” surrounded by a nearby, “invisible enemy.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 321) When the French arrived in Viet Bac it was deserted.” (Vietnam: a political history. 320)

The French gained nothing. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 321) The French foot soldiers knew they could not win the war but the generals and the politicians were in denial. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 321-322)

The French decided on a pacification program. Part of that strategy required them to surround the Vietminh at Viet Bac and “cut them off” from the rest of the country. The French would then “pacify” the rest of the country. However, the French Army was not large enough to occupy and “pacify” in static defensive bases in Vietnam. In fact, their forces were already spread thin. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 322) They were unsuccessful. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 323)

1949 saw ferocious fighting between the two sides. The Vietminh gained more territory in the Red River Delta in the Hanoi and Haiphong area. This continued into 1953. Ironically, the French military began to acknowledge the importance of diplomacy in the conflict. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 323)

The Vietminh gained much needed military equipment from now Communist China. Giap launched an attack in May 1950 on an outpost where the French although outnumbered were able to maintain the base. The Vietminh wanted to remove the French from the Vietnamese-Chinese border. In one battle the Vietminh used six battalions to crush the French. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 324) Suffering light casualties the Vietminh forced the French out of the Red River Delta leaving being a “vast amount of equipment” and losing 6,000 soldiers. This was the “greatest military defeat in France’s colonial history.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 324-325)

The guerrilla war grew in size as larger units engaged each other. In addition, the Vietminh and French fought throughout the country not just the North. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 325)

Although winning on the battlefield, in the early part of the French War the French surprisingly offered to negotiate by sending Viet Nam scholar Paul Mus to Hanoi. He supported Vietnamese independence and had been in the paratroop corps in Indochina. The French Army demanded, in the negotiations, that all foreigners serving with the Viet Minh be surrendered to the French. “There were indeed then with the Viet-Minh a bevy of Japanese officers afraid of Allied war crimes courts and even a sprinkling of Germans from the Nazi missions in China, as well as some Foreign Legionnaires of various nationalities.” They trained the Vietnamese in the use of the many types of weapons the Viet Minh were able to obtain. (Bernard Fall. Last Reflections on a War. 87-88) This was one of their weaknesses and the French knew it. (Bernard Fall. Last Reflections on a War. 88) Paul Mus argued unsuccessfully that Ho Chi Minh would never betray people who sought refuge with him. But the French insisted “or the war would go on until victory.” Nevertheless, according to Mus Ho was hopeful as indicated by champagne and glasses being cooled nearby. The famous discussion followed, “Monsieur le professor, you know us very well. If I were to accept this, I would be a coward. The French Union is an assemblage of free men, and there could be no place in it for cowards.” So spoke Ho Chi Minh. (Bernard Fall. Last Reflections on a War. 88)

During both wars there formed, Hanoiologists, people who predicted this or that, and made statements to be taken as fact which were usually totally inaccurate. (Bernard Fall. Last Reflections on a War. 88-89)

Significant military and political actions during the Vietnam War occurred in Laos. One aspect in the early Indochinese effort to establish independent nations occurred in Laos. One of the royal princes met with Ho Chi Minh obtaining support for Laotian independence. However, by the spring of 1946 the French “occupied all the major towns” in Laos. As a result the Laotian government fled to Bangkok where they organized a resistance to the French. (Roger Hilsman, To Move A Nation. 98)

However, the Laotian government began to split with some siding with Prince Souvanna Phouma negotiating a peace with the French. Others sided with Prince Souphanouvong who formed the Communist dominated Pathet Lao, a guerrilla organization with very close ties to the Viet Minh. (Roger Hilsman, To Move A Nation. 98)

The Vietminh knew the war would last for many years as they could not defeat the French in open combat. By 1950 the Vietminh had a very well trained and equipped army. The French did not know this and made their first mistake in October 1950. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 316)

By 1950 the Vietminh used “a modified version of the laws of revolutionary warfare laid down by Mao Tse-tung . . . three stages. . . . Truong Chinh . . . the then chief theoretician of Vietnamese Communism. . . . held the Vietminh will be weak and the enemy strong. The Vietminh therefore will be on the defensive and the enemy take the offensive. In this first phase, the Vietminh had to preserve its forces, withdraw into safe territory, and be content with harassing enemy convoys and bases. In the second phase, that of the “equilibrium of forces and of active resistance,” the enemy will no longer be able to make headway, but the Vietminh will not yet be able to regain lost territory. The military task during this period consists of engaging, tying down, and, if possible, exterminating enemy units through guerrillas and regional troops, and of sabotaging the enemy’s economic activities. This second phase promises to be the longest of the three. It will end when the Vietminh has built up strength to open its own counteroffensive, beginning with a war of maneuver, passing through a war of large movement, into a war of large movement, into a war of position, and ending with the victory of the Vietminh.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 325-326)

General Giap believed he was ready to attack near Hanoi in early 1951. His forces were mauled by the French. In March Giap attacked again in the Haiphong area. Again, the French defeated the Vietminh. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 326)

General Giap attacked the French in the delta for a third time. However, this was a Catholic region and the Vietminh lacked their requisite “popular support.” In addition, the French Navy attacked the Vietminh’s lines of supply and “used napalm bombs on an enemy who for the first time had left the protection of the jungles.” The Vietminh lost again. The war was at a stalemate. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 327)

The French overhauled their command. They made General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny both civilian and military commander of Indochina. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 327-328)

De Lattre was able to thwart” Giap’s attempts to expel the French from Hanoi and the delta.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 328) Unfortunately, he was unable to enact long term policies which would help the French defeat the Vietminh. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 329)

Buttinger suggests that the French needed to cut Chinese aid to the Vietminh. However, that “could not even be considered.” The French would have to change tactics. They would have to go on the offensive, receive military aid from the United States and, the creation of a native army. In this way the French could create the so-called “de Lattre Line.” However, “the United States was still involved in Korea.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 329)

De Lattre went ahead anyway and his defensive line proved futile. The Vietminh were able to infiltrate nevertheless. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 329-330) Although he wanted more mobile forces de Lattre’s soldiers were static and therefor unable to attack the Vietminh who, therefore, increased in strength. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 330)

“The Vietminh had an advantage over the French in all respects except in the number of regular troops and amount of heavy equipment.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 330)

“The great disadvantage of the French, loudly deplored by de Lattre in 1951, Salan in 1952, and Navarre in 1953, was that with an organized, well-equipped fighting force almost twice the size of Giap’s regular army, fewer troops were available to them for offensive action than to the Vietminh.” The overwhelming amount of French troops were “tied down in static defense.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 330)

The French introduced conscription for the Vietnamese. “To avoid conscription, many young men in the South joined the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao militias. Those who enlisted during 1951 were poorly trained and equipped, but the major deficiency then and for a long time to come was the lack of qualified officers. The best elements of the educated middle class had no desire to fight in an army still under over-all French direction for a regime they despised and against people, who even if Communist-led, were fighting for national independence. . . . the Vietnamese National Army never became much of a fighting force. It remained indifferently trained, poorly led, and unmotivated.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 331)

The French did not believe that the Vietnamese could be good soldiers. They, of course, ignored the abilities of the Vietminh. There were also Vietnamese in the French Expeditionary Corps who fought well but again, this was ignored by the French command. However, since the French created and controlled Vietnamese army did not fight for independence its utility was useless. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 331)

During the war against the French the Vietminh were not interested in spreading communist ideas as they were on, “national liberation and a progressive, democratic state. To say that the Vietminh leaders, being Communists, merely pursued their Party’s aims is politically misleading, for it implies that their nationalism was fraudulent. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 332)

Unless one understands this point one cannot possibly understand how the Vietminh could become the vehicle through which the Vietnamese Communists achieved their victories. . . . The truth is that being Communists did not prevent the Vietminh leaders from being authentic nationalists, as extreme and determined as any the anticolonial movement had produced. In fact, the Vietnamese Communists could become effective only by being nationalists first and Communists second.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 332-333)

The Vietminh tackled the issues that mattered to Vietnamese in the post-World War II period. Two of these were starvation and availability of medicines. Furthermore, the Vietminh initially had no transportation. “Their soldiers had no shoes, their children no clothing, they had no soap with which to wash the one garment they owned” and they ate a meager diet. In the first four years of the French war the Vietnamese received no outside aid. The peasants were pushed. Rents were lowered and no land confiscated. Although yields were high at times there was not enough food. Most of “the rich food producing areas were largely in French hands” so that any food harvested had to be carried to those who needed it. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 333-334)

Also, the Vietminh did not have access to the country’s industrial production. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 334)

“Priority was of course given to arms production, and, significantly, to paper. The Vietminh regraded its papers and other propaganda materials as essential to victory as guns. Lack of machinery limited industrial production largely to goods that could be produced with the available handicraft skills and equipment. Thanks to the French policy of preventing industrialization and of keeping the peasants too poor to buy imported goods, these skills had survived. Small establishments turned out textiles, soap, paper, sugar, metal, and simple agricultural implements. Some vitally important articles, such as mechanical pumps, were made from the motors of captured vehicles. The French air force had difficulty knocking out the many production sites, few of which could be rightly be labeled factories. They were well hidden in dense jungles, and many operated either underground or in caves.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 334) The military acumen of the Vietminh astounded the French: their ability to disperse, reorganize, hide and camouflage. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 335)

The Vietnamese were able to mine minerals and “all mines were nationalized. There was a complicated method of exporting the minerals and rice, and importing needed weapons, medicines, radios and machinery which was “mostly US Army surplus.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 334-335)

The Vietminh combated the long hated illiteracy in the country. “Technical education was stressed, but other branches of higher learning were not neglected. For the Party elite, intensive courses in Marxism were conducted with as much zeal as the training of officers in military academies.” The population also heard the Vietminh economic and political agenda. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 335)

“It was the total mobilization of the entire people (which led to organized control of thought and action) and the integration of military and political life that made the Vietminh leadership such a formidable opponent.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 335)

“The scope of the political indoctrination of the people was truly fantastic. . . . ritualistic election of leaders, gave the impression of an autonomous and highly decentralized existence, but control over them was total. . . . All leading positions in all organized bodies and on all vital economic, cultural, or military fronts were in the hands either of Communist Party members or their proven allies in the Vietminh.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 335-336)

The Vietminh, nevertheless, maintained some governing functions in French held areas. Peasants sometimes threatened to give the Vietminh rice. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 336)

In February 1951 the Vietnamese Workers Party, a Communist organization, replaced the Vietminh. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 338)

“The Vietminh did not withdraw its political cadres from the South, and although the overthrow of Diem was not their immediate assignment, their activities constituted the greatest challenge Diem had to meet, because once again the masses were receptive to Vietminh propaganda. Hanoi’s triumph over the French had impressed the entire population. The great patriotic demand for freedom from foreign rule had become a reality as the result of the armed struggle led by the Vietminh. . . . The Vietminh, to be sure, was Communist-controlled and the masses were anything but communist.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 389)

“When the military units of the Vietminh were withdrawn from the South in accordance with the Geneva agreement, the Vietminh remained in control of the countryside. In some areas it even grew stronger. After the fighting ceased and the French left, the Vietminh no longer needed to secure control by military means. The arms left behind by the troops who had gone North were buried; Vietminh power, for the time being, was to be based on organization and on the influence gained over the people. They were convinced that victory was already theirs, even if its consummation had to await the elections of July, 1956. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 455)

State Department official John Ohly warned that taking over the colonial functions of the French in Indochina was not wise. “These situations have a way of snowballing.” (Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. 678)

March 6 Agreement

“The main provisions of the treaty signed March 6 [1946] were French recognition of Vietnam as a free state with its own government, parliament, army, and finances,” and Vietnamese agreement that their country was to form part of the Indochinese Federation and the French Union. A referendum to be held in Cochinchina was to decide whether the three “states” of Vietnam should be united under one national government. . . . France promised to withdraw her troops in five annual installments, which would have meant the end of French military occupation in 1952. The Vietnamese pledged to end the war their guerrillas were conducting in the South.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 242) “The outcome of this referendum doubtlessly would have meant the extension of Hanoi’s authority over Chochinchina.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 247) The French army resisted. Vietminh and anti-Vietminh were upset as well. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 242) As well, the French colonial government “assured colonial society in Saigon that the agreement did not apply to Cochinchina.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 247) Commissioner Cedile said the agreement did not apply to Cochinchia only Annam and Tongking. He added that, Cochinchina “would remain a separate state with the Indochinese Federation.” Even the French Socialists betrayed Ho Chi Minh. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 248)

D’Argenlieu was duplicitous in his dealings with the Vietnamese. He refused to hold the referendum. He arrested Vietminh negotiators. And he put a price on the heads of the nationalists. Fighting between the two groups “grew more savage. . . . None of the agreement’s provisions was ever implemented in Cochinchina.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 248)

Vo Nguyen Giap stated, “In this agreement, there are arrangements that are satisfactory to us and others that are not. . . . Once liberty is obtained we will go toward independence, toward complete independence. . . . We negotiated above all to protect and reinforce our political, military, and economic position.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 243)

“Negotiations were preferable to armed resistance. The country was not yet ready for a long-drawn-out war and the French were too strong for a short war.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 243)

“The agreement raised hopes for the resolution of Franco-Vietnamese differences, yet in effect it served to destroy any chance for a peaceful settlement. However, the concessions the two sides made in the agreement were so incompatible with the stated objectives that insistence on the aims was bound to end in war.”(Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 244) The French also essentially recognized Vietnamese independence. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 245)

The French were the first to break the agreement. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 245) They were determined to crush the Vietminh. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 245-246)

Dalat

“The Dalat conference opened in April 17 and lasted until May 11. . . . The French delegation consisted mainly of colonial administrators and technicians [who were not] authorized to speak for France or conclude any kind of political agreement.” No agreement was reached. “The Vietnamese delegates allegedly left the conference in tears. Giap, who had emerged as the strong man of the delegation, seemed more upset than his colleagues. It may well be that at Dalat he became convinced that war had become a certainty.”(Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 249)

Giap thought of as “opposed to compromise” and Ho chi Minh viewed as a moderate. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 249-250)

Paris Negotiations/Fontainebleau

As the French and Vietnamese prepared to negotiate, again, this time in Paris, combat continued in southern Vietnam. D’Argenlieu attempted to formally make Cochinchina a separate state, the Republic of Cochichina. He finally recognized it as such, in the name of France, on June 1, 1946. This violated the “March agreement [and] had not been authorized by Paris.” Sainteny then postponed the conference. The French then declared the central highlands of Vietnam autonomous.” The are contains many ethnic minorities. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 250)

Modus vivendi agreed to by Ho Chi Minh and Marius Moutet. It “gave the French everything they had demanded first at Dalat and then at Fontainebleau. The chief purpose of this modus vivendi was to bring about a presumption of French economic and cultural activities in the North, as well as a further improvement of their military position. As to the political issues vital for the Vietnamese, the modus vivendi was silent: nothing was said about the promise of ultimate independence. The French flatly refused to reconfirm their recognition of Vietnam as a free state. All Ho Chi Minh received was another promise of negotiations for a final treaty, to start no later tan January, 1947.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 253)

D’Argenlieu was a major obstructionist. He constantly changed the rules; sent troops to where they are not allowed. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 252) Overall, the French government was never serious. Even with this, while many in the Vietminh wanted to give up negotiating, Ho Chi Minh persevered. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 252)

French Politics

France was devastated by World War II. It had been conquered by the Germans and their were questions about why their defeat had been so quick.

As a result, “France never had the strength for a large-scale unilateral commitment, and knew that public opinion at home, as well as war wariness among the nationals upon whose territory the war was being fought (a factor that appears to be often forgotten now), demanded that a short-range solution to the conflict be found.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. viii)

The French Parliament “restricted the use of draftees to French homeland territory, thus severely limiting the number of troops that could be made available to the Indochina theater of operations. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. viii)

Consequently, General Navarre did not receive the number of soldiers he requested. He had to rely on native Indochinese men to supplement his forces. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. ix)

After the liberation of France from the Germans the economy struggled. Although the US paid 80% of the French military expenses in Indochina the French people suffered a very heavy economic burden. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 354-355) The Communists in France called it the dirty war which many non-Communist French agreed with. Overall, in analyzing the war, the most French agreed that it was wrong since the war was “nothing but an attempt to preserve what was already lost.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 355)

The working class demanded peace. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 355)

Initially, the French parliament believed that a quick military solution was possible. As that failed a call for peace and ending the war grew. Finally, on March, 9, 1954 the French parliament agreed to peace negotiations. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 355)

However, Ho Chi Minh was disturbed that “The war failed to arouse pro-Vietnamese sentiments in France; public opinion echoed press reports, which were fabricated almost exclusively by colonial officials in Hanoi and Saigon. Not only the Socialists, but the Communists also abstained from making Vietnam a central issue of French politics.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 294)

The French people were divided over the war. The right wing of French politics believed that the French politicians were “soft” on the Vietminh with all of the negotiations. However, the division among the French had to do with “means, not ends.” Even the Communists wanted to maintain French control over Indochina. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 279)

The French Socialist Leader Leon Blum supported Vietnamese independence. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 268)

The Left in French politics accepted the Right’s colonial policy even though they opposed it. They did not have the political will to stop the colonialists. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 281) In addition, while the French Socialist Party opposed recolonization and wanted negotiation with the Vietminh, their representatives in the government supported the war! These socialists “regarded it as a necessary sacrifice but did not feel that it was a betrayal of Vietnam.” Unbelievably, the “Socialist Minister for Overseas Territories . . . believed that French policy in Indochina, although steadily moving toward the inevitable colonial war, would be less disastrous and less reprehensible if presided over by a known friend of the colonial peoples.” The Socialist became prisoners of the “colonial party.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 282) Even the French Socialist leader Leon Blum took the to the war path with class that the war was the fault of the Vietminh. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 282-283)

“It is therefore wrong to say, as the Left in France still does, that the war broke out because the nobler intentions of France were continuously thwarted by the advocates of force who held strategic positions both at home and in Indochina.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 283)

The Socialist Minister of Overseas Territories, Moutet visited Vietnam but refused to meet with the Vietminh. He subsequently decided that military action was necessary.

