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Sayed Hossein Nasr. Islam: religion, history, and civilization. Western Islam “experts” have “various prejudices and ideological biases. . . . studies have been distorted and tainted by a particular set of errors and deviations.” “The study of Islam in the West began in the tenth and eleventh centuries. . . . Islam was seen as a Christian heresy.” Westerners still believed they were superior. “Little was done to understand the teachings of Islam on their own terms.” “Islam is not only a religion; it is also the creator and living spirit of a major world civilization with a long history stretching over fourteen centuries.” “Islam created a civilization that has covered the middle belt of the Old World for over a millennium. This civilization produced great intellectual figures, distinct art and architecture, dazzling achievements in science and technology, and an equitable social order based on the teachings of the Quran. . . . deeply influenced Western as well as Indian and even to some extent Chinese art and thought. Its scientists formulated theories and carried out practices that were widely emulated by Western scientists during the middle Ages and even the Renaissance.” “Because Islam, like Judaism, does not permit the making of a Divine image.” “Wherever, Islam went, it did not destroy the local culture, but transformed it into an Islamic reality. . . . As a result, Islamic civilization developed into several distinct cultural zones including the Arabic, Persian, Black African, Turkic, Indian, Malay, and Chinese.” “Not only did Muslims synthesize Greco-Alexandrian, ancient Mesopotamian, Iranian, and to some extent Chinese science, but they created amknby new sciences. For example, in mathematics they expanded the study of geometry of the Greeks and created the new disciplines of trigonometry and algebra. Likewise, in medicine they furthered the studies of Hippocratic and Gaelic medicine while diagnosing and distinguishing new diseases, discovering new remedies.”

Shlomo Sand. The Invention of the Land of Israel: from holy land to homeland. Sand recounts that during the Six Day War his unit entered the West Bank and fought for a neighborhood in Jerusalem. While he thought this was his first time “abroad” his fellow soldiers said, “What are you talking about? This is the true land of your forefathers.” (2) “Never did I accept the idea of the Jews’ historical rights to the Promised Land as self-evident. When I became a university student and studied the phonology of human history that followed the invention of writing, the Jewish return - after more than eighteen centuries - seemed to me to constitute a delusional jump in time.” (15) “I am equally convinced that Zionism did not succeed in creating a worldwide Jewish nation but rather only an Israeli nation.” (16) Most Jews who “express solidarity with the self-declared Jewish state - prefer not to live in Israel and make no effort to immigrate to the country and live with other Israelis within the terms of the national culture. (17) There never was a united Jewish nation in ancient times. And the land occupied by Judea and Israel was called Canaan. (24) “Few Israelis are aware that David, son of Jesse, and King Josiah ruled in a place known as Canaan or Judea, and that the group suicide at Masada did not take place in the Land of Israel.” (26) After the 1948 war the Israelis removed the Arabic names of conquered towns because, “we do not recognize the Arabs’ proprietorship of the land.” (28) The “historical right to the Land of Israel, the only purpose was to establish moral legitimacy for the appropriation of territory.” (29)

In a meeting with the British in 1966 it was reported that Kissinger “was decidedly gloomy about the current political situation in the south.” He did not think the government of Air Marshall Ky would last. (678) As for warfare, “Kissinger thought that Hanoi and the VC could accept a 10-1 kill ration almost indefinitely. He thought the VC were still far from the bottom of the barrel. (685) The Germans told Kissinger that the war was not winnable. That the important area of world affairs was Europe, not Asia. Kissinger argued that “we are defending Europe in South East Asia. Adenauer replied that if we kept up our present pace [in Vietnam] we would lose both Europe and Asia.” (712) In 1962 Kissinger believed that “Communist China is likely to be in more of an expansionist phase than Soviet Russia. . . . [Nevertheless] both of them are a menace to world peace and partly because of Communist doctrine.” (724-725) Thought good diplomatic relations should be had with Communist China if they renounced “the use of force in the Formosa Strait.” He denounced France’s recognition of Communist China. (725) In A World Explored, Kissinger argued that force should only be used as a last resort. (732) In 1965 Kissinger traveled to Vietnam three times. He decided “that the United States must extricate itself from that country by diplomatic means. It clearly could not hope to win a war against an externally supported guerrilla movement at an acceptable cost in an acceptable time frame. Worse, the very government it was seeking to defend showed little sign of being capable, much less worthy, of being preserved.” He became consumed with the U.S. avoiding humiliation.(733) He believed that infiltration of the North Vietnamese into South Vietnam would stop following American bombing. (737) After the assassination of Diem in 1963 and after his visit in 1965 to Vietnam Kissinger conflicted that “the situation was hopeless. [In 1968 he wrote] I then decided to work within the government  to attempt to get the war ended. . . . but it was ineffective.” (822) Kissinger hated Richard Nixon. “That man is unfit to be president. . . . Look, I’ve hated Nixon for years, Kissinger told Brzezinski.” (826) Nevertheless, if his patron Nelson Rockefeller “decided to campaign for Nixon, Kissinger would stand ready to assist him.” (828) Kissinger criticized the anti-war movement for its making “heroes of leaders in repressive new countries,” such as Che Guevara, Ho Chi Minh, or Mao Zedong. (836) He wrote an article “defining what he called the Vietnamese syndrome: optimism alternating with bewilderment; euphoria giving way to frustration, based on the fundamental problem that military success . . . could not be translated into permanent political advantage. . . . It would be difficult to imagine two societies less meant to understand each other than the Vietnamese and the American. But mainly it was because American strategy had all along been misconceived. From the outset of military intervention under Kennedy - as Morgenthau had seen, but he had missed - there had been a “failure . . . to analyze the geopolitical importance of Vietnam . . . implied its relative unimportance. Then there was the fundamental problem that the American military had sought to wage a conventional war against guerrillas, following the classic doctrine that victory depended on a combination of control of territory and attrition of the opponent. . . . [However], guerrillas rarely seek to hold real estate . . .  We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our psychological exhaustion. . . . the guerrilla wins if he doesn’t lose.” (839) Kissinger claimed that American diplomatic efforts were separate from the war. Hanoi, on the other hand, viewed them as part of the same process. (840) He believed in an honorable end to the Vietnam War. “Any other solution may unloose forces that would complicate prospects of international order.” (843) From the time of his appointment as Nixon’s national security adviser the press idolized Kissinger. (857) From the beginning of his tenure as National Security Adviser Kissinger planned to marginalize the incoming Secretary of State William Rogers. (860)

