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Francis Fitzgerald. Fire in the Lake: the Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam. 1971. Although victorious at Dien Bien Phu the Viet Minh did not control the cities or the south. (88) The United States was determined to undermine the new Viet Minh government under Ho Chi Minh. In violation of the Geneva Agreements Col. Edward Lansdale organized small military units to commit acts of sabotage. (102)

The Viet-Nam Reader: articles and documents on American foreign policy and the Viet-Nam crisis. Marcus G. Raskin and Bernard B. Fall, ed. As the Korean War began the French argued that their war in Indochina was an anti-communist crusade. However, the United States did not want a stalemate splitting Viet Nam as they agreed to in Korea. 200 American air force technicians were sent to Indochina in early 1954 to fix French aircraft. Navarre and Dulles believed this would be the beginning of the destruction of the Viet Minh. According to Dulles they would be defeated by the end of the “1955 fighting season. . . . But at the onset of the 1954 fighting season the French were already hard pressed by Ho Chi Minh’s guerrillas and jungle wise regulars. In hopes of drawing the Viet Minh forces into a set piece battle, the French had gambled 15,000 of their best troops at a jungle valley called Dien Bien Phu, more than 220 miles behind enemy lines.” (54) Admiral Radford and Secretary of State Dulles believed that the loss of Indochina would force the United States to pull back as far as Hawaii. (58) As the great scholar Michael Parenti pointed out, that is an insult to the United States Navy. In late April 1954 the United States toyed with the idea of bombing Dien Bien Phu. (63) Congress would have authorized whatever President Eisenhower requested without analyzing the situation. (65) The authors vehemently criticize American foreign policy leaders for their support of corrupt and non-representative people in Viet Nam because this leaves only the Viet Minh as a viable alternative to lead the country. (290) However, those other than the Viet Minh had little standing with the Vietnamese population anyway. Ho Chi Minh and his Viet Minh did the lion’s share of creating an independent Vietnam.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=05nh1asqU9o

Short bios of significant people involved in the battle. Men of Dien Bien Phu. General Christian Marie Ferdinand de la Croix De. Prisoner of war in World War II. Escaped. Served under Navarre as the French Army took Karlsruhe. Retired after Dien Bien Phu. Major General Rene Cogny. Escaped from a German POW camp during World War II and joined the resistance. Caught and sent to concentration camps. After the war he served under General de Lattre in Indochina. After de Latte’s death he enthusiastically tried to defeat the Vietminh. As an artillery officer he relied on those weapons in Indochina. After Dien Bien Phu he served in central Africa. Pham Van Dong. Vietminh diplomat. Son of a court official. Spent six years in a French prison. Minister of Finance. Vice President. Intelligent and passionate for nationalism. General Vo Nguyễn Giáp. Strong character. Revolutionary. Imprisoned. Taught History. Published nationalist newspaper. Military training in China. Wife died in a French prison. “He is said to have told General Leclerc, I have been to a military academy - that of the bush and the guerrilla war against the Japanese.” Ho Chi Minh. Had many names in his fight for Vietnamese independence. Traveled the world. Wrote articles. Imprisoned by the French and the Chinese. Returned to Vietnam in 1944 and “took to the bush.” He said that, “it was not in Moscow that I learned what revolution was, but in Paris . . .” General Henri Navarre. Attended Saint Cyr the French military academy. Served in intelligence. Did not believe that he could win the war but hoped to stabilize things. Colonel Charles Piroth. Artillery commander at Dien Bien Phu. The failure of his artillery led him to commit suicide. Lieutenant General Raoul Salan. Graduated from Saint Cyr. Commanded “French forces in Indochina after 1945.” (311-319)

Howard R. Simpson. Dien Bien Phu: the epic battle America forgot. Simpson served as a U.S. official in Indochina at the time of Dien Bien Phu. He visited the area in November of 1953. “Dien Bien Phu was not a massive engagement in conventional terms, but it was a decisive military contest and a microcosm of the international political-military clashes to emerge in the wake of World War II.” (xvii) “By mid-December, Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap’s forces were already closing in on the ill-fated fortress, and it was impossible to venture far from the valley without costly contact with Vietminh regulars.” (xvii) The French military leadership would not give credit to the Vietminh for their successes in battle and with organizing the Vietnamese people. However, the field officers and soldiers respected the ability of the Vietminh. (xx) The French could not believe that the Vietminh could move massive artillery pieces into place around Dien Bien Phu. Contrary to their confidence in their own artillery which failed miserably. The same scenario occurred during the American War. (xx) Despite warnings from the French air force that air support would not supply and even win the war in Indochina the officers in charge at Dien Bien Phu continued planning accordingly. (xx) Furthermore, the French and the Americans committed atrocities by wanton killing of civilians with “heavy bombing and free-fire zones [which] alienated the population and increased support for the VC (Viet Cong).” (Xxi) Everyone, except the Vietminh, failed to understand the “flexibility” of guerrilla operations, especially with supportive weather conditions. Also, the Vietminh were much more organized and equipped than the French gave them credit for. (Xxi)