Dean Acheson became involved with Indochina Affairs as Secretary of State in mid-1950 with the North Korean invasion of South Korea. (Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. 1969. 671) President Roosevelt had no sympathy for the French effort. “By 1949 Ho’s Viet Minh regime was exercising authority over a large part of the country and was in revolt against the French. Another leader, Prince Bao Dai, was prepared to cooperate with the French in establishing something called self-government within the French Union, which, as time revealed, meant different things to the Vietnamese and the French.” Acheson recognized Bao Dai’s status in Vietnamese society. (Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. 1969. 671)

In March 1949 Bao Dai and President Auriol of France made the Elysee Agreements which “promised Vietnam its won army for internal security, membership in the French Union, a role in foreign and defense policies, and a bank of issue.” While this coincided with US interests the State “Department doubted whether they moved far enough or would be carried out fast enough.” (Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. 1969. 671)

As a result, Acheson claims that the US had to support the French in Indochina so that they could guide Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia to independence. (Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. 1969. 671-672)

Secretary of State Dean Acheson recognized that the French attempt to thwart the Viet Minh as “Prince Bao Dai, was prepared to cooperate with the French in establishing something called self-government within the French Union, which, as time revealed, meant different things to the Vietnamese and the French.” (Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. 671) Agreements between the French and Bao Dai were supported by the United States but the State Department “doubted whether they moved far enough or would be carried out fast enough.” (Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. 671)

“As we saw our role in Southeast Asia, it was to help toward solving the colonial-nationalist conflict in a way that would satisfy nationalists aims and minimize the strain on our Western European allies. This meant supporting the French presence in the area as a guide and help to the three states in moving toward genuine independence within . . . the French Union. . . . The French balked . . . in transferring authority over internal affairs.” The Vietnamese had no power. The US States Department doubted this agreement would work. (Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. 671-672)

In 1949 Acheson had many meetings with the French that went nowhere. Acheson told the French that they must transfer more administrative functions to the Vietnamese. (Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. 672)

The least the French did was to appoint Bao Dai “chief of state of Vietnam.” The goal was to create a “duly elected Vietnamese government.” Only the US and the British would recognize this government and, the Soviet Union recognized the Viet Minh. The US defended its actions by stating that, “our fundamental policy of giving support to the peaceful and democratic evolution of dependent peoples toward self-government and independence.” The US representative to Saigon agreed. (Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. 672, 673)

In addition, the State Department “recommended aid to France and the Associated States in combating insurgency, which was backed by the Chinese and the Russians.” Interestingly, the Viet Minh are considered the insurgency but the puppet, French and American created government is considered legitimate. There would be economic and military aid but no use of American military forces in Vietnam. The US remained ready for a Chinese or Russian military intervention, however. Interestingly, the US believed that even if the US intervened they would be defeated by the Viet Minh. Thus the French would have to hand over full power including the military to the new government in Saigon. (Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. 672-673) In 1952 Acheson made it clear that the US “would not contribute ground forces to a war in Indochina, but we would consider with our allies air and naval participation if it was necessary to interrupt communication between China and Indochina.” However, the French never presented effective policies. (Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. 648)

Meanwhile, the view of US policy in 1950 was that it was confused, “directed neither toward deign the French out of an effort to re-establish their colonial role, which was beyond their power, nor helping them hard enough to accomplish it or, even better, to defeat Ho and gracefully withdraw.” If France withdrew, Acheson believed, it would not have been helpful to Southeast Asia or in the “stability and defense of Europe.” This was the best the US could do. (Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. 673)

The French Socialists rejected the Bao Dai solution “on the grounds that the ex-emperor did not enjoy authority in the country, and the Right opposed him because of his rigid insistence on unity and independence.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 307)

In response to the impasse of 1947 the French appointed Leon Pignon to lead the country. He had been an Indochina colonial officer and his appointment signified a “hardening of the French position.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 307-308)

The also continued in 1947, despite the odds, to try to establish an effective “anti-Vietminh regime.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 308)

“On March 12, 1949, France authorized a Cochinchinese assembly. The Socialist proposal for direct, popular elections was rejected in favor of indirect elections by local bodies and provincial councils and by the French chambers of commerce and agriculture. . . . [however] At least forty of the sixty-four members of the new assembly . . . were elected by administration picked people.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 309-310)

The elections were a farce. The vast majority of the Vietnamese eligible to vote did not vote. There was vast bribery for votes as well. Other voters were threatened with murder. Nevertheless, Cochinchina voted to become a part of Vietnam. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 310)

Even though Bao Dai returned to Vietnam most Vietnamese found him useless. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 310) There was no sympathy for him as the view was that he allowed himself to be used by the French. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 311)

Throughout the end of 1950 the “military situation in Vietnam deteriorated. The French virtually besieged in their bases, called for still more aid.” (Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. 673) Diplomat Livingston Merchant informed Acheson that “the military situation in Vietnam was extremely serious; that military aid should receive highest priority; that Prince Bao Dai should be pushed to assume maximum effective leadership; that although Indochina was an area of French responsibility, in view of French ineffectiveness it would be better for France to pull out if she could not provide sufficient force to hold; that we should strengthen a second line of defense in Thailand, Malaya, Laos, Cambodia, the Philippines, and Indonesia; and that the military problem was essentially one of men and the sinews of war. We could supply the second; the first must come from national forces in Vietnam.” (Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. 674)

While the US provided aid the French did not think it was “enough.” They constantly sent emissaries to the United States to ask for more and more aid. They even urged the US “to declare that the loss of Indochina would be a catastrophic blow to the free world.” The US agreed in a released joint communique. The US even noted similarities between the Indochina conflict and the Korean War. (Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. 674-675, 676)

Yet, they resisted providing progress reports on their military and political activity in Indochina. “Too little seemed to be happening in Vietnam in developing military power and local government responsibility and popular support.” In the fall of 1951 the US Joint Chiefs of State warned against making a commitment of forces to Indochina.” Nevertheless, one issue that would not go away was, what would the US do if the Chinese intervened in Indochina as they had in Korea. (Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. 674-675)

The Indochina War involved not only the French but the United States, Great Britain, and possibly the People’s Republic of (Red China). Under Acheson, the United States met with the French and the British to encourage “further development of indigenous forces”; to warn “Peking against aggression in Indochina”; and to come up with options “should the warning be ignored.” However, Acheson was not to be specific with the French or the British. Later there would be concern about what if the Chinese called the US, French and British bluff and the US did nothing? Therefore, threats were no longer expressed. (Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. 675,676)

While the French constantly demanded US aid they also “resented what they considered United States intervention.” Interestingly, the French continued to complain when the US asked for an accounting of how effective US aid was. By 1950 the US was paying one-third of the French Indochina bill. The French did nothing. In 1951 the US agreed to pay 40% of the “total French expenditures in Indochina.” (Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. 676)

According to Dean Acheson the USA became frustrated with the disconnect between what the US knew as to what was happening in Indochina and “about French military plans.” By the end of 1951 the US no longer trusted the French claim that they would “weaken the enemy.” In addition, the US had no confidence in Vietnamese soldiers and, they had no confidence in French assurances or statements about the war. The US wanted to make its own assessment. (Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. 676-677)

Also, by the end of 1951 the French began to have doubts about their Indochina war. (Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. 676)

In addition, the French believed that Indochina had to become economically independent so as not to pull down the French. Otherwise, the French might decide to just pack up and leave. Also, Bao Dai was not considered capable of leading south Vietnam through this. (Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. 676)

The French also complained that the Vietnamese did not cooperate. Bao Dai said the French would not allow true Vietnamese independence. In addition, State Department official John Ohly feared that the US would replace the French in Indochina and not simply aid them. Acheson again quotes Ohly saying that “these situations have a way of snowballing.” It would take the American experience in the war to prove true. (Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. 674)

Acheson did not want to change course, nevertheless. (Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. 674)

Korea took precedence over Vietnam after the Chinese entered the war. (Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. 674)

By 1952, the French, whose ability for lucid political thought continued to erode, also were pleased that Bao Dai had finally chosen a true, reliable anti-Communist, a man who would neither curry favor with the Vietminh nor make unreasonable demands.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 315)

By 1953 the French people were frustrated with the progress of the war. They “had good reason to question the course chosen by their leaders in Indochina.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 354)

After the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu the French parliament voted for compromise. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 370)

The US sent a military mission under Lieutenant General J.W. Daniel to Indochina to assess the situation. The mission recommended, “in addition to the four hundred million dollars in aid set aside for Indochina, three hundred eighty-five million more should be made available before the end of 1954.” The French continued to promise an accounting of their progress in Vietnam but as usual did not. By the end of 1953 “the situation in Indochina deteriorated.” The French appeared to want to give up and the British wanted to bring the Soviet Union in to help resolve the situation. (Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. 677)

In February 1954 Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union met in Berlin to “bring about a peaceful settlement in Korea and Indochina. A month later President Eisenhower declared

Southeast Asia to be of the most transcendent importance to the United States, and during April 1954 consideration was given to getting united tripartite military action there with the British and French. Dienbienphu fell on May 7, 1954, and on July 20 the Convention of Geneva ended the hostilities and French Indochina, and divided Vietnam.” (Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. 677-678)

Chien Tranh Pháp

The French Indochina War was a disaster for France. Nothing had changed from 1946 to 1953 for them. (Randle 3) They were politically and militarily incompetent. The cessation of hostilities in Korea in 1953 left the French in a quandary. With little to show for their war they were forced to negotiate. (Randle 4)

“The French regarded the Indochinese War as primarily a domestic matter, and France successfully resisted efforts to bring the question of the war to the United Nations.” (Randle 12)

The Chinese Communist victory in 1949 provided meant the Vietminh could now receive supplies more easily. (Randle 3)

The French War in Vietnam was problematic for the new superpower and world leader after World War II. The issue was how to deal with the Communists not Indochina. In fact, one of the US China experts who would later be tarred by McCarthyism understood the force of “Asian nationalism” at the time. Nevertheless, at Potsdam, President Harry S. Truman agreed to splitting Vietnam in two for purposes of taking the surrender of Japanese soldiers. The British would take the surrender south of the 16th parallel and the Chinese north of the 16th parallel. In the mean time those countries controlled the areas they operated in and this gave the British the opportunity to continue colonial control in Vietnam. “Truman, pushed by his military advisers who were wary of what anti colonialism might mean as far as the future of U.S. naval and air bases in Asia was concerned, urged that we go along with the British.” That was the extent of American thought on the issue. (David Halberstam. The Best and the Brightest. 78-79)

The most people knew about Vietnam was that it was rich in resources. (David Halberstam. The Best and the Brightest. 79)

The United States began supplying the French in mid-1950. (Randle 3) Nevertheless, Acheson found French politics fickle. Finally at the end of 1950 their national assembly decided to reinforce their military in Southeast Asia and to create militaries in the “Associated States.” (Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. 674)

Spring 1953 Giap “thrust into Laos only to withdraw several months the later.” However, later in the year he “moved his armies in to the Annamite mountains of Laos and Tonkin. In December” he moved further into Laos and took “Thakhek on the Mekong River. By January 1954 . . . [he] controlled more than half of Laos and small areas of northern Cambodia.” (Randle 8)

This concerned the French and “peace offers . . . were viewed by an increasingly concerned segment of French option as a realistic basis for negotiation.” (Randle 8)

General Navarre and “Maurice Dejean, French High Commissioner for Indochina [believed] that Laos would have to be defended: France, they felt, was obliged to defend Laos under the terms of the Franco-Laotian treaty of 22 October 1953.” (Randle 8)

In 1953, influential French believed that the two military forces should negotiate, at least, an armistice. Pierre Mendes-France advocated “negotiations to end the war and [he was] a proponent of a program for granting genuine independence to the Indochinese.” (Randle 5)

French premier Joseph Laniel “vowed to perfect the independence of the Associated States.” However, he negotiated with the State of Vietnam and not the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. “Georges Bidault, Laniel’s Foreign Minister, resolutely opposed granting unrestricted independence to the Associated States. They must be joined in the French union, Bidault believed, with impediments upon their sovereignty. Ardent Indochinese nationalists nationalists were sure to reject this kind of independence, but, whatever the attitude of the Indochinese, Bidault’s views were shared by many deputies of the right and center.” (Randle 5)

Toward the end of 1953 the Vietminh “controlled more than half of Vietnam: northern part of the country and “the central highlands of Annam, and several important sectors in the Mekong delta in Cochin China”, and the rural areas. (Randle 8)

The French controlled the major cities of Vietnam: Hanoi, Haiphong, Hue, Tourane (Da Nang?), Saigon. (Randle 8)

“By fall of 1953 a large and growing number of non-Communist French were becoming tired of this war, which had consumed 25 percent of the officers and 40 percent of the noncommissioned officers of the French army - a war that had been singularly devoid of glory and appeared to offer no future gains for Frenchmen or for France.” (Randle 6) A French victory still meant Vietnamese independence and “many Vietnamese nationalists . . . would be satisfied with nothing less than complete independence, withdrawal of the French army.” (Randle 6) The war did not benefit France. And why should they fight for the Bao Dai government? (Randle 6)

“There was, moreover, little feeling in France for continuing the war on the margins of China simply because the Vietminh were Communists and because an American policy of containment required it. By the end of 1953 many Frenchmen were unwilling to view the Indochinese War as a struggle against communism.” Ho Chi Minh analyzed the situation thusly by thusly stating that “American Imperialism is making French Colonialists carry on and extend the war of conquest in Vietnam for the purpose of rendering France weaker and weaker and taking over her position in Vietnam.” (Randle 6) The Democratic Republic of Vietnam believed that the only nations that could negotiate were they and France. (Randle 8)

Nevertheless, Laniel continued to promise “independence to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia” but he was stymied “by the French right, which included important figures in the government itself - Foreign Minister Bidault among others. By the fall of 1953 it became clear that absolute independence for the Associated States was out of the question.” (Randle 12)

French “domestic politics would not have permitted Laniel, nor perhaps even Mendes-France, to deal directly with the Vietminh in late 1953. So long as hope of a military victory against the Vietminh persisted, the parties of the center and right would have joined to overthrow any government that dared deal with these Vietnamese “rebels.” Despite the anti-war sentiment most French officials continued to feel, throughout the winter of 1953/1954, that victory was possible.” (Randle 7)

The Russians sought a peaceful settlement of the Franco-Vietnamese War in 1953. They promoted a policy of “peaceful coexistence.” The Chinese told the French that they “would not oppose a solution to the Indochinese War that might entail Vietnam’s remaining with the French Union.” (Randle 4,18)

Furthermore, the Russians proposed “a meeting of the Big Four foreign ministers.” Britain and France agreed. (Randle 18) The Americans were not so sure but “eventually agreed.” (Randle 19)

At a meeting of Britain, France, the US, and the USSR. The conference took place in Bermuda. The Russians wanted the Chinese to be represented but the United States resisted. IndoChina was on the agenda. (Randle 20)

The French government changed with Pierre Mendes-France taking over. (Roger Hilsman. To Move a Nation. 103)

Therefore, the State of Vietnam feared France would abandon them to get a deal with Ho Chi Minh. (Randle 7)

Interestingly, the French were not concerned about communism as much as the Americans. (Randle 13)

Dean Acheson claimed that the US gave military and economic aid to the French war effort to restore “stability.” The US always claims it wants stability but its own military actions destabilize areas belong belief. Communism must be eradicated and the US desired rice, rubber and tin from Indochina. (Noam Chomsky, At War with Asia. 111-112)

The Vietnamese revolution “threatens the new order that we have been trying to construct in Asia with Japan as junior partner, linked to Asia by essentially colonial relationships. (Noam Chomsky, At War with Asia. 114)