Niall Ferguson. Kissinger: 1923-1968: the Idealist. The prevailing view that Henry Kissinger supported the Vietnam War is incorrect. However, Ferguson’s own admission, Kissinger disagreed with the American conduct of the war not the principle of fighting it. He vociferously argued for “improvements to the American counterinsurgency strategy, then - to an extent never previously recognized by scholars - by seeking to broker some kind of peace agreement with the North Vietnamese, using a variety of indirect channels of communication to Hanoi that passed through not only Paris but also Moscow. (583) Kissinger assumed China controlled Southeast Asia and wrote that the United States Air Force could bomb those areas where the Chinese actively supported communist forces. (588) Furthermore, Kissinger wrote that history is not on the United States’ side when combatting guerrillas. One needs “adequate military force.” That supposedly happened and still the Americans lost. (588) “The people of South Vietnam must develop a long-term commitment to their government [which they did not] if they wish to attain political and economic stability. . . . I regret that the JFK Administration has seemingly reversed its position of demanding governmental reform.” (588) In 1962, Kissinger wrote that the U.S. military program seems half-hearted and inadequate . . . worst features . . . may get us slowly into a war that a decisive effort now might prevent.” (589) “The worst course is a commitment just large enough to contain the guerrillas but not large enough to defeat them. This almost certainly will get us into a big war.” Which is what a large military force is! (589) Kissinger believed that the Diem coup was the basis of all the difficulties in Vietnam in 1964 and 1965. (591) His criticism of attacking the Diem government stemmed from his belief that the U.S. would be demoralizing the South Vietnamese government which is just what the Viet Cong want. In addition, encouraging a military coup is contradictory to U.S. values. (592) Kissinger disagreed with the announcement  that the U.S. planned to withdraw its forces by 1965 as encouraging the enemy. He also criticized vehemently the view that the war could be “won by firepower alone.” He believed that this was a psychological war; whatever that means. He wrote that conditions would “get worse.” (592) Kissinger acknowledged that the United States established the Diem government in 1955, something few people, even critics of the war admit to. The justification for the ouster of Diem was that he was losing the war against the communists. However, Kissinger noted that American officials had been touting their success against the Vietcong. (593) Ironically, considering his Nixon Administration actions, he wrote that he did “not like our country to be thought of in terms of the cynical use of power.” (594) Kissinger believed in principle “like Woodrow Wilson, he favored a worldwide system of security and growth. But [believed] that was prevented by Communist hostility.” (621) In August 1965, Kissinger traveled to Vietnam. He believed at that time that the war could not be won by military means. However, he had no problem in 1969 using the American Air Forces in the war. (625) On his trip Kissinger was amazed that “senior officials were concealing information from one another.” (636) Kissinger concluded that the war was one “bureaucratic struggle. There was no overall plan, no central concept, only pieces of paper produced by essentially autonomous operations.” (637) He came to believe that the war was a “civil war.” Ironic since he mentioned that the U.S. created the South Vietnamese government. (638) Kissinger did not believe that full victory was possible. The Viet Cog must have some role in a new south Vietnamese government. (640) After visiting Vietnam Kissinger concluded that China would not enter the war. Any amount of Chinese troop that caused the U.S. danger could be destroyed by the U.S. Air Force, especially with nuclear weapons. (643) His analysis of the war and U.S.  bumbling was damning. We assume that the enemy is stupid, he asserted. We don’t understand the flexibility of guerrilla war. We are exhausting ourselves with large unit combat. (643) Rosy portrayals of the war led Kissinger to remark, that he didn’t know “how the Vietcong were still surviving.” He found the U.S. Army ineffective except for “flooding of meaningless statistics.” Most of the people Kissinger spoke to did not share General Westmoreland’s optimism. (649-651) The South Vietnamese Government was not a government and had no support outside of the city. The Vietcong had too much of the allegiance of the population. (649-651) Kissinger found the term “pacification” condescending” and “too reminiscent of colonial wars.” (665) Kissinger let other government officials know that he believed Vietnam was the cornerstone of American policy “for decades to come.” (665) Privately Kissinger had “deep anxieties about the course of the war.” Publicly he supported the Johnson administration.” (669) He offered that “intellectuals were in an easy position to talk about ideal policies . . . the harassed, hard pressed officials are not in the same fortunate position. . . . [to defend South Vietnam] . . . would be considered by other nations as symbolic of our inability to protect them from this kind of Communist attack.” (669) Angered by “calls to defy the draft” Kissinger called this “defeatism” which could cause “Peking and Hanoi to underestimate seriously the extent of the American commitment.” (670) The U.S. should negotiate, according to Kissinger, after the Americans destroy Hanoi’s “political apparatus in the countryside.” Kissinger decided that “secure areas” should be established. Demonstrating the American fixation on numbers, he wrote, “it was better to have 100 per cent control in 40 per cent of the country than 40 per cent control in 100 per cent of the country.” Kissinger changed his mind from previous statements; showing he would do what was necessary to be within the reaches of power. (674)