Ted Morgan. Valley of Death: the Tragedy at Dien Bien Phu That Led America into the Vietnam War. “The French no longer knew why the war was being fought. For the Americans, it was a war against Communism, as in Korea. The Associated States wanted their independence. But the French? Te said they too were fighting Communism, while in reality they wanted to maintain the French Union. . . . the French were up to their ears in hypocrisy.” (Ted Morgan. Valley of Death: the Tragedy at Dien Bien Phu That Led America into the Vietnam War. 183) The French “minister of finance, Edgar Faure, said, “Whether we win or whether we lose, we will not remain in Indochina.” (Ted Morgan. Valley of Death: the Tragedy at Dien Bien Phu That Led America into the Vietnam War. (183) Bickering amongst the French generals over strategy and tactics. Navarre ordered an attack on the Vietminh which had been stockpiling supplies. “In the ensuing battle, which lasted three weeks, the French, with tanks, artillery, and air support, gave the Vietminh a mauling.” (Ted Morgan. Valley of Death: the Tragedy at Dien Bien Phu That Led America into the Vietnam War. (185) In preparing for a Vietminh attack one French officer told visitors to Dien Bien Pu that “he had removed every bramble and thicket until Beatrice was as clean-shaven as a Thai whore’s cunt.” (225) French artillery commander Col. Piroth did not have appropriate maps. The “scale of the maps was 1/100,000” meaning they had to use slide rules. (227) Navarre was not sure of victory. (228) As a result he ordered preparations for evacuation of Dien Bien Phu. (229) He also let people know that losing at Dien Bien Phu did not mean losing the war against the Viet Minh. So, instead of evacuating he strengthened his forces. (230) Brothels were established for the soldiers. (232) There were other signs that the French did not take this seriously as high level visitors from throughout the world came to visit. (232) Before the actual battle began the French sent out recon patrols which the Viet Minh constantly attacked. (233) General Cogny did not inspire confidence in the U.S. Consul at Hanoi, Paul Strum. (234) Much of the French population opposed the war. (234) President Eisenhower criticized French resolve believing that they wavered in their policies. “If the United States replaced the French in Indochina, the Vietnamese could be expected to transfer their hatred to us.” (235) Eisenhower did approve the secret sending mechanics to work on aircraft. “Mississippi Democrat John Stennis . . . As always, when we send one group we shall have to send another to protect the first and we shall be fully involved.” (236) “To some extent, Giap was able to protect his supply lines with 37mm antiaircraft guns from China, placed at choke points such as river crossings. Bombing the supply routes became dangerous for the French, but the strikes nonetheless contributed to keeping Giap behind schedule.” (238) “Building the artillery emplacements also turned out to be enormously time-consuming. Contrary to Colonel Piroth’s artillery manual, which dictated that cannons must be placed on reverse slopes, with the shells lobbed mortar-style over the crests, Giap placed his big guns on the slopes facing Dien Bien Phu.” (238) The Viet Minh suffered from non-combat diseases, and accidents. Trees fell on them, there were snake bites, and falls from bridges. Malaria and other diseases took their likes. They had only one surgeon and six medical assistants. (239) Navarre projected an optimistic facade by saying that, “the Vietminh offensive [in Laos] is slack, or about at its peak. . . . Giap’s offensive is blocked.” He told an ambassador that “Dien Bien Phu is a veritable jungle Verdun which he hopes will be attacked as it will result in terrific casualties to the Vietminh and will not fall.” (246) American Admiral Radford told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that “there was no danger of the French being driven out of Dien Bien Phu.” He also stated that the Vietminh would not attack has they had limited access to supplies. (247) The opposite was actually the truth. Secretary of State Allen Dulles added to this ignorance by stating that “there will probably bot be any major decisive engagements during the remains two months of March and April of the fighting season.” (247) February 3, 1954 Giap celebrated the Vietnamese New Year of Tet by “firing thirty or so rounds.” The French returned artillery fire but only hit “dummy emplacements.” (248) After meeting with his staff Giap concluded that “the French could not evacuate” Dien Bien Phu and therefore “had to reinforce it. Giap would maintain the initiative. The longer it took, the more the French would use up their supplies and munitions, and the more casualties they would suffer. The body count was vital to the French, who, unlike the Vietminh, found replacements hard to come by. For the first time, Giap’s divisions would have artillery and antiaircraft guns. They would destroy Dien Bien Phu strongpoint by strongpoint.” (248) Captured Vietminh soldiers told the French that they were “surrounded by twenty-seven battalions armed with artillery.” (248) In February, the French War Minister flew to Dien Bien Phu and his plane was attacked by the Vietminh. “Pilots called Dien Bien Phu the chamber pot.” Interestingly, Castries claimed he could “crush four Vietminh divisions” while his officers stated that “it had become too dangerous to go outside the perimeter.” (248-249) Officers were angered with one writing that “the Navarre Plant is a bust. . . . The Viets are on the offensive and all we can do is fight back. Everybody’s fed up.” (249) In addition, the Vietminh “learned from the Chinese experience in Korea the method of hiding their artillery from air strikes and counter battery fire. The Vietminh dug tunnels in the sides of mountains to conceal their guns, bringing them out to fire twenty rounds and wheeling them back in before they could be spotted.” (260) Giap originally scheduled the attack for January 26, 1954, however, he cancelled it because of the lack of supplies and the Vietminh had not completed their preparations. One of his aids said Giap lacked “the Bolshevik spirit.” At the same time his troops caught malaria and lived on rice. Nevertheless, he knew that that he outmanned and outgunned the French. (260) On the other hand the French with erroneous philosophical memes. “The Vietminh have no roads. Cannot must be hauled over roads. Therefore the Vietminh have no cannon. The Vietminh have no experienced gunners. Therefore the Vietminh artillery will fail.” (261) This ignored their own intelligence. (262) Although the French detested what they referred to as “American inference” U.S. Lieutenant General John W. “Iron Mike” O’Daniel believed that the French could defeat the Vietminh. Nevertheless, he cautioned that he would have taken some of the high ground. (263) Just before the Vietminh attack on March 13 a French officer noted that they were encircled by