The French worried that “increased American involvement in the war” would displace them. (Randle 12)

The Vietminh ended up surprised that the French who made so much of their own liberation from the Nazis did not understand that the Vietnamese also wanted to be liberated from foreign rule. Buttinger describes this as a “lack of political imagination” on the part of the French. Free French leader Charles DeGaulle did not realize that it was the Vietnamese who would decide their future. The French began to refer to their empire as “the French Community” which they declared on March 24, 1945 while the war in Europe was still going on. The Vietnamese would have none of it. The defeat of Japan would surely show that Vietnam was now a free country. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 212-213)

However, with Japan’s surrender it was the British, in the South, and the Chinese, in the North who were assigned to disarm the Japanese. The Chinese forces occupying northern Vietnam did not sit well with the French especially since the Chinese opposed colonialism. “The reconquest of Indochina turned out to be the bloodiest period in the entire history of French Indochina, proving not only that the methods of the French had not changed, but also that colonial rule could no longer be maintained by force alone.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 215)

The Potsdam Agreement gave the French the opportunity to return to Vietnam. The French returned to Saigon which was easiest for them. They forced the “ouster of the Vietnamese Government from Saigon and the onset of Vietnamese armed resistance.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 216)

The French were willing to negotiate only if “their prewar rule over the country first be restored. . . . No nationalist leader at that time was willing to renounce independence, and most thought than an armed clash was unavoidable.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 218)

There were two choices available to the Vietnamese independence movement. One, was to militarily confront the French as soon as possible and, the other, to wait for the victorious western powers to recognized Vietnamese independence. The Vietminh favored the latter and it was a disaster. The West did not recognize Vietnamese independence and in fact supported the French return as colonists in Indochina. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 218-219)

An immediate fight against the French would precipitate a fight against the British who came to disarm the Japanese. That would put the Vietnamese in a difficult position. Therefore, the Vietminh ordered that there be no violence and that French personal safety be guaranteed. The Vietminh even postponed their lauded land reform plans. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 219)

The Chinese arrived in Hanoi September 9, 1945 and threw Sainteny and his staff out of their buildings. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 230)

In February 1946, the French and the Chinese negotiated a treaty which allowed “French troops were to relieve the Chinese armies” in northern Vietnam. “For the Vietnamese, the treaty was just another betrayal of the Vietnamese national cause. No other even in 1946 could have altered more profoundly the circumstances on which the survival of the Hanoi government depended.” The British also stated that they would soon leave Vietnam for the French to do as they pleased.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 238-239)

Ho Chi Minh predicted this and the international isolation of his country. Even the Soviet Union did not recognize the Vietminh! Ho decided to negotiate with the French and be prepared for war. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 239) Nevertheless, the Vietminh allowed French soldiers to return to Hanoi. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 240)

British soldiers arrive September 12, 1945. The general in charge is Douglas Gracey and he supported the French right of return to Indochina. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 221)He did everything to make this happen including violating “the instructions that the British occupation forces were not to interfere in the internal affairs of Indochina-i.e., that they were not to take sides in the developing conflict.” His orders were “to disarm the Japanese.”(Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 221-222)

Gracey ignored his orders. He allowed the French to “evict the Vietnamese from the administration of Saigon.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 222) He also ordered the Japanese forces to “police the city [Saigon].” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 222-223) “To demand that the Vietnamese-made obstacles to a French return be removed by the Japanese was contrary to the Potsdam decision.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 223)

The declaration of Vietnamese independence on August 5, 1945 was short-lived as French soldiers came with the British whose assigned mission was to disarm the Japanese soldiers in Southern Vietnam were “bent on reestablishing colonial control over all of Indochina.” (Truong Buu Lam. “Japan and the Disruption of the Vietnam see Nationalist Movement.” In Aspects of Vietnamese History. Walter Vella, ed. 262)

“In the northern part of Vietnam, pro-Chinese Vietnamese political groups returned in the wake of Kuomintang troops and tried to abolish all the political and administrative structures set up buy the Viet Minh. By and by, the Viet Minh administration and its followers withdrew into the shadow of secrecy.” (Truong Buu Lam. “Japan and the Disruption of the Vietnam see Nationalist Movement.” In Aspects of Vietnamese History. Walter Vella, ed. 262)

The French easily reestablished control over the whole country. Pro-French Vietnamese quickly came into the fold. Pro-Japanese Vietnamese joined them. “The Viet Minh was left quite alone to struggle against the French reconquest of their old colony, just as they had been left quite alone during the war to resist both the French and the Japanese.” (Truong Buu Lam. “Japan and the Disruption of the Vietnam see Nationalist Movement.” In Aspects of Vietnamese History. Walter Vella, ed. 263)

At this time, in order to placate any concern with their revolution, the Vietminh “decreed the death penalty for attacks on private property.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 233)

The French made sure the Fontainebleau conference failed and that war would ensue. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 253)

As the negotiations failed due to French duplicity, the French also illegally occupied Pleiku and Kontum and strengthened the garrison of Tourane.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 254)

The French, it turned out, from early 1946, planned to overthrow Ho Chi Minh. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 254) This convinced Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap “that the only way they could win was by conducting a people’s war which enjoyed the fullest support of the entire population.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 254)

As a result the Viet Minh abandoned the cities and fled to the countryside. “Saigon and Hanoi, as well as vital Haiphong; fully realizing that what was really vital in that kind of war were not the cities, the bridges, and whatever puny industries he had then or has now, but the allegiance of his people.” (Bernard Fall. Last Reflections on a War. 89)

The Vietminh “called a general strike in protest against the Franco-British effort to stifle the nationalist movement.” The French countered by ending negotiations with the Vietminh. Gracey supported the French by suspending “all Vietnamese newspapers. . . . And on September 21, Gracey proclaimed martial law.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 223) He then armed 1,400 French soldiers who attacked Vietnamese anywhere they saw them. They also occupied government buildings and arrested Vietnamese. “French civilians insulted and attacked Vietnamese walking on the streets while French and British soldiers looked on. Hundreds of Vietnamese were beaten up and jailed.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 224)

Gracey and the French colonial leaders were not pleased and ordered the French soldiers to their bases. Nevertheless, the Vietminh "retaliated with a vengeance.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 224) And, they prepared for war. It began on September 24, 1945 and quickly “spread over the entire South, and into Hanoi and the northern half of Vietnam.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 224-225)

A “general strike” occurred in Saigon and there was destruction of the electrical works, “and the central market was set on fire.” French and Franco-Vietnamese people were murdered in their residential areas. The Japanese were used to restore order. Random arrests of Vietnamese occurred. Buttinger calls this “the outbreak of civl war.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 225)

General Leclerc was in charge of the French military in Indochina and did not understand that this was a political war. He initially drives the Vietminh out of Saigon. The British aided the French including using their air force. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 226) Leclerc then attacked the Vietminh below the 16th parallel. “He thought of his campaign as a simple mopping up operation which would take no more than four weeks.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 227)

The Vietminh prepared for an attack on northern Vietnam. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 228) However, the Chinese occupied the north and were sympathetic to the Vietnamese desire for independence. No one contested Vietminh right to rule in the north. In early 1946 the “French still did not have a single armed soldier in the north.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 228) The Chinese would not allow it. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 229)

Although the Chinese brought with them anti-Vietminh nationalists. The Chinese were anti-communist. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 235) Also, the Chinese threw their weight around in Vietnam and the Vietminh had to accept it. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 236)

The Chinese left a lasting negative impression on the people of northern Viet Nam by robbing “the countryside bare.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 23)

Conflict between the French and the Vietnamese developed after the March 6, 1946 agreement. As Ho maneuvered around the French people questioned his desire for “winning a monopoly of power for the Communist Party” and his dedication “to the liberation of his people.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 246)

“Finally, on September 14, 1946, the break came. The French proved unyielding on the unification of Viet-Nam and at home not only the right wing but now the left wing was clamoring for results. In a dramatic session, Ho and the French Overseas Minister, Marius Moutet, signed a modus vivendi - an agreement to disagree - after Ho had vainly pleaded with him to relent somewhat on the terms. Moutet, boxed in by his own hawks, explained the he was unable to do so, and Ho signed, muttering audibly: I’m signing by death warrant.” (Bernard Fall. Last Reflections on a War. 86)

He believed that war was inevitable and told David Ben-Gurion so. It may have begun in December 1946 when “the French electrical plants in Viet-Nam . . . blew up. . . . Viet-Minh shock troops began to attack French garrisons from south of Saigon to the Chinese border.” (Bernard Fall. Last Reflections on a War. 86) The military mania charge was General Giap. Viet-Nam was also isolated from any Communist country. This would change after December, 1949 with the Chinese Communist Revolution. (Bernard Fall. Last Reflections on a War. 87)

After the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu the Vietminh were expected to attack Hanoi. The French were trapped in Hanoi and Haiphong. “Everywhere isolated French posts fell to the Vietminh, who knew that the French no longer had the reserves needed to interfere with their concentrated and determined attacks.” The morale fo the Vietnamese National Army, created by the French, was quite low. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 372) After the fall of Dien Bien Phu a “number of its soldiers chose to join the Vietminh.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 373)

French forces remained in Vietnam until July 1955. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 411-412)

The French were clueless as to the new Asia. Nationalist independence movements dominated the political and military sphere. In Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh led his communist dominated Viet Minh to leadership of independence for Vietnam and thus all of Indochina. (Roger Hilsman, To Move A Nation. 99)

The United States faced a dilemma by the French War in Indochina. It opposed colonialism but opposed communism even more. Some realized that their war to maintain control over their part of Asia was futile. In addition, any self governing governments “within the French Union” could not be taken seriously. Interestingly, State Department and CIA personnel in Saigon believe that the only way to resist communism was to grant full independence to Vietnam. Also interesting was the fact that in 1951 Congressman John F. Kennedy believed that the US supported colonialism. The US formed a middle of the road policy which was “the worst of both worlds.” (Roger Hilsman, To Move A Nation. 99)

The US used all its power to keep Red China and other communist nations from directly helping the Viet Minh. Following North Korean attack on South Korea in June 1950 and, the Russian and Chinese recognition of the Viet Minh as rulers of Vietnam “President Truman recognized the three “Associated States.” (Roger Hilsman, To Move A Nation. 99-100) After this US military aid flowed to France. “It is estimated that the United States financed 40 per cent of the total cost of France’s Indochina war between 1951 and 1954, and by mid-1954 was paying for more than 75 per cent of it.” (Roger Hilsman, To Move A Nation. 100)

President Truman increased aid to the French in Indochina after the North Korean attack on South Korea in June 1950. It was in September of 1950 that the creation of “indigenous armies in Indochina was the only way to save the situation there and preserve the French army in Europe.” The French demanded financial aid to do this.

Guerrilla Warfare

However, one guerrilla leader named De Tham fought the French to a standoff and was able to have his own semi-sovereign region in the early 1900s. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 127)

“A ruthless application of the scorched-earth policy and incessant attacks by small guerrilla bands succeeded in slowing down the French advance. Never and nowhere were the French safe from the guerrillas. They could be fought off, but they were seldom caught and returned again and again.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 227)

It was Nguyen Binh who perfected guerrilla tactics. The French, in turn, terrorized the Vietnamese peasants and destroyed villages “from which they had been fired upon, thus turning thousands of lukewarm nationalists and even people friendly to them into bitter enemies.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 260)

“Vietminh strategy between 1947 and 1950 called for keeping the French out of regions vital to the Hanoi government as sources of food, manpower, and minerals, and for harassing the French wherever they had established themselves. Though the Vietminh fighters, as ubiquitous and persistent as the country’s mosquitoes and leeches, did not succeed in expelling the French from their positions, they did succeed in immobilizing the men needed to hold them. . . . the guerrillas . . . carried on their fight chiefly by night, blowing up bridges, building road blocks, ambushing patrols and convoys, assassinating collaborators, and attacking lookouts.” The French were isolated and trapped. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 317)

Early in 1951 the Vietminh and French committed “the greatest military blunders” in their attempt to strike a decisive blow against each other. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 320) The Vietminh were well trained and equipped, however, the French defeated them in their first battle. The Vietminh decided to continue guerrilla tactics as a strategy. This was successful as the French gradually lost control of territory. “The famous de Lattre Line of watchtowers and small fortifications built in 1951 to stop further infiltration was about as effective as a sieve. the subversion of french control behind the line was called the “rotting away” (pourrissement) of the delta.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 320)

“In October, 1947, when General Valluy launched his first offensive to wipe out the Vietminh, the French were largely unaware of the advantages their opponent enjoyed-mountains in which to set up secret bases, jungles and marshes favoring the guerrillas, seemingly inexhaustible reserves of manpower, skill, and aggressiveness, and, above all, widespread popular support.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 320)

Valluy had 30,000 soldiers and hoped to “destroy Giap’s regular army, capture the Vietminh leaders.” He planned to surround Viet Bac with all the French arms they had available “in what was undoubtedly the greatest military action in French colonial history.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 320-321)

Throughout the war the French would maintain isolated military bases against the advice of military experts. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 324)

The French decided to create a government of anti-communists under the Emperor Bao Dai and to negotiate with him. They believed that this would undermine the Vietminh. If the Vietminh refused to accept this state of affairs of limited independence then the French believed they would crush them militarily. “But now it would no longer be a colonial war. It would become a war between two Vietnamese governments, a civil war, a war between “Communism” and “anti-Communism,” in which the role of the French would merely be to support the “anti-Communist” regime against the Vietminh.” This ignore the reality that nationalism drove the Vietnamese to support the Vietminh. The fact that the French dominated the anti-Communist and Bao Dai political organization made those organizations useless as they would not achieve real independence. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 286) Ironically, it was Leclerc who said, “Anti-Communism will remain useless as long as the problem of nationalism is not solved.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 286-287)

The French used all sorts of excuses to delay an independent Vietnam. They claimed they were willing to negotiate and make concessions, but only to a truly representative government, one willing to agree that the free state of Vietnam remain a member of the French Union.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 287)

However, the anti-Communist Vietnamese refused because they knew this would not lead to independence. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 287-288)

“Bao Dai had been residing in Hong Kong since disengaging himself from the Viet Minh in March, 1946. He had learned of the French plan of using him against the Vietminh back in January, 1947 . . . messengers and old collaborators of the French had been going to Hong Kong . . . only too confirm . . . Bao Dai, his will strengthened by his cautious advisers, was remaining aloof. . . . if the French wished to win his cooperation, they would have to offer him at least as much as Ho Chi Minh demanded: the dissolution of the Cochinchinese government, the reunification of Vietnam under one government, and, of course, independence.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 288-289)

The French properly looked at Bao Dai as a playboy. However, by 1947, Bao Dai had political acumen which he would demonstrate. He understood that the French were determined to deny Vietnamese independence. Nevertheless, the French were enthusiastic. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 289)

During the French War the French used Emperor Bao Dai but gave him no power.

Bao Dai refused to undermine Vietnamese independence by doing the French or go against the Vietminh, which “he frequently referred to as the resistance.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 291)

He stated that, “I belong to no party.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 292)

Although, in 1947, “Ho Chi Minh even had Bao Dai reconfirmed as supreme counselor of the government [in order to alleviate anti-communist criticism]. It was all in vain . . . Bao Dai . . . determined not to make common cause with Ho Chi Minh.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 296)

However, Bao Dai ended up lumping all "resistance to the French as Communist,” thus condemning “all non-Communists fighting with the Vietminh.” Therefore, these non communists,

“faced with the alternative of renouncing armed resistance or continuing to fight, these nationalists moved closer and closer to Communism . . . Once again anti-Communism turned more nationalists into Communists than did Communist propaganda.”