The death of Henry Kissinger sees people throughout the world celebrating. He caused death and destruction of people and institutions. I will post information from the various books about Kissinger. The following is from Niall Ferguson's biography. Niall Ferguson. Kissinger: 1923-1968: the Idealist. Historian Ernest May told Kissinger that his bombing of Cambodia is “tearing the country apart domestically.” He meant the United States. (15) Hans Morgenthau criticized Kissinger as hostile to democracy. He wanted stability even if that meant imposing dictatorship upon people. Instability meant communism to Kissinger. (17) Kennedy adviser Arthur Schlesinger introduced Kissinger to a host of high level liberal Democrats, such as Eleanor Roosevelt, Adlai Stevenson, and, of course, the Kennedys. (331) In 1954 Schlesinger showed Kissinger a letter from the former Secretary of the Air Force Thomas Finletter in which Finletter supported the “administration’s reliance on the threat of massive retaliation [thermonuclear weapons].” Kissinger then wrote an opposing view, “The Impasse of American Policy and Preventative War.” This launched his career. (331-332) He believed that too many crises occurred after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu. There was opposition to America in Japan; “changing weapons balance; hesitations of our Western Allies.” “The USSR has managed to capture the peace offensive,” to such an extent that the US is cornered everywhere. And, he appeared to express the belief that the Russians would surpass the US in nuclear weapons production. (332) Kissinger found President Eisenhower’s New Look Defense Policy ambiguous. While Eisenhower found the Korean War difficult Kissinger found it “possible.” He argued that you could fight a local war as Korea was known by threatening the Soviet Union with a nuclear attack. This would be cheaper too. (333) Kissinger also came up with the idea of "limited war with nuclear weapons.” Vice-President Nixon argued for this in 1953. Military men did also. All considered this “a viable alternative to the threat of an all-out war.” (335) In the 1950s Kissinger outlined “his rapidly crystalizing view on the viability of limited nuclear war. “ Nuclear weapons, particularly of the low-yield type, seem to offer the beast opportunity to compensate for our inferiority in manpower and to use our superiority in technology.” (362) “There had been a failure to grasp the full implications of thermonuclear war, namely that there could be no winner in an all-out conflict because even the weaker side may be bale to inflict a degree of destruction which no society can support. Kissinger’s doctrine of limited nuclear war . . . the goal of war can no longer be military victory as we have known it. Rather it should be the attainment of certain specific political conditions which are fully understood by the opponent. The purpose of limited war is to inflict losses or to pose risks for the enemy out of proportion to the objectives under dispute. The more moderate the objective, the less violent the war is likely to be.” (366) Kissinger believed that the alternative would be to give in to the Soviet Union. (368) An all out nuclear war Kissinger believed would mean both sides lose. Therefore, you must have limited nuclear war. (369)

E.J. Hobsbawm. Nations and nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth, reality. This is a classic work on nationalism. “There is no historical continuity whatever between Jewish porto-nationalism and modern Zionism.” (78)

https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=miko+peled+george+galloway

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L1PKlV1JMBU&t=1670

https://www.laprogressive.com/the-middle-east/gaza-bombing

https://www.counterpunch.org/2024/01/01/a-voice-for-the-oppressed-john-pilger-radical-journalist-and-documentarian/

https://news.yahoo.com/henry-kissingers-bombing-campaign-likely-025005533.html?fr=sycsrp_catchall

The greatest muckraker of them all, John Pilger, passed away Dec. 30, in London. learned so much from him and his writings.