Bao Dai and other anti-communist nationalists proved ineffective in the fight against colonialism. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 296)

The French didn’t even accept Bao Dai’s conditions for peace. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 297)

The varied anti-Vietminh nationalists were hopelessly disorganized. They looked to Bao Dai to save their cause. There was the “moribund VNQDD and the Dong Minh Hoi.” They organized the United Front in China in February, 1947. They chose Bao Dai, unbeknownst to him, as their leader. In essence, they agreed to cooperate with the French. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 297)

“Bao Dai’s most loyal supporters were the royalist mandarins of Annam and Tongking, the most prominent of whom had been led into collaboration with the French by their hatred for the Vietminh.” The French used them to hide the fact that the French were the real rulers.(Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 298)

Anti-Communist nationalists preferred fighting between each other rather than accomplishing their stated goals. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 300) Ironically, some anti-Vietminh nationalists had an interest in a French military failure as the existence of the Vietminh gave them a reason the French needing them. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 301)

In the pressure of the moment Bao Dai agreed to collaborate with the French by signing an agreement which “even his most uncritical supporters let him know . . . seriously jeopardized his cause.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 301) Even the ultimate opportunity General Xuan criticized it. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 302)

Diem convinced Bao Dai to make more demands, “such as the immediate dissolution of the Cochinchinese government in favor of an Administrative Committee for the South as a first step toward reunification.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 302)

In December 1947 Bao Dai extricated himself by leaving Vietnam and traveling to France. He hoped to find out from the French government itself what their policy was. He was disappointed as the French government turned to the Right. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 302)

“General de Gaulle’s Rassemblement Populaire was expected to form the next government.” They rejected any previous French government agreements with the Vietminhand supported the “Bao Dai solution” even though Bao Dai “had little hpe” for an independent Vietnam. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 302-303)

The French put Bao Dai in charge of the State of Vietnam in 1948 which would be “an Associated State within the French Union.” The British and the Americans recognized this state in February of 1950. Laos and Cambodia received similar status. The People’s Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics “recognized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN) in early 1950. (Randle 4)

“On August 18, 1945, Bao Dai had addressed a moving appeal to de Gaulle on behalf of Vietnamese independence, in which he prophesied that, even if you were to . . . re-establish a French administration here, to would no longer be obeyed; eat village would be a nest of resistance, every former friend an enemy, and your officials and colonists themselves would ask to depart from this unbreathable atmosphere.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 270-271)

Bao Dai was put on the throne. His father was the Emperor Khai Dinh. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 146)

He liked being a playboy rather than an emperor. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 160)

Bao Dai spent his early life in France returning in 1932 to become emperor. But the court life was alien to him. The nationalists believed him a traitor for cooperating with the French. In 1945 the Japanese captured him while he was out hunting. “In exchange for his life he signed a proclamation announcing the independence of his country and the end of French rule.” After the Japanese surrender Ho Chi Minh forced Bao Dai to abdicate and given “the derisory title of Ho’s supreme counselor,” as described by Bodard. Ho took Bao Dai to “revolutionary meetings.” The “superstitious populace . . . believed Bao Dai to be a god.” (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 69)

Bao Dai maneuvered his way to China and away from the Viet Minh. Interestingly, the Americans operated on the belief that Vietnam was a southern Chinese province. (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 69)

Continuing his bouncing around by the major players in Vietnamese politics the Governor-General Pignon again put Bao Dai on the throne. Pignon’s attempts to reform the reactionary colonial government in Saigon with “the active zeal of Nguyen Binh’s Resistance” failed so, he brought in Bao Dai. The is the French butting into someone else’s business. Bao Dai would be a puppet supporting the French created Republic of Vietnam. (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 69)

Bao Dai joined the Vietminh as well as "wealthy men . . . a Catholic leader agreed to become Ho Chi Minh’s first minister of economics, why Catholic priests came out in support of the government.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 232)

In Hue . . . Bao Dai declared his willingness to have Ho Chi Minh form a government, but popular sentiment expressed at a mass rally in Hanoi prevented this compromise with the old regime, though Ho Chi Minh probably would have accepted. Instead, Bao Dai was asked to resign. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 209-210) There is no more convincing testimony to the popular support the Vietminh enjoyed at that time than that Bao Dai gave up his throne on August 25 and expressed has support of a Vietminh regime.” Bao Dai later stated that “he would rather be a simple citizen of a free country, he said, than the ruler of one that was enslaved.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 209-210)

“The year 1948 brought the gradual erosion of Bao Dai’s resistance; 1949, its collapse.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 303) The French manipulated the demise of the influence of Bao Dai by claiming they were about to negotiate with the Vietminh; they were not. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 304)

Bao Dai appointed General Xuan head of government. “The armed forces and foreign policy were to remain in French hands, while the transfer of governmental authority in other fields was envisaged only on the basis of separate accords still to be concluded.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 305)

In the end “no respected nationalist would join any of the governments created later in the name of Bao Dai.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 307)

With the Chinese Communist revolution of 1949, Bao Dai believed that the French would agree to an independent Vietnam in order to get American aid as the Americans were eager to counter a perceived communist threat. However, the French never allowed that to happen. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 309)

The French made another flawed attempt to counter the Vietminh with a Bao Dai government. They allowed the Vietnamese to have their “own police force and granted the right to appoint some ambassadors and delegates to the Assembly and High Council of the French Union, two bodies distinguished for their total lack of influence on policy-making. In matters of real importance, the agreement either permanently restricted the exercise of sovereignty or made it dependent on separate, yet-to-be-concluded accords.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 309)

This was complicated because the agreement between Bao Dai and the French required “the creation of a territorial assembly for Cochinchina to decide on where this part of Vietnam was to be returned to centralized rule. But permission for the creation of such an assembly had to be given by the French parliament, and once constituted, the decisions it reached also required approval by the French legislature.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 309)

Bao Dai appointed Nguyen Van Tam prime minister of Vietnam in 1952. This was the last of the so called Bao Dai solution. Tam was considered a French lackey. This, consequently, pleased the Vietminh. By 1950 controlled territory and had an army. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 315)

Regarding the creation by the French of a Vietnamese national army to fight the Vietminh, Bao Dai said, “It would be too dangerous to expand the Vietnamese Army, because it might defect en masse and go to the Vietminh.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 331)

“In fact, a few companies did defect; others refused to go out on patrol or move for their home districts. Nguyen Van Hinh, a French citizen and French officer, who became its general and chief of staff, said it would take seven years before the National Army would be ready to relieve the Expeditionary Corps of its static duties and take part in offensive operations against the Vietminh.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 331-332)

Officials in the Bao Dai government lived in luxury at the “expense of the people.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 336) His supporters were “rich Vietnamese in the cities, and above all the large landowners.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 343) Attempts by Bao Dai’s government to keep Vietnam afloat and independent went for naught. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 343-344)

The Bao Dai government felt betrayed. However, they were created by the French. They claimed that only Bao Dai represented the Vietnamese nation and that the Vietminh had no standing. They argued that the Vietminh army should be integrated into the army of the State of Vietnam and that the agreed upon elections should use the State of Vietnam as the authority. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 376) Any government elected would serve under Bao Dai, they maintained. Only the Americans supported this. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 376) However, the French recognized the Bao Dai government and Ngo Dinh Diem was called by Bao Dai to lead that government. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 377) Partition was now a fact. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 378)

After the Chinese Communist Revolution of 1949 the Laokay path to connect with the Viet Minh fell to them and thus, could out flank the French in Tonkin. (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 47) Chien tranh Phap - “It was at Laokay (Lao Cai) that I first had the painful revelation that the war in Indochina might be lost,” wrote Bodard. “Up until then I had lived in a state of illusion. Like all the rest of the French I admitted that the Vietminh had an undoubted superiority in treacherous art of guerrilla warfare, that murderous, bloody hide-and-seek.” French soldiers claimed they could beat the Vietminh in an open battle. Now, Bodard had his doubts. (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 47)

Chien tranh Phap - “For at Laokay (Lao Cai) I saw Giap’s regiments attack the French army in force. For the first time the Vietminh regulars, slipping out of their quadrilateral, launched a real offensive. And in the face of their attack the French officers changed their presumptuousness for fear, their complex of superiority for a complex of inferiority, and all this in a matter of days, even of hours. They fought with wonderful courage; yet at the same time they fought like mens who were going to be beaten in time to come.” This fore told Dien Bien Phu. (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 47-48)

Chien tranh Phap - Bodard waited for the “new, hard, pure, remorseless Asia.” (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 48)

Chien tranh Phap - Major military combat took place along R.C. 4. “Everywhere else it was guerrilla fighting and small-scale murder.”

“In this part of Tonkin, an almost uninhabitable jungle, the French strategy was to hold strong points such as Langson and Caobang, which were linked by the road, the R.C. . They therefore depended entirely on the road, whereas the Vietminh did not, for they were supplied by coolies coming through the jungle paths. So the Vietminh strategy was to cut the road. They already had whole regiments for this task, and presently they were to have whole divisions.” (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 48)

“In the end the Vietminh did cut the R.C. 4 for good and all and the French had to rely on airlift; but in 1949 things had not reached that stage.” (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 48)

Several miles of trucks of various sorts traveled the R.C. 4 which was simply a gash in the landscape. There was the French military and the many ethnic traders. The French forces made up peoples of various nationalities who “could only be told from one another by the range of their headgear.” (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 49) Nevertheless, the Viet Minh “shoot us like rabbits,” said a French sergeant. (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 51)

“The sergeant explained how impossible it was to protect a convoy, whatever one did or tried to do: and yet everything had been tried. The defense had begun in the simplest way. The army built a post wherever an ambush had taken place. They had to build a great many. For no sooner was one finished than the next ambush was laid just next to it, only a few hundred yards away: a new fort was set up on the spot. . . . there began the practice of sweeping the road. This was carried out from one end of the R.C. 4 to the other. On a convoy day each post sent a patrol out as far as the next post to inspect the road, drive the Viets away from it and fill up the holes and cutting they had made. It was a huge and very dangerous task, with small groups of men searching every yard of the road, fighting and carrying out repairs. The convoy would only leave when messages came in from every post announcing that the way was clear. Often it was not. The Viets only had to hide in the green walls on either side not to be seen. The convoys went on being shot to pieces, and often a sweeping party was destroyed as well, as a preliminary.” (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 53)

The French decided on a very detailed search of the area twice a week. Every mountain, every hill, and every cave was searched. The French forces cut paths to all of these areas. However, there was not enough manpower. (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 53)

The French realized that large numbers of forces had to be deployed on every military operation. Every detail had to be taken care of. Planning had to be thorough. Nevertheless, the result were the same. “The Viets always had the advantage. It was absurd to imagine that it was possible to go through such a solid jungle and such ragged, tumbled mountains with a fine tooth comb. Trying to do so never stopped the Viet regulars from slipping though the networked of French defenses in thousands whenever and wherever they chose, and massing on the sides of the R.C. 4; just as they had done before, they remained hidden behind the embankments until the convoy arrived, and then they destroyed all or part of it.” (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 53-54)

Bodard calls this section of his book, the dirty war. “I saw every sort of guerrilla and counter guerrilla fighting. So often I wanted to ask a French officer, man to man, Can you defend civilization while you let yourself slide toward everything most inimical to it - violence, deliberate cruelty, torture?” Even in France this type of warfare was condemned. Interestingly, the soldiers themselves “took a strange pleasure in knowing themselves alone and misunderstood.” Few officers doubted French military policy or the military leaders in Indochina. “Their superiors were tolerant of mediocrity, eccentricity, and even vice, but not of independent thinking or, or, worse, pessimism.”(Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 59)

“Both the Vietminh and the French, of course, showed me masses of pictures of atrocities committed by the other side. I never, with my own eyes, saw any French atrocities. But I see ugly things. Often I saw French patrols returning from abandoned villages, garlanded with chickens, and driving herds of pigs and water buffaloes.” (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 59)

Muslim soldiers raped Vietnamese men which was an unusual practice. (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 60)

“Whole villages were burned and dynamited” on French military orders for “anti-French activities.” (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 60)

The French dropped Vietminh captives from planes. (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 60)

French journalists knew not to report what they saw or what they were told. (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 59, 60)

Torture, said one officer, was the “least wasteful method - the method which saves most lives.” (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 61) The officer continued, “I was in the Resistance in France. When I got to Asia, I was revolted by what I saw. We are like to Boches I thought. We are applying the principles of the occupation of France: Order, Collaboration Repression. I am an assassin like them. I thought of resigning my commission, but I hadn’t the courage: it would have been casting a terrible slur on the French army.” (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 61)

“We French had come back to Indochina to fight a war of colonial reconquest. But very soon, almost inspire of ourselves, and certainly in spit of our second thoughts, our monstrous errors, and our basic incomprehension, we have become the only force which keeps the Vietnamese from falling into the Kafkaesque world of Asiatic Communism. And because of that we have millions of people with us, notables and nha-ques alike. No doubt they don’t like us, and will want to get rid of us later. But in their hearts they have the anguish of knowing that only we can save them.” (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 61)

“We are here to defend human values. . . . to defend them, we must degrade ourselves.” (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 61) “People . . . must be “converted to the Good. . . . Whoever resists the Good . . . is a criminal.” (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 62)

The officer then defends the torture and murders of the Inquisition of the middle ages. He then claims torture is part of Asian civilization. It is necessary against the “Viets.” The French would lose the war “and we would lose all the support of the population” if they did not torture. (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 62)

Nevertheless, the officer believes that the Indochinese War with its torture drives one insane. (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 63)

But the officer explains that the Vietminh on the other hand have a “well-established criteria” for their atrocities. The so-called guilty persons crimes are described and the appropriate punishment implemented. This establishes the “Reds” as the supreme arbiter of conflict and confirms an “obsessive belief that the Party is omnipresent and omniscient. Not even an evil thought can be hidden from the Party.” (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 63)

“The discipline of Viet guerrillas, regulars and cadres is unbelievable. The great rule is that the soldier is the people’s friend. In the villages he helps with the housework and the harvest, he smiles, he’s polite, he plays with the children, he makes himself useful in every way he can. He never steals; any soldier who takes a handful of rice by force is promptly shot before the whole population.” (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 63)

“But he does not know what the Expeditionary Force will do when it bursts into his village; perhaps they will burn down his house, perhaps they will give him medicine. Their punishments and rewards make no sense to him.” (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 63)

“What does a regular army, an occidental army, do about a population in which every individual is involved in the hostilities? The old international law, in which civilians who fight are treated as francs-tireurs, cannot be applied, or we would have to shoot millions of men, old people, women, and children. There is no official point of view. Saigon insists on mildness, and says that we are not making war but suppressing a revolt (though it seems to me the word suppression is even worse than the word war). The high command forbids flam throwers and napalm, and recommends that tanks and artillery should be used with extreme moderation. But big set-piece operations in battalion strength are mounted in areas where there are only guerrillas and assassination committees. Useless and murderous. You attack a village; it turns out no Viets are there; but you have have killed a crowd of nha-ques; and you find women and children lying on the ground torn to pieces by your shell bursts. And after that, they’re supposed to love you!” There are appalling atrocities committed by the Expeditionary Force. Soldiers killed “people passing by” but were simply transferred. (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 63-64)

The officer claims also that the French execute their own soldiers for rape, for example. However, he claims that frequently the Vietnamese woman claims rape when she doesn’t believe she was paid appropriately. (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 64)

The officer blames the Vietminh for provoking atrocities by committing much more than the French. The Americans, he said, in what became true during the American War, would commit many more atrocities by simply bombing selected areas. “Liquidate the population and liquidate the problem.” (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 65)

In what would become a familiar tale during the American War, Chien Tranh My, “the officer spoke mournfully of the high command’s clumsy tactics, of poor training for jungle fighting, of too-heavy equipment and a want of mobility, of the army’s enormous and absurd bureaucracy, of excellent Intelligence and purblind staff interpretations, of the Commander in Chief’s shortsighted optimism. (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 65-66)

“Pignon, the French High Commissioner from 1948-1950, dreamed of a great Vietnamese policy.” (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 69)

Guerrilla Warfare - “Guerrilla warfare is not merely one aspect of the art of fighting. It is in the first place a pitiless logic - the logic of the utter want of compassion. It is the mathematics of persuasion, into which there enter precisely weighed doses of brainwashing and atrocity. It is a matter of arriving at correct solutions by means of dialectic reasoning, solutions that will allow one to dominate human beings completely and turn them into perfect tools for the cause. It requires a total dehumanization; all civilized society’s feelings vanish; individuals no longer exist. The goal is the creation of the People, the politically worked-over mass that acts as the supporting basis for the guerrillas, the mass that is to be urged and drawn on to a higher fate and that is to be sacrificed to that fate.” (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 33-34)

This “infected the French.” It became a facet of their counterinsurgency. “it was corrupting, catching delight in it - Asia’s well-known sadism. In the end it was a sickness of the mind that infected even the most normal human beings.”(Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 34)

Despite descriptions of Asian cruelty, Bodard describes the inability of the French Foreign Legion to defeat the Vietminh due to the latters holding “impregnable places of safety just at hand.On the one side the Plain of Reeds thrust out an arm as far as Hocmon, and on the other the Moi forest stretched out to Thuddaumot, a few miles away. Saigon was in easy reach, and there were the hunted Vietminh leaders concealed themselves under a variety of disguises.” (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 34)

A French officer told Bodard that once one of his soldiers is wounded he stops fighting and uses every available soldier to transport the wounded. Due to the jungle marshes this is necessary. He didn’t know what the Vietminh did. “So you don’t kill many Viets? We kill scores of them. But there are always just as many left - in fact more. There’s an inexhaustible supply. And then it’s not always the real full-blown Viet that we kill. We only know afterwards, and not always then. Often they are just villagers, people’s militia . . .” (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 40)

A large area of jungle occupied by the French “was totally cut off from the Tonkin delta. It was separated from it by the Vietminh” who also had access to Ho Chi Minh’s headquarters. French planes “had to leapfrog” for supplies. The pilots flew on sight alone. There were no communications towers. They frequently crashed. They would also take off with “zero visibility.” (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 41, 42)

The French soldiers “displayed a kind of weariness, a kind of deliberate carelessness.” (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 41)

Dying in Indochina was stupid. (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 44)

The French High Commissioner d’Argenlieu vehemently opposed the agreement. “The Admiral had served in World War I and . . . joined the Carmelite Order.” He rejoined the navy at the beginning of World War II. He was very close to Charles DeGaulle. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 246)

“Like so many Frenchmen, he (d’Argenlieu) was unaware of the force and purpose of the national movement. But once in Saigon, he realized that his mission was bound to fail unless the national rebels were defeated.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 247)

Although the French were winning the war against the Viet Minh it was draining them of “postwar treasure (it finally cost France about $10 billion, in addition to $954 million United States aid actually expended in Indochina prior to July, 1954) it became increasingly clear that France had entirely lost sight of any clearly definable war aims. General Henri-Eugene Navarre, the unfortunate French commander-in-chief at the time of the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, was to argue later in his book Agonie de l’indochina that there were two acceptable but contradictory war aims: France could be expected to fight the Indochina War alone but with all her might only if the Indochina States would accept a special relationship that would justify the expenditure in blood and money that would entail - and if they were willing to help in the fight to the utmost of their abilities. If, on the other hand, the Indochina War had become an integral part of the world-wide struggle, led by the United States, for the containment of communism, all other nations concerned with stopping communism had an obligation equal to that of France to participate in the struggle.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. vii-viii)

Nevertheless, the Vietminh controlled more territory toward the end of 1946 than they had before. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 260)

“French intransigence became something like a secret weapons for the Communists. . . . The French insisted on collaboration under conditions that made native self-rule a farce, and the Communists insisted on unity under conditions that forced all other resistance groups to give up their identities and become satellites of the Vietminh.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 260)

When war between the Vietminh and the French officially broke in 1946 out the Vietminh had 100,000 soldiers. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 261)

The spark for the conflict occurred on August 29, 1946 when “French Army units at Haiphong expelled the Vietnamese from their customs house at Haiphong.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 262)

On November 20, 1946 actual combat took place. The first at Langson where the French defeated the Vietminh. The second occurred at Haiphong. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 263) A French seized a Chinese boat so, the Vietminh seized that same French boat and took three prisoners. In the fighting that followed the Vietminh took three more prisoners. The French commander decided to retrieve them all by force. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 263-264) Negotiations followed and the prisoners were released. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 264)

On November 23, 1946 the French demanded that the Vietminh forces leave Haiphong. When they did not, "the French threw everything they had into the battle for Haiphong-Infantry, takes, artillery, airplanes, and even naval guns, which fired at Vietnamese sectors where there was no fighting at all. Even civilians who had managed to reach open terrain outside the town were fired upon by the naval guns because they were mistaken for soldiers massing for an attack. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 265-266) Anywhere from 6,000 to 20,000 people were killed. “There was no one left in Haiphong in a position either to count the dead or interested in doing so. . . . The battle for Haiphong lasted several days. Vietnamese resistance was strong, but their arms were inadequate.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 266)

The Vietminh government tried to ameliorate the situation. However, the French continued to assert their power over Vietnam much to the despair of the Vietnamese. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 266-267)

Giap prepared for war by sending his soldiers out of Hanoi and other large cities. He also ordered “roadblocks between Hanoi and Haiphong. In Hanoi itself, the Vietminh began to erect barricades, dig trenches, fell trees, and bore tunnels for safe passage between their various strongholds. . . . Some needed little provocation to attack French soldiers or even civilians, and not a day now passes without shooting in some part of the city.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 267)

However, the French “became daily more aggressive.” And the Saigon French derailed any attempts by Ho Chi Minh to negotiate with Blum. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 268)

The French attacked Hanoi removing all barricades and occupying Ho Chi Minh’s house. Better equipped French soldiers were able to push the Vietminh out of areas they controlled. The took over the major “towns and cities in Tongking and northern Annam. However, as in the South, the countryside was and remained under effective Vietminh control.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 269)

FRENCH PUBLIC

Much has been made about who fired the first shot. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 269) But the real issue is French resistance to historical inevitability, namely, nationalism. Also, and ironically, the French war against the Vietnamese “violated the very principles on which France herself bases her political existence.” The wartime leader Charles DeGaulle exerted heavy influence on French politics at the time and stated, “United with the overseas territories which she [France] opened to civilization, France is a great power. Without these territories she would be in danger of no longer being one.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 270)

The French argued that the were fighting against communism, nothing else. “France, it seems, was sacrificing her wealth and her manpower to save Vietnam for the free world. It was a conflict between Democracy and Communism.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 278)

It quickly became clear that this was a colonial war. “The military welcomed the war . . . for they knew that negotiation meant recognition of Vietnam’s independence, and this the French were unwilling to grant.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 278)

As Paris began to make “concessions” to end the war the French colonials sabotaged them which led to charges of French “duplicity” as well as extended the war. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 280)

Those who wanted negotiations created the question of, if you do not negotiate with the Vietminh, then who do you negotiate with? The French contended that the Vietminh “were not really representative of the people.” Therefore, would it be possible for the French to create another government that they could negotiate with? “And if such a government were to become capable of taking the wind out of the sails of the Vietminh, would it not have to obtain what the Vietminh tired to achieve-full independence. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 281)

Interestingly, General Leclerc initially believed that the war “could not be won” as the Vietnamese were united against the French. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 284) He believed that there was only a political solution. Despite this the French military in Vietnam was confident. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 285)

Interestingly as well, the French government claimed that Vietminh radio broadcasts desiring peace could not be considered official and therefore could be ignored. Even the French Communists supported the hostile French Indochina policy. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 285)

“However, when, after two months of fighting, it became evident that prospects for a quick military solute were anything but good, Leclerc’s belief that the main problem in Vietnam was political rapidly gained ground in the more enlightened circles of the Left and Center.” The military “remained ludicrously optimistic.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 285)

“Once the war spread to the North and Ho Chi Minh called the nation to arms, even the exiled anti-Vietminh and the Dong Minh Hoi appealed to the people to join the fight against the French.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 288)

The French then offered liberty over independence. What did that mean? It “meant that the army, diplomacy, the federal services, and the federal budget would remain in French hands.” The French were determined “to remain masters of Vietnam.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 293)

“Driven from Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh and his government had retired into the old rebel country known as the Viet Bac, as inaccessible to the French for the time being as were the large Vietminh held territories in northern Annam and their mountainous retreat south of Hue.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 294)

“The first great attempt to destroy the Vietminh militarily was known to have failed.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 303)

In October 1949, the same time the Communists took control over China, the French agreed to limited self government for the Vietnamese. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 309)

“After five years of costly and arduous effort, the French were farther from their goal than they had been at the outbreak of hostilities. . . . At first the war had gone badly for the Vietminh. They had lost not only Hanoi, Haiphong, and Hue, but by the end of March, 1947, they had also almost all towns in Tongking and northern Annam and many of their lines of communication. The Vietminh army, which had remained largely intact, was moved into the Viet Bac, the mountainous region north of Hanoi, and for the duration of the war the Viet Bac remained a training ground, supply base, and command center of the armed forces, as well as the governmental and organizational headquarters of the Vietminh.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 316)

First, the French could not occupy the whole country. By 1947, the Vietminh controlled the countryside and the the only conclusion that could be reached was that the whole country of Vietnam was against the French. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 316-317) “The strong nationalist and anti-French sentiment of the population explained the widespread support enjoyed by the Vietminh fighting units. This support made it possible for them to assemble without fear of discovery, to replenish their ranks, and to create an intelligence network that kept them informed about the strength, movement, and even the plans of the French.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 317)

As the Vietminh began to attack the French in 1950 and, as the Vietminh controlled most of the country, the French realized that they could not garner enough soldiers to defeat them. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 319)

“An erroneous opinion that gained currency soon after the outbreak of the Indochina War holds that the defeat of the French was due to their alleged ignorance of Vietminh military theory and Vietminh ingenuity in mobilizing the population. But the French knew a great deal more in 1952 than the Americans had learned in 1965.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 336) “Nor was the French defeat due to massive outside (Chinese) aid to the Vietminh, despite the claims of Western propaganda. The French were losing long before Chinese aid became effective. And since Chinese aid resulted in vastly greater and speedier US assistance, it is safe to say that the Vietminh would have defeated the French also without Chinese aid.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 336-337)

The Viet Minh began their attacks on the northern highlands where Dien Bien Phu is located in October, 1952. They “overran the first line of French defensive positions in less than a week.” Next came a battle at Na-San. The French brought in enormous amounts of troops and artillery. General Giap decided to have the Viet Minh use “human wave attacks” which were successful for the Chinese in the Korean War. However, the French positions held. The French would use the same strategy at Dien Bien Phu. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 24)

“While Giap laid siege to Na-San, a part of his forces bypassed the French hedgehog and plunged deeper into T’ai territory, sweeping aside the light screen of small outposts which stood between them and the border of Laos. The French high command suddenly became aware of the new danger and hurriedly marched a Laotian light infantry battalion from San Neua to Dien Bien Phu. But it was obviously no match for of the Viet-Minh’s 316th Division plus the 148th Independent Regiment. Dien Bien Phu was evacuated without a fight on November 30, 1952.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 25)

The French military downplayed the loss of Dien Bien Phu. However, “journalists and other observers knew that the loss of the whole highland area . . . constituted a severe French defeat. The occupation of Dien Bien Phu in particular gave the Viet-Minh an open door into northern Laos. General Salan, despite what his press officer said, was perfectly aware of the importance of the valley of Dien Bien Phu.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 25)

However, a secret order, issued by General Salan, recognized the significance of the valley and ordered the recapture Dien Bien Phu in early 1953. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 25) It was also an acknowledgement that the “situation had badly deteriorated” in the Red River Valley. Retaking Dien Bien Phu would threaten “the Viet Minh rear areas.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 26)

“Salan underlined the usefulness of a reconquest of Dien Bien Phu as a stepping stone to the relief of the garrison of encircled Na-San. There can therefore be no doubt that the importance of Dien Bien Phu had become ingrained in French military thinking. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 26)

In late November of 1952 a Laotian battalion allied with the French had withdrawn from Dien Bien Phu and left the area to the Viet Minh. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 8-9) Interestingly, no one thought that the Viet Minh would attack the local village because it was economically and agriculturally successful. Opium that was produced was used by the Viet Minh to buy American weapons and European medicine “on the black markets of Bangkok and Hong Kong.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 9)

Large Viet Minh units formed at Dien Bien Phu. They had combat experience; victory and defeat. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 9) “What had attracted Viet-Minh heavy weapons units to Dien Bien Phu was exactly what made the valley attractive to the French High Command also : wide open spaces in the midst of a mountain area whose unused airfield (the Viet-Minh, of course, did not possess a single aircraft) could be put to good use as both a firing range and a training ground for the troops.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 9-10)

The airstrip at Dien Bien Phu was “sabotaged against possible use by French aircraft.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 10)

The Viet Minh knew that the upcoming battle would see them face the best of the French Army. As the French paratroops dropped the Viet Minh began shooting. The paratroops were scattered. This proved a problem for the Viet Minh as well as the French forces were not in one place. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 11)

There were French military officers who “opposed to the idea of establishing another airhead behind Communist lines.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 18)

Navarre presented plans that ignored the air base at Na-San. “Na-San tied down the effectiveness of a light division and an important share of the available air transport tonnage without tying down even its own equivalent in enemy manpower.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 31)

After the war, Navarre and Cogny argued over who and why a base at Dien Bien Phu was set up. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 31)

“Certainly it would be unrealistic to expect the Vietnamese to rally to a French colonial cause, to fight the Vietnamese of the Vietminh with only unreliable promises of something describes as free association with the French Union.” In France, however, French officials questioned relying on Vietnamese forces to fight the war. It would also take about a year to train these forces. (Randle 9)

General Pau Ely, the French army chief of staff, “warned the government that the Navarre Plan would not permit General Navarre to hold Laos, and might even result in the loss of the Red River delta if the Vietminh launched a determined offensive.” (Randle 9)

The American military establishment doubted the workability of the Navarre Plan. However, the Americans decided to let the French make their own decisions which included “the Laniel government’s rejection of negotiating directly with the DRVN.” (Randle 17)

“The Indochinese War had not yet caught the attention of the American public.” (Randle 17)

An American government concern was how to support the French and keep the war a French affair and to modify right-wing Republicans. (Randle 17)

Laniel played both sides in France: those who wanted to end the war through negotiation and those who wanted to pursue victory. (Randle 18)

In the years of the Laniel government, “the Vietminh were rebels and therefore could not demand to be treated as a legitimate entity, particularly since France and her allies had recognized another government of the Vietnamese people.” (Randle 18)

Operation Castor began on November 20, 1953. First, there was an aerial assessment of Dien Bien Phu as to where beast to drop paratroopers and supplies. Weather was most significant. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 1) General Rene Cogny commanded the French in Viet-Nam. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 2) The airplane mechanics worked exhaustively to keep the planes supplying Dien Bien Phu in working order. however, there were not enough mechanics for the planes. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 3)

The Viet Minh already had forces in the area and this would endanger some of the troop and supply drops at Dien Bien Phu. Therefore, General Gilles hoped to paratroop soldiers in such a way as to surround the Viet Minh and capture their commander. But that was a fantasy. The French did not have enough soldiers to perform such as task. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 4) “Natasha” was the name of the first drop zone. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 5)

The paratroopers were supremely confident of victory. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 6) However, the paratroop drop from the planes meant that they would be dispersed over more territory than had been planned. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 7-8)

In the first battle it was French and Vietnamese fore who defended the base. This is significant because “mixed French-Vietnamese units on the whole fought better than purely Vietnamese units and also purely European units (who did not have the benefit of the knowledge of local terrain and language of their Vietnamese comrades) is an important lesson of the French-Indochina War that apparently was forgotten in south Viet-Nam ten years later.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 8)

French General Navarre built up his forces to achieve victory in 1954 or 1955. (Roger Hilsman. To Move a Nation. 100) However, the French generals “persisted in fighting the guerrilla war with large-scale conventional tactics-which permitted General Giap, the Viet Minh supreme commander, to choose just when and where he would accept the challenge to fight a conventional battle.” (Roger Hilsman. To Move a Nation. 100) Dien Bien Phu would be the place chosen by the French to defeat the Viet Minh by blocking their supply lines from China. Thus, Navarre put his best soldiers, “elite parachutists, and made it a standing dare to the Viet Minh” at Dien Bien Phu. (Roger Hilsman. To Move a Nation. 100)

By January 30, 1954, the portions were set as Giap place soldiers “in the hills around Dien Bien Phu while other troops and thousands of peasant sympathizers began the “impossible” task of hauling artillery up over the mountainous trails by hand.” (Roger Hilsman. To Move a Nation. 100)

However, believing he had the upper hand “Giap attacked Na Sam on November 23 [1953 and was] repulsed.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 349) Licking his wounds Giap took “a rather unimportant and poorly garrisoned town by the name of Dien Bien Phu.” He took posts along the Laotian border. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 350)

In December 1953 Giap moved his forces into Laos. In January 1954 General “Navarre began his much advertised and later much criticized Operation Atlante. He “relied heavily on units of the Vietnamese National Army. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 355-356) The French moved north where they were met by the Vietminh. The battle that ensued was more bloody than Dien Bien Phu and the French forces were wiped out. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 356)

“On May 7, 1954, the French forces at Dienbienphu surrendered, and on May 8, the discussions at Geneva turned to the question of Indochina.” Continued military advances by the Vietminh left the Russians and Chinese concerned that the US would become involved. The two nations were sure that a partition of Vietnam would benefit the Vietminh in the long run. This pressure on Hanoi did not sit well with the Vietminh. (Roger Hilsman. To Move a Nation. 102-103)

The defeat of communism in Indochina became a serious issue after the Chinese communist victory in 1949. The US refused to negotiate with Ho Chi Minh and believed that the future of the war against communist expansion lay at Dien Bien Phu. The Eisenhower Administration supported the Bao Dai solution. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 360) This made the Franco-Vietnam War a war between East and West, between communism and democracy. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 360)

Many American “legislators, political analysts, and military leaders, were opposed to aiding France as long as the Associated States were denied full independence.” The US, however, decided that aid to the French would not help them defeat the Vietminh. The US support for the French in Indochina had to do with fighting communism rather than, as it appeared, to support French colonialism. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 361)

In May 1950 the United States committed monies to support the French military effort in Indochina which they claimed would “bring stability and order to Indochina.” The beginning of the Korean War increased the Truman Administrations concerns over the war in Indochina. Following the armistice in Korea in 1953 the Eisenhower administration focused on Indochina. (Randle 10)

President Eisenhower evoked concern that communist armies would shift their efforts from Korea to Indochina thus misunderstanding the war on a fantastic scale. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles reiterated this view two days later. (Randle 10)

The PAVNs invasion of Laos in April 1953 prompted the United States to give “C-119 troop transports to the Royal Laotian government.” The Eisenhower Administration worried that Thailand could be threatened and so would receive American military aid. Following the Korean War the Chinese increased their aid to the DRVN. (Randle 10)

As a result, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced on September 2, 1953 that, “Communist China has been and now is training, equipping and supplying the communist forces in Indochina. There is the risk that, as in Korea, Red China might send its own army into Indochina. The Communist Chinese regime should realize that such a second aggression could not occur without greave consequences which might not be confined to Indochina.” (Randle 11)

In addition, the Americans were frustrated by French failure “to solve the problem of Vietnamese independence. Unless the charge of colonial repression could bee avoided - unless the French could be persuaded to give the Vietnamese genuine independence - the government of the State of Vietnam could not win the allegiance of the Vietnamese nationalists and the Navarre Plan could not succeed.” (Randle 11)

“A report of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs stated in June 1953: . . . that until the peoples of the Associated States are assured of receiving their ultimate independence, success in driving out the communist invaders will be difficult, if not impossible to achieve.” (Randle 11-12)

The US pushed France to do at least give the semblance of independence to the Vietnamese but decidedly did not lobby for real independence. Furthermore, the US did not want to be associated with maintaining French colonialism. (Randle 12)

The US also introduced the domino theory, namely, that all of Southeast Asia would go communist if the Vietminh were not defeated and the French were not victorious. This became more important than the independence of Vietnam. The US spread propaganda that the Communists were outside influences and indigenous to Vietnam. The US would do all it could to derail a peace agreement after the fall of the French. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 361)

Other Americans were shocked by the French acceptance of defeat and appalled by the idea of compromise. The China Lobby and Republicans viewed this as,

“another betrayal of the cause of freedom. Vice-President Nixon, Secretary Dulles, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Radford, also took the position that such compromise must be avoided, if necessary through direct U.S. military intervention.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 365)

“The maneuverings of these three powerful men, which, in the absence of Presidential leadership, remained uncoordinated throughout, are among the saddest chapters in U.S. diplomacy. The first one to act, entirely on his own, to bring about direct military intervention, was Admiral Radford. He induced Ely to postpone his departure for Paris . . . during which he persuaded the receptive French general that a massive U.S. airstrike could still save the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu. Radford assured Ely that Eisenhower would approve such a step.” The French agreed. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 365-366)

However, the US changed its mind. However, “Dulles had an entirely different concept of the U.S. role.” However, he needed US Congressional support. And, Dulles did not want a one time attack to help at Dien Bien Phu; he wanted to free Indochina from communism. And, the US would lead a “Western coalition.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 366)

However, with popular support for the war waning in France the French believed that the Americans were “willing to fight to the last French soldier.” (Randle 13-14) American involvement in the war was “suspect.” (Randle 14)

There was talk that the US would become directly involved. Congressional reaction did not support this. (Randle 14)

“The United States could increase its diplomatic pressure to persuade the French to grant independence to the Associated States. This could result in the French pulling out of Indochina altogether, which, in view of the popularity of the Vietminh in many areas of Indochina (a fact appreciated in hight government circles), would result in a Vietminh takeover of Vietnam, and possible even Laos and Cambodia. If, on the other hand, this increased pressure did not eventuate in a withdrawal of French Union forces, it would antagonize the French, weaken the Western alliance, and most certainly jeopardize the European Defense Community treaty, which had not yet been rectified by the French National Assembly.” (Randle 14)

The United States did not look at a Communist Vietnam as independent of the USSR and Red China in 1953. Therefore, Indochina was still considered “strategically important” by the United States. (Randle 16) Thus, the American view “on the strategic significance of a Vietminh victory described the situation in such metaphors as a chain reaction, a cork in a bottle, and a row of dominoes - implying that all Southeast Asia would become Communist if the Vietminh should emerge victorious.” (Randle 17)

The spread of communism worried the Americans more than “satisfying the nationalist aspirations of Vietnamese elites.” French negotiation with the Vietminh appeared to satisfy that issue. (Randle 17)

In early April 1954 Eisenhower and Dulles decided against military intervention in Indochina “unless the Chinese intervened.” Nevertheless, the Americans threatened intervention. (Randle, Robert. Geneva 1954: the settlement of the Indochinese War. ix)

Interestingly, Dulles misjudged the French military situation at Dien Bien Phu. He was unimpressed by the significance of the battle. In addition, Dulles wanted international support, namely, from the British. They refused to be involved in Indochina. In the end both the French and British refused to be involved in any Dulles plan. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 367)

However, Dulles’ approach was “characterized by astuteness and an acute sense of political realities and the limited they imposed and the possibilities they offered.” (Randle, Robert. Geneva 1954: the settlement of the Indochinese War. ix)

Finally, by 1953, the Vietnamese national army under Bao Dai came to be. This made the war now a civil war. In addition, the conflict became internationalized with “the Communist powers on the one side and the United States on the other.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 338)

However, it was clear that the “Bao Dai solution” had failed to produce a [peaceful result and this left many Vietnamese frustrated. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 303)

By 1953 the Vietminh had grown in power and the Vietnamese National Army under Bao Dai floundered. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 347) “clear heads in the nationalist camp foresaw that France would lose Vietnam even thong she might still win the war. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 347)

By 1953 the Viet Minh had grown and now contained “well-trained, regular combat divisions that could take on anything the French could oppose them with.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. ix)

“With Korean War terminated . . . Chinese instructors and Chinese-provided Russian and American equipment began to arrive in North Viet-Nam en masse. The enemy now had seven mobile divisions and one full-fledged artillery division, and more were likely to come rapidly from the Chinese divisional training camps near Ching-Hsi and Nanning. ” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. ix)

Consequently, the French believed that their best strategy was to “induce the enemy to face up to them in a set-piece battle, by offering the Viet-Minh a target sufficiently tempting to pounce at, but sufficiently strong to resist the onslaught once it came. It was an incredible game, for upon its success hinged not only the fate of the French forces in Indochina, and France’s political role in Southeast Asia, bu the survival of Viet-Nam as a non-Communist state and, to a certain extent, that of Laos and Cambodia as well - and perhaps (depending on the extent to which one accepts the falling dominoes theory) the survival of some sort of residual Western presence in the vast mainland area between Calcutta, Singapore, and Hong Kong.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. ix)

Giap began the final military struggle in October, 1952. “He assemble east of the Red River.” The French prepared to be attacked. However, the Vietminh secretly moved their forces elsewhere. They capture Nghia Lo and soundly defeat the French forces. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 348)

The French respond with Operation Lorraine where General Salan will throw most of his forces in an effort to block General Giap because Giap did not move as Salan thought he would. However, Operation Lorraine collapsed “of its won weight. . . . It took the French a full week to retreat behind the de Lattre Line.” The Vietminh ambushed the French as well. In addition, the Vietminh refused to enter into a major battle. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 349)

The French believed that the Viet-Minh would again invade Laos. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 34)

General Cogny’s staff was horrified. They were “vociferously opposed to the whole operation.” Gogny agreed. He wrote that the General Staff prepared for a European war and that their ideas were outright wrong. There is, they said, no way to stop Viet-Minh infiltration. The whole battle will turn into a meat grinder. That the Viet-Minh can easily block the base with just one regiment. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 35-36)

More communications revealed that Cogny’s staff believed that “being cut off from the rice of Dien Bien Phu would be of only minor importance to the enemy in any case; that French-led guerrilla units in the area were not yet effective and than an early operation at Dien Bien Phu could well bring about their destruction.” Bombing the area around Dien Bien Phu was a waste, they argued, because too much French aircraft would be needed. They concluded that the French forces would be outnumbered. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 36)

The French believed they could defend their Dien Bien Phu with what experience showed was too little men. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 40) In addition, the French were either over confident of their abilities or dangerously condescending of the Viet Minh’s. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 44) The Viet-Minh made clear that they would fight “in the jungle valley.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 45) At the same time, Navarre ordered an attack in south central Viet Nam, called Operation Atlante. This weakened his defense of Dien Bien Phu. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 45) It was a contradiction. Navarre had refused Cogny’s request to relieve the pressure on Dien Bien Phu with an attack on the Viet Minh. Now Navarre proposed an attack of little military value. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 46)

One of the areas the French meant to attack with Atlante had been under Viet Minh control for nine years. “After an initially successful landing at Tuy-Hoa behind Communist lines on January 20, 1954, the operation bogged down completely. The Vietnamese troops who were to receive their baptism of fire in the beachhead either gave a poor account o themselves or settled down to looting. The Vietnamese civil administrator who began to pour into the newly liberated areas were, if anything, worse than the military units.” The Viet Minh were not phased. The “went on the counteroffensive on the southern mountain plateau, destroying Regimental Combat Team 100 and compelling Navarre to summon from North Viet-Nam airborne troops which had been located there as theater reserves for Dien Bien Phu.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 47)

At the same time, in December 1953, the Americans vastly increased their military aid to the French for their war in Indochina. Therefore, “more French troops had become available and there was plenty of American materiel on hand to arm them. Tens of thousands of new Vietnamese recruits were joining the French Union forces. The French forces held the initiative throughout Indochina and the enemy seemed for once uncertain as to what to do next.” However, Ho Chi Minh told a Swedish reporter that he was ready to negotiate “an armistice and a settlement of the Indochinese question.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 47)

The Battle of Dien Bien Phu was set and meant that the French would sacrifice some soldiers in order to defeat the Viet Minh. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 50)

A post war investigation by the French found that General “Navarre’s lack of knowledge of jungle warfare in the marshes of Indochina was the principal cause of a fatal flaw in reasoning : On the basis of intelligence provided him, Navarre felt that the Viet-Minh could hardly concentrate more than one division at Dien Bien Phu within a month’s time and that it would be impossible for the enemy to maintain more than a two-division siege force at Dien Bien Phu even for a limited period in view of the severe pounding of his communication lines by the French Air Force.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 50)

This was the main flaw in French thinking; “underestimation of the Viet-Minh’s capabilities.” Later the French military would believe that this was a substitution of the facts. Interestingly, Viet Minh commanders shared these doubts as well. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 50)

Viet-Minh soldiers were “inexperienced in the destruction of well-entrenched and mutually supporting strongpoints. Thus, a series of headlong rushes against such French fortifications could well result in extremely heavy losses and a perhaps crippling deterioration of morale. Failure could set back the over-all Communist plan for a general offensive by a year, after which the new influx of extremely large amounts American aid would make itself felt in Indochina and would permit the French vastly to expand the native Indochinese armies.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 51)

“In the deadly guessing game that is grand strategy, the little Vietnamese history professor with his largely self-taught military science had totally outguessed the French generals and colonels with their general staff school diplomas. As the divisions of the Viet-Nam Peoples’ Army swiftly began to close in on the garrison of Dien Bien Phu, and the latter made no move to evacuate the valley, Giap knew that the final victory in the battle was to be his.” He achieved surprise and that he said was the key to his victory. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 51)

“The Battle of Dien Bien Phu was lost during the brief fortnight between November 25 and December 7, 1953. It was not lost in the little valley in Viet-Nam’s highland jungles but in the air-conditioned map room of the French commander-in-chief.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 51-52)

The lightly armed French airborne forces were not familiar with building or defending fixed positions. They also did not realize that an attack was imminent “by vastly superior forces.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 53) One French military officer refused to command the base because he said “that the defense of Dien Bien Phu would be be an open invitation to disaster.” Finally, Col. de Castries took the position. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 54)

Viet Minh well camouflaged. French fire artillery but hit their own forces instead. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 82) The French attacked and slowly cleared the the hidden Viet Minh positions but at a great loss of life. Hand to hand combat, “flame throwers and explosive charges” were used. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 83) From December 20, 1953 to February 15, 1954 the French lose about ten percent of their troops in battle. The French forces are told to use less ammunition. The French lose the high ground around Dien Bien Phu. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 84)

While the Viet Minh camouflaged the French did not. They did not even try to hide their positions. “The urgent needs for construction wood led, to be sure, to the almost immediate felling of all the trees in the position area. The trees were followed within a short time by all the bushes, which were used as fuel for the hundreds of cooking fires of the garrison. The constant marching to and fro of 10,000 men, 118 vehicles, ten tanks, and five bulldozers took care of the grass. Within a few weeks, even the slightest slit trench or the brown earthy background of the valley like a Chinese ink drawing. Each artillery piece and mortar could be seen from far away, glistening in its wide-open firing position. And since there was neither space nor materials available for alternate gun positions, enemy observers hidden in the hills were able to pinpoint every heavy weapon in the fortress.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 93) In addition, many radio sets required antennae which also gave away the operator’s position. Furthermore, no camouflage was used. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 94)

“General de Castries counted firmly on the massive use of firepower and the relative mobility of his forces to destroy the enemy before he could decisively harm the garrison.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 96)

“As it became clear that the battle for Dien Bien Phu was going to be a slugging match, the French High Command decided to provide Dien Bien Phu with sufficient heavy firepower to enable it to destroy the enemy’s field pieces by counterbattery fire, and to smash his infantry attacks against the strongpoints by withering protective fires.” They believed their artillery to be first rate. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 98) American artillery supplies helped. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 99)

In addition, the French believed their fighter bombers gave them a significant advantage. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 98)

An American officer suggested that the French “quadruple mounts of .50 caliber machine guns” as they had been devastating against human wave attacks in the Korean War. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 99)

“By mid-March, the French defenders at Dienbienphu were in trouble, and Washington was worried.” The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Radford offered US bombers to “eliminate” the Viet Minh positions at Dien Bien Phu. This was called Operation Vulture. (Roger Hilsman. To Move a Nation. 100-101) The United States, as Hilsman stated, relied on strategic bombing to win wars, and thus, “make war “immaculate,” to move it up above the jungle muck and blood of ground combat to the clean blue skies. General Navarre was ecstatic and believed this would also deter the Chinese from entering the war as they did in Korea. (Roger Hilsman. To Move a Nation. 101)

American congressional leaders were not impressed with Radford’s claims. And if the bombing failed to destroy the Viet Minh they asked, would the US send military forces to Indochina, as had happened in Korea? And, “the wanted to know why Radford and Dulles were so sure that the Chinese Communists would not intervene.” Also, where did our allies stand? (Roger Hilsman. To Move a Nation. 101)

In the end, congressional leaders stipulated that US allies would have to also aid the French; that Indochina should be given its in dependence as soon as possible; and, however, that the French keep its army in Indochina. (Roger Hilsman. To Move a Nation. 101)

However, beginning on “March 13, Communist artillery fire rapidly neutralized the main artillery positions inside Dien Bien Phu itself, while the field guns stationed at Isabelle found themselves beyond effective range of the northern strongpoints and thus were incapable of taking the place of the muzzled artillery positions.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 100) Also, put out of commission were the artillery “observation posts and observation aircraft . . . during the first forty-eight hours of the battle.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 101)

The artillery commander was Piroth. He would commit suicide after the first day of fighting. He bragged that the Viet Minh would not get their artillery close enough to be of any use. If they did, Piroth’s artillery would “smash them.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 101)

At the same time “Navarre was worried: Beatrice was surrounded by impenetrable jungle hills which could conceal scores of enemy heavy guns, and once Beatrice was in enemy hands, it was obvious that much of Dien Bien Phu was going to be under enemy fire.” However, Piroth dismissed that fact saying that French artillery would first destroy the Viet Minh artillery. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 102)

In addition, it was nearly impossible to aerial photograph the area. So, the Americans supplied “infrared film” and “newly developed camouflage-detection film as well. Both had worked effective in Korea. In Viet-Nam, they were total failures.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 103)

Nevertheless, the French Air Force accurately estimated the amount of heavy equipment the Viet Minh were able to set up. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 104)

“As early as February 14, 1954, Le Monde’s veteran correspondent Robert Guillain reported from Dien Bien Phu all that had to be known about the Viet-Minh’s siege techniques: Without us seeing it, the Views built their positions right under our eyes, and not on the reverse slope but on the one facing us. Guillain, who had been to Korea, correctly stated that similar situations have existed there, but that fantastically dense American air strikes usually overcame the obstacle and neutralized such positions.” Guillain concluded that the French lacked effective “airborne fire power.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 104)

Nevertheless, the French did not hold the high ground. They thought they had superior fire power to counter this imbalance. They were wrong. In addition, French maps of Dien Bien Phu were poor and certainly not of good to artillery planners. To make matters worse the Viet Minh captured the French artillery planning map. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 104)

In the French favor however realized the effectiveness of Viet Minh artillery and set out to correct the situation. They were helped in that they “deciphered Communist logistics code” so that they knew the where Viet Minh artillery were located. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 105)

Despite all the fighting the Viet Minh “refused to come out in the open and fight.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 105)

The French defenses at Dien Bien Phu were not good. Aircraft and ammunition dumps were dangerously close and were hit during the battle. Defensive positions were poorly constructed as well. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 105, 107) Ironically, none of the civilian or foreign military observers made note of these deficiencies. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 105-106)

An American, General Trapnell, was impressed as he observed American supplies being used. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles told President Eisenhower that the French were concerned that the war was not going well for them. French General Blanc wrote a report which stated that, “by April 15 the fortress would be a marsh drowning in the monsoon rains, and to destroy the enemy’s main battle force there was a pure illusion.” Nevertheless, Eisenhower replied to Dulles that, Lieutenant General John “Iron Mike” O’Daniel assured him that things were fine. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 108)

There were two American army colonels and one American air force officer observing and advising at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu and none of them counsels the French against their folly. By March, 1954, the Viet Minh artillery had wrecked many. French aircraft and the air field as well. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 109)

According to French intelligence the nearby village was ordered cleared “by noon Saturday, March13, 1954. . . . Previous experience suggested that the enemy would attack at an hour when it would still be light enough for him to register his artillery fires, but too late for the French fighters based at Dien Bien Phu effectively to intervene in the battle, and for those based in Hanoi to intervene at all.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 110)

The Viet Minh “chose to drive approach trenches as close as possible to the French portions, from which they emerged at the opportune moment under the cover of their own artillery fire.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 94)

So it was not surprising that during the beginning of the battle at Dien Bien Phu Viet Minh artillery proved incredibly accurate. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 94)

French forces multinational: Laotian, “French, Foreign Legion, Vietnamese, Arabic, and African.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 53)

500 observation aircraft landed at Dien Bien Phu. At the same time another small airfield, described as dangerous for pilots, was also vulnerable to nearby Viet Minh attacks. It was finally evacuated to Dien Bien Phu. This began in November 1953. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 19) The withdrawing French forces knew the terrain well. However, “roving units of [Viet Minh] finally caught up with them when they were two days’ march away from Dien Bien Phu, and their last leg of their march became a continuous battle against well-laid Communist ambushes.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 19-20) T’ai people fought with the French. There is animosity between the T’ai and the Vietnamese who regard the T’ai as savages. The French told the world that they had successfully taken Dien Bien Phu and were there to stay. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 20) However, the French overextended. Their air force did not have the range to aid them at Dien Bien Phu. Nor did they have enough artillery or armor. Thus, the Viet Minh “began to find the valley of Dien Bien Phu most attractive.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 20-21)

Following the French return to Viet Nam in 1946 the Viet Minh “refused to be drawn into a major battle. Finally, the French offered them 17,000 troops in the valley of Dien Bien Phu as bait, just as the Mongols had attempted to corner Dao in the plain of Bach-Dang. In a grueling fifty-six day fight the Viet-Minh won.” (Bernard Fall. Last Reflections on a War. 47)

However, “Dien Bien Phu sealed the division of Viet-Nam into a northern Communist and a southern non-Communist state; their cultures would soon diverge under the competing influences of Russian and Chinese training in the north and American training in the South. (Bernard Fall. Last Reflections on a War. 47)

Before Operation Atlante the Vietminh had already surrounded Dien Bien Phu. Ironically, Dien Bien Phu was strategically insignificant. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 356) The Vietminh were entirely camouflaged; not even to be seen by air reconnaissance. The French were outnumbered two to one. However, they believed their superior equipment would rule the day. American officials agreed. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 357)

The battle began on March 13, 1954. In a few days, with heavy Vietminh artillery and suicide attacks the French airstrip became problematic. As a French defeat appeared likely the French requested US military intervention. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 358, 359)

In 1954 as the battle of Dien Bien Phu raged the French asked for US. Help in defeating the Viet Minh. However, the US still smarted from the Korean War.

However, the Vietminh had superior artillery and were too well concealed to be bombed. In addition, French aircraft could not use the airstrip because of Vietminh artillery and bad weather. The Vietminh were able to use human muscle to bring up their heavy weapons and supplies. The French did not consider this. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 357)

Also, Giap delayed the attack for weeks and this frustrated the French. They would know that the Vietminh had them in a tighter noose than previously realized. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 357) Some French leaders questioned this French military strategy. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 358)

“Vietminh artillery had put the airstrip out of commission; the wounded could no longer be evacuated; supplies had to be parachuted into the camp. Digging a complex network of trenches within yards of the French defenses, the enemy encircled the garrison and the French were unable to break through.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 369)

“On the Viet-Minh side March 13 was the payoff for almost five months fo backbreaking labor: the transportation through hundreds of miles of jungle of thousands of tons of supplies, and the gamble of Gen. Giap and his able chief of staff at Dien Bien Phu, General Hoang Van Thai.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 125)

The Viet Minh had failed in previous attacks on French fortified positions. “French artillery and fighter bombers in 1951-1952, had been a failure.” There were others. “Considering how long it took the Viet-Minh logistical system to build up supply depots with human carriers and its small pool of Russian trucks, a last-minute French decision to pull out from Dien Bien Phu by air would leave the bulk of the Communist battle force almost in the middle of nowhere, while the French would be free, thanks to their high airborne mobility, to concentrate their troops for an attack on the Viet-Minh’s sensitive rear bases to the north of the Red River Delta.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 125)

However, Giap used “daring raids” to force “Navarre to fritter away his last mobile reserves.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 125)

In November, 1953 Viet Minh “General Vuong Thua Vu’s crack 308th Division, composed almost entirely of volunteers from Hanoi and the province of Vinh-Puc-Yen, started its march toward Dien Bien Phu . . . under steady pelting by French fighters and bombers which, to all appearances, had little effect.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 126)

If the Viet Minh had only infantry to attack the French they would have lost even though they out manned the French three to one. The Viet Minh learned from the Chinese and the Russians the concept of the “Heavy Division.” They created the famed 351st which used “concentrated artillery fire” which the Russians used to defeat the Germans during World War II. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 126)

There were several Viet Minh artillery units which received training in China and 75mm howitzers and 105mm howitzers captured during the Chinese Civil War or the Korean War. They entered Dien Bien Phu in late 1953 and early 1954. Also, Viet Minh infantry was well equipped with anti-air weapons and the “normal complement of heavy weapons and mortar battalions.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 127)

This gave the Viet Minh superiority in weapons and the French air forces could not overcome this. The Viet Minh did not have an air force. Nevertheless, this did not surprise the French They knew for over a year that the Viet Minh had this capability. “What surprised the French completely was the Viet-Minh’s ability to transport a considerable mass of heavy artillery pieces across roadless mountains to Dien Bien Phu and to keep it supplied with a sufficient amount of ammunition to make the huge effort worth-while. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 127)

“Essentially, then, the battle of Dien Bien Phu was won along the communications lines leading from the Chinese border at Mu Nam Quan over Provincial Road 13-B to the Red River, thence via Provincial Road 41 to Dien Bien Phu. The total length of that trek from the border with all its detours, deep fords, substitutions for blown bridges, and alternate bypasses, was over 500 miles. It is difficult for the Western observer to imagine what it means to keep open 500 miles of jungle road in the face of the constant threat of aerial bombardment and strafing. It would have been extremely difficult had there been available modern roadbuilding machinery and adequate protection against air attacks, as had been the case when American engineers built the Burma Road during World War II. The road to Dien Bien Phu required nearly 20,000 coolies and tribesmen impressed from the nearby villages, who slaved for three months to rebuild the shattered remains of Road 41 and to widen its turns to accommodate the artillery pieces and the 800 Russian-built Molotova 2 1/2-ton trucks which were to become the backbone of the conventional supply system.” Viet-Minh radio broadcast “Everything for the Front, Everything for Victory.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 128)

General Giap wrote, “our troops razed hills, cut roads in to the mountainsides and opened the road to the artillery. . . . The secret was well kept thanks to excellent camouflage, and roads were kept open until the end of the battle. . . . Night and day, the enemy bombed those very difficult roads and nonetheless our transports got through on the whole. Hundreds of thousands of dan cong [civilian coolies], women as well as men, surmounted perils and difficulties . . .” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 128-129)

According to Fall, there was more than just popular enthusiasm that aided the Viet Minh. It was the 151st Engineer Regiment of the 351 Division. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 129)

“Contrary to later allegations, the French High Command was fully aware of the fact that all depended on whether the Communist supply system could be effectively disrupted. Unfortunately, on the basis of the devastating effect of aerial bombardment on conventional supply lines in Europe (and a myth sedulously fostered in the early 1950s by the American proponents of heavy-bomber warfare and used against the Ho Chi Minh Trail in 1965-66), the French Air Force shared the belief of its American colleagues that round-the-clock bombardment of the one Communist communication axis with Dien Bien Phu would actually succeed. Apparently, the United States Air Force had failed (at least by late 1953) to inform its French colleagues in the Far East of the highly ineffective American aerial interdiction operations in 1951-52, known under the code name of Operation “Strangle.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 129)

While the Americans destroyed bridges and tunnels the Koreans and then the Vietnamese would use “human carriers” who did not need them. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 129) The American way of war, however, fell victim to “poor roads and bad weather.” The French did not know of the problems the Americans faced in the Korean War. Therefore, they continued. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 130)

The French attempted to interdict the Viet Minh supply routes. However, the Viet Minh were able to rebuild roads that had been bombed or simply create new ones, ironically, in places that had been previously bombed by the French. In addition, Viet Minh antiaircraft weapons had markedly improved. The French fly through a “gauntlet” of antiaircraft. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 131) The French did bomb supply routes close to the Chinese border. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 133)

To avoid French aircraft the Viet Minh “actually tied the tall tall treetops together until they formed a tunnel of vegetation.” The Viet Minh soldiers kept receiving their ammunition. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 133)

“Inexorably, like hundreds of little streams joining together to form a major river, the flow of Viet-Minh coolies, trucks, thousands of hand-pushed bicycles, and pack animals converged on the valley.” The Viet Minh had almost 50,000 personnel including more than 33,000 soldiers. An additional 23,000 Viet Minh support troops “were strung out along communication lines.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 133)

The French had about 7,000 combatants. “Thus, in addition to enjoying firepower superiority, Gen. Giap’s forces also enjoyed a superiority in manpower of five-to-one. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 133-134)

When the fight began on March 13 the Viet Minh had Beatrice “tightly surrounded.” There was “fierce hand-to-hand combat” and the French “liberally napalmed the area.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 134) One Viet Minh 75mm. howitzer “damaged and destroyed almost a dozen aircraft without being located by the French.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 134)

The French defeat at Dien Bien Phu was not the final battle of the French War but it demonstrated that the French could not hold onto Indochina. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 369)

A commander at Dien Bien Phu sank into a deep depression. (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 1)

85,000 soldiers died and were wounded in the war and the French people and their leaders looked for a way out.

“The story of American policy toward Diem illustrates the power of wishful thinking, the shortcomings of U.S. diplomacy, and U.S. ignorance of the most effective methods of fighting Communism. In principle no fault can be found with the decision to help South Vietnam survive as a non-Communist state, if that a turned out to be what the people wanted. But whether or not this was the wish of the people could not be fairly determined in 1954.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 431)

The only choice in an election in the South was the much hated French allied candidates. Therefore, Washington wanted there to be a choice between the Vietminh and Diem. “The hope of most Americans for such an anti-Communist Vietnam was for a state that brought its people prosperity, social justice, and the gradual realization of the freedoms for which they had fought in the long struggle for independence. This, according to some Vietnamese nationalists, was the South’s vocation, and only if these conditions were fulfilled could the South become viable, defensible, and worthy of survival. . . . The American people would not have supported their government’s policy of aiding south Vietnam after 1954 had they foreseen that the country, ruled by brutal and sterile dictatorships, could only if the United States went to war.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 431)

There was, therefore, a “three-sided tug of war.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 290)

The United States did not criticize the French nor did they support the Vietminh. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 294) The only way the United States would support the French in Vietnam is if there was an “independent, not a colonial country, that its government was not headed by a French puppet, and that anti-communism cease to be a device for maintaining French rule.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 308)

The United States did not want to offend France either over its Indochina policy. As the war progressed, “Washington was gradually induced to drop its officially neutral stance and take an active part in in the struggle for Indochina.” Ironically, the US believed that “they were being faithful to American ideals of political pragmatism.” US Ambassador William Bullitt claimed that the Vietnamese wanted independence and that precious few were communists. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 359) He did not understand, however, that France and Vietnam were not going to come to an accommodation without Vietnamese independence. Also, going to war against the communists was not going to be agreed to as they were the leaders of Vietnamese independence movement. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 359-360)

On April 7, 1954?, President Eisenhower introduced the concept of the domino theory, which stated that if Indochina became communist then the rest of Southeast Asia would become communist. Nevertheless, Eisenhower would not have the US go it alone in Indochina. (Roger Hilsman. To Move a Nation. 101)

According to Hilsman, British policy was crucial. They supported the use of atomic weapons as the only way to destroy Viet Minh artillery at Dien Bien Phu. (Roger Hilsman. To Move a Nation. 101) Nevertheless, the British argued, ground forces would be needed as the “Viet Minh strength was popular support for independence and and end to French colonialism.” The result would be Chinese intervention and another Korean War. (Roger Hilsman. To Move a Nation. 101-102)

As the Battle of Dien Bien Phu unfolded General Paul Ely of France went to Washington to ask for military assistance including the use of American pilots to fly missions in Indochina. US official were mixed in their reactions. The vast majority of Congress and the vast majority of the Joint Chefs of Staff opposed what they considered another possible Korean War. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 365)

President Eisenhower himself could not decide whether to militarily enter the war or not. He would have agreed to intervention if the British had agreed to participate. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 369) “During the entire Geneva period, the diplomacy of the Eisenhower Administration was never anything but wildly incoherent.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 370) They were full of contradictions. One of the most significant was the inconsistent promotion of the domino theory.

“On April 9 [before the fall of Dien Bien Phu], Eisenhower had said that the loss of Indochina would cause Southeast Asia to fall like a set of dominoes, but barely five weeks later both he and his secretary of state stated flatly that the retention of Indochina was not essential for the defense of Southeast Asia.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 365)

Another group also formed a United Front. They, however, had been French collaborators. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 297-298) Bao Dai, however, was not impressed as he knew they had questionable nationalist commitment. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 298)

“Collaborators and would-be collaborators, including the discredited separatists who had helped d’Argenlieu create the Republic of Cochinchina. . . . Le. Van Hoach, still head of the Republic of Cochinchina, representing the Cao Dai, and Nguyen Van Xuan, whom the French had since promoted from colonel to general-the first Vietnamese to be so honored. As soon as it became clear that the that the French considered dropping Cochinese separatism in favor of a national anti-Vietminh regime, Xuan returned to Saigon, and in a repulsive display of opportunism transformed himself from a separatist into a nationalist.” He offered his services to Bao Dai and changed the name of the Cochinchina government to the Government of South Vietnam. Other political parties formed had no “popular appeal.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 299) However, because of the duplicity of Xuan people who joined his government quickly quit. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 307)

“The Xuan government, although useless to the French and detrimental to the anti-Vietminh, was allowed to survive for a full year, the second year in which the French made no progress in the war against the Vietminh.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 307)

The Vietminh would later try Xuan in abstentia “and sentenced him to death, but because the discredit he brought on anti-Communist nationalism benefited the Vietminh, no effort was made to carry out this sentence.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 306)

Most of these people were entirely depended on the French for sustenance. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 300)

All of a sudden, however, the Bao Dai hangers on who had demanded a separate state, now insisted on a unified Vietnam. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 303)

There were Vietnamese who criticized these French sponsored governments writing that they would not be popular. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 307)

Bodard recounted a French officer’s frustration with the insanity of the war and higher ups stupidity. Sound familiar. Unfortunately, he thought the population liked the French even after they destroyed their villages. Also, described Muslim forces raping men. I have hear about this in other wars. (Bodard. 71)

“But above all, the great motor, a great driving power, revolved steadily, ceaselessly, efficiently, to the profit of one and all. And this engine that turned out the pilasters without which there would have been no history, no events, no Indochinese war, was Saigon. It was Saigon’s inhabitants, Saigon’s two million piaster-worshipping inhabitants, who kept the war going and who in return derived a wonderful degree of prosperity from it.” (Bodard. 71)

Saigon was a multifaceted city, although a city in name only. There was big money with a “civilized . . . middle-class” attitude. The residents had no clue as to why there was a war. (Bodard. 71)

Although Saigon presented itself a moral is was immoral. “The only thing that counted was money, and it counted a degree unknown in the rest of the world. . . . This big-money Saigon was the one that carried weight in Paris, the one that had its own lobby there. . . . this particular Saigon owned the Vietnamese government. . . . His Excellency Nguyen De, the Emperor’s principal private secretary, was a former comprador (go between for foreign firms) in the Bank of Indochina. And as for Huu, the prime minister, he had been an official in another bank, the Credit Foncier.” (Bodard. 72)

Rich and poor worshipped the piaster to the detriment of any sense of humanity. (Bodard. 72-73) There “was an unknown Saigon, an unhealthy, dangerous city, almost as remote as the other end of the world. The Europeans knew only that undesirable things happened there at the soldier and nha-que level.” (Bodard. 73)

Asian millionaires controlled Indochinese banking and therefore the piaster. They joined French and Chinese capitalism which allowed them to exploit the native population.” (Bodard. 73)

While the bankers and financiers lived well in Saigon in the rest of the city “there were the straws, a hopeless labyrinth, a shantytown of nearly two million wholly anonymous beings. . . . There were no streets, no shops, no laws. The people had built their own cabins on the bare and stinking earth, on the mud, in the midst of the canals that wound in every direction - canals that were themselves densely populated, covered over with floating cities of sampans and barges crammed side by side in utter promiscuity . . . The whole population of these shantytowns was made up of rootless, displaced people. There was no steady work, no proper way of earning a living. . . . turned themselves into coolies, trishaw drivers, peddlers., . . . outlaws, small-time pimps, small time gangsters, a few laborers and a few men employed at pitiful wages. There were crowds of beggars, cripples, men who were walking corpses, abandoned, eaten up by vile diseases.” (Bodard. 76)

“In addition to this there were three main organizations the squeezed the masses by mere brute force. The Vietminh. The Binh Xuyen. The police. They waged a three-sided war among themselves for the monopoly of the racket.” (Bodard. 78)

The thirty thousand French who lived in Indochina were concentrated in a small part of Saigon. “Their happiness consisted of pursuing money.” There were official and black market money changers for the piaster. (Bodard. 78)

“The very exclusive Sporting Club” did not admit Vietnamese or Chinese. (Bodard. 79)

The Saigon elites did not talk about the war although the French press kept them informed. Even though these people could hear “the thunder of artillery or the rattle of machine guns” just outside the city, there was massive “indifference.” Life went on alongside the “fighting and dying.” (Bodard. 80)

“Indeed sometimes people would go to watch the war. The best place to see it was from the Majestic. . . . This is where the snobs of Saigon gathered, together with jovial Americans remarkable for their pattered shirts, which they wore outside their trousers.” (Bodard. 81)

French sailors strolled over to a village for fun and were murdered. Other sailors responded by burning the village and subsequently killing forty. (Bodard. 81)

Bodard describes Cholon as a twin city to Saigon where “the China of the old days, allied to European capitalism. Europeans did not live there, but they went to Cholon for its exotic flavor, for its sophisticated pleasures . . . and for the love of the haughty taxi girls.” (Bodard. 82)

As far as the roads are concerned the Vietminh “attack anything that moves.” (Bodard. 83) The beast way to avoid conflict was to travel by air. “The people of Saigon could leapfrog from point to point all over Indochina.” (Bodard. 84)

Although the war was expensive for the French it also brought in money to France. And politicians of all political persuasions profited. (Bodard. 87)

It was the Chinese who controlled secret banks who “were the real governors of money in the Far East.” (Bodard. 88)

Chinese from Macao controlled the economy of Saigon but “the Binh Xuyen wrested it from them after a hidden, underground war.” (Bodard. 93) The reward “was the notorious Grand Monde.”

“Cholon was a true Chinese city with all the proper traditions. It was a huge watertight club whose eight hundred thousand members devoted themselves to the practice of wisdom as it was understood in the ancient Chinese conception of life. Life’s only aim was sensual enjoyment. So right conduct consisted of getting the necessary money for pleasure and a life full of delights, whatever the cost.” Most people eked out a living and suffered from “disease and death” for the profligating lifestyle of the few.” (Bodard. 93)

Cholon was a sleepy town in the daytime. (Bodard. 93) However, it exported an enormous amount of rice. This all occurred during the war. (Bodard. 94)

The Chinese and Vietnamese labored under strenuous conditions and had to pay taxes to both the Vietminh and the Binh Xuyen leaving them very little to live on. (Bodard. 94) Nevertheless, “Cholon was scarcely menaced by famine.” Food was everywhere. (Bodard. 95)

Grand Monde - a pivotal battle in Vietnamese history in which the powerful Macao Chinese “Lam Giong was crushed by the small-time bandit Bay Vien, thanks to the support of His Majesty Bao Dai.” (Bodard. 103)

The Grand Monde was a collection of “gambling houses” on the “outskirts of Cholon.” It was surrounded by toughs of various types providing security. (Bodard. 103)

There were also poor peasants and laborers with their bone protruding; the sight of rich and poor being very stark. (Bodard. 104)

“Furthermore this wonderfully organized Grand Monde was one of the pillars of Vietnam. Every year the government once more awarded the contract to Monsieur Lam Giong.” (Bodard. 107-108)

Lam Giong paid any potential enemies and key government people to secure his investment. The Vietminh, the police, the Emperor Bao Dai, the sects, especially the Binh Xuyen, all received payments. (Bodard. 108)

“At the beginning of 1950 all the Chinese of Cholon and Saigon admired and respected Monsieur Lam Giong.” (Bodard. 109) That soon changed as a grenade was thrown in to one his businesses. “Sixty gamblers around a table were blown to pieces. But the explosion was anonymous. It was not yet known what gang had gone into action against the Macanese.” (Bodard. 110)

“Next there was a kidnapping. At first it seemed a perfectly commonplace affair.” Cholon was shocked but Giong would not allow the police to investigate as he knew who the culprits were. And, so did everyone else. It was the Binh Xuyen gang. After a ransom was paid they released the hapless victim. “Bay Vien had chosen this way of announcing his claim to the Grand Monde.” (Bodard. 110)

“[Bay Vien] The former convict had become Bao Dai’s favorite and His Majesty’s tool for the total exploitation of the Grand Monde by the court. . . . To be sure, the knowing Lam Giong had already allocated a very handsome share to Bao Dai in 1949, when His Majesty returned to Vietnam. But nevertheless the Macanese Grand Monde remained within the prime minister Huu’s sphere of influence, and Bao Dai wanted it to be within his. The whole of Vietnamese policy in 1950 was concerned with the bitter struggle between the head of the state and the head of the government over the Grand Monde.” (Bodard. 110-111)

Bay Vien emerged victorious and Prime Minister Huu and Bao Dai became enemies. Bay Vien changed little in the activities of the Grand Monde but he did stop paying protection to the Vietminh and others, except for the government. The government but no officials were paid. “Bay Vien kept everything for himself . . . the Emperor and the imperial cabinet. This two-handed monopoly of the Grand Monde was to have exceedingly important consequences for the history of Vietnam; it caused jealousies that five years later it caused the fall of Bay Vien and then that of Bao Dai.” (Bodard 111)

Interestingly, the Binh Xuyen were part of the Vietminh. However, they were not trusted and so their leaders were killed and the soldiers made a part of the Vietminh. Nguyen Binh knew that Bay view kept funds that were supposed to go to the Vietminh and that Bay Vien was close to French intelligence. The two’s hatred for each other was so strong that they arranged for each other’s murders. For keeping the Vietminh monies Nguyen Binh attacked Bay Vien who “fled blindly across country and reached his oldest haunt, the village of Binh Xuyen near Cholon - in his distress he returned to the place where his gang had first been formed and from which it took its name. Bay Vien was safe, but more than a thousand of his soldiers, surrounded in the rice paddies by the Vietminh, had had their throats cut. He ordered terrible reprisals, for his murder committees in Saigon were still intact, and in one night they wiped out the rival murder committees of Nguyen Binh.” (Bodard. 113)

Nevertheless, Bay Vinh was in trouble and the French offered him safe passage to France as a way out. (Bodard. 114)

The French and Vietnamese who opposed the Vietminh “sacrificed in cold blood” their countrymen for “speculating and profiteering.” “The models for most Bao Dai ministers and high officials were the French and Vietnamese war profiteers who led luxurious or at least very comfortable lives while their countrymen starved and died. Corruption flourished. Bao Dai officials sold high positions . . . for the defense of the free world. . . . The soldiers of the Vietnamese National Army . . . were shamelessly betrayed by their leaders. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 339) Life was most difficult in the Vietminh areas as the war was fought. There was less suffering, although there was still suffering, in the French held areas. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 338-339)

Black market dealing of the currency, the piaster, was “one of the greatest financial scandals in the entire history of colonial Indochina.” The result was an inflation of the piaster and a huge profit made by the dealer. Many French and Vietnamese millionaires were created. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 340)

Interestingly, all this aided French exports to Indochina which in turn aided the French colonials in Indochina. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 341)

The French manipulation of the piaster destroyed the Vietnamese economy in 1953 leaving the claim of an independent Vietnam hollow. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 341-342)

The French colonial leader Sainteny believed that the Americans interfered with the French attempt to reconquer Indochina. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 229) The OSS teams in northern Vietnam were sympathetic with Vietminh nationalism. “The French felt betrayed by an ally whose support they considered vital. French bitterness toward the Americans has given rise to the myth that the difficulties the French encountered in regaining control of the North were as much due to American hostility as to Chinese obstruction.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 229-230) However, it was on American ships the French soldiers arrived in southern Vietnam. (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 231)

“Secretary of State Byrnes soon let the OSS and other American agencies in Vietnam know that the United States did not oppose a French return to Indochina.” (Joseph Buttinger. Vietnam: a political history. 231)

“The first battle [of Dien Bien Phu] lost was that of the long-range penetrations designed to dislocate the enemy’s rear areas. The second battle was now under way. Its design was to dislodge the enemy from his dangerous northern and northeastern look-out posts from which the whole valley and the so-essential airfield could be constantly watched. The French were now in the process of losing the battle.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 82)

Dien Bien Phu desperately needed tons of construction material which could not be supplied soon enough. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 89) This made preventing Viet Minh infiltration impossible. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 93)

General Giap split Laos in two by the end of 1953 and had “advanced toward Luang Prabang” at the end of the Berlin Conference at the end of January 1954. This encouraged the French to seek a settlement. (Randle 27)

“In February [1954] the chiefs of staff and their president, General Paul Ely, concluded that a military decision could not now be obtained in Indochina and that the only possible policy was to seek favorable military conditions for a political resolution of the conflict.” (Randle 27)

The war began in favor of the French “The Vietminh were no more than scantily armed guerrillas, who live off the Expeditionary Force, procuring their weapons by ambush and theft.” (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 1) In addition, the French had popular support and “could get all the native soldiers and partisans they wanted.” They also had an endless supply of money. (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 2)

In 1948, although there was blood and death, Saigon had “a standard of living that was unbelievable for Asian peasants.” The war in the countryside did not disturb this. The main war took place “far north, in the mountains of Tonkin near the Chinese border, the Expeditionary Force” against the Viet Minh. “But nobody bothered to talk about it. The war was endless; the war was routine; and Indochina was a chessboard on which the innumerable pieces had become immobile. It was the elisement, the bogging down.” (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 6)

The government of Indochina in 1948 “belonged to the Expeditionary Force; in the countryside there was no civilian state to be seen - no administration, no laws, no courts, no public services. Whether or not they were successful in fighting the Viet Minh, after every battle soldiers decorated soldieries with medals and “elegant officers came in from their rural fiefs to trust like lords” through Saigon. (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 6)

Furthermore, French soldiers in Indochina and from the French colonies were paid very well as oppose to the pay a French soldier received in France. (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 6) And, because the exchange rate from piasters to francs was so good “real fortunes could be made in money changing.” (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 7)

Nevertheless, even in the economically well off Cochinchina, Vietnamese nationalism had a following. “Vietnamese partisans prowled the Plain of Reeds.” Even the French approved Cochinchina government sought unification of the country with Annam and Tonkin. The French colonial residents of Indochina believed that the time honored French policy of cutting off the heads of Vietnamese nationalists would sustain Indochina as a French territory. They argued that “before 1940 absolutely any Frenchman could travel wherever he liked, even in the wildest districts, without carrying a weapon.” Bodard describes these well fed colonials “fat bellies” as the “colonial egg.” They believed they were the kindest of rulers and could not understand Vietnamese desires for independence. (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 7)

Then they bickered among themselves. They disliked “soldiers like Sainteny, who had openly sympathized with Ho Chi Minh’s nationalism, and General Leclerc, who had come to pacify the rebellious country but had ended by concluding it was pointless to try to return to colonialism. Even Admiral d’Argenlieu, the first high commissioner, had, as they saw it, made dangerous and unnecessary concessions.” Those who followed d’Argenlieu. Sympathized with independence as well. This did not satisfy the “colonial egg.” (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 7)

70% of the French forces were not French. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. x)

“The French reoccupation of the valley lasted a total of 209 days, and the actual siege 56 days. The Germans held Stalingrad for 76 days, while the Americans held Bataan for 66 days and Corregidor for 26; . . . . The record World War II siege was no doubt that of the French coastal fortress of Lorient, held by German troops for 270 days from 1944 to VE day.” Many of these sieges involved hundreds of thousands of troops. Dien Bien Phu, on the other hand, had 13,000 thousand French forces against approximately 100,000 forces of the Viet Minh. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place.) So, with such small numbers, how did this turn out to be the decisive battle of the French War in Indochina?

“On 20 November 1953, six battalions of parachutists of the French Union army occupied the basin at Dien Bien Phu in northwestern Tonkin; and in December, General Navarre declared that Dien Bien Phu must be held at all costs.” (Randle 8-9)

The Navarre Plan was a “political-military plan.” There would be 550,000 French soldiers, most of whom would be Vietnamese although there would be other soldiers from the “French Union.” However, to give the Vietnamese something to fight for there would have to be “genuine independence for the State of Vietnam.” (Randle 9)

Civilian airlines in Indochina took up the slack created by a smaller than needed air force. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 16)

“A few months earlier, on August 12, Na-San, an airhead far closer to Hanoi than Dien Bien Phu, had finally been evacuated because it had tied down more troops and more air transport that it was worth. . . . But . . . Dien Bien Phu was picked precisely because the valley . . . draws far too large to become a hedgehog position in which the French troops could be sealed off. Here, there was space for maneuvering. Thanks could be employed if they could be brought in by air, as indeed they were, later.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 18) Although successful, memories of Na-San did not sit well with General Gilles. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 18-19)

Lieutenant General Henri Navarre took command of French forces in Indochina on May 28, 1953. Some of his subordinates liked him because he did not bother them. Major General Rene Cogny referred to him as an “air conditioned General.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 26-27) Time magazine, in a profile of the general, wrote, “A year ago none of us could see victory. There wasn’t a prayer. Now we can see it clearly - like light at the end of a tunnel.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 28)

The French liked an air base at Dien Bien Phu because they could now “spread a sufficient degree of insecurity into the enemy’s own rear areas so as to compel him in turn to disperse his troops for the purpose of protecting those areas. Since successful infiltration of Communist-held areas could be attempted only with hand-picked French and Vietnamese special forces units, conventional military means had to be found for something more massive than infiltration. This out to be strongly defended hedgehog positions resupplied by transport aircraft and supported, in case of direct enemy attack, by combat aircraft.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 30-31)

After plans for fighting at Dien Bien Phu were approved by the French government “planning of the battle of Dien Bien Phu took on the preordained air of a Greek tragedy.” The Viet Minh we’re surprised that the French abandoned Na-San. However, they did it so quickly that they left “behind many of the fixed installations, large stocks of reserve ammunition, and the precious pierced-steel mats with which part of the airfield was covered. The vast mine fields which covered the various strongpoints were also left behind and later carefully dug up by the Viet-Minh and used against the French elsewhere. The French sabotaged as much of the materiel as possible and the French Air Force bombed many of the remaining installations, but a great deal nevertheless fell into Communist hands.” (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 34)

Following World War II Laos also agitated for independence from the French. One of the Laotian leaders sought help from the Viet Minh. (Roger Hilsman. To Move a Nation: the politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy. 1967. 97-98)

French sign “a treaty of association” with Laotian Prince Souvanna Phouma who was Prime Minister of Laos. This meant Laos was an independent nation within the French Union. (Bernard Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place. 34)

Ho’s nationalism was honed when during the Geneva Conference and the scheduled 1956 elections he did not have the support of the Chinese or the Russians, so-called below Communists. (Bernard Fall. Last Reflections on a War. 89)

In early 1954 the French believed that the United States “was willing to see French soldiers sacrificed in a desperate war rather than negotiate with the Chinese. (Randle 26)

“Opium was a military objective for both the Vietminh and the French. . . . [For the Viet Minh] Drug trafficking was justified by dialectic: the people were to make use of everything, even vice and evil, to ensure their triumph. [For the French] possession of the opium crop meant that the Vietminh were denied the opportunity of filling their coffers; and what was more it allowed the Expeditoaryu Force and the administration to add to their secret funds, which, officially, were absurdly meager.” (Lucien Bodard. The Quicksand War. 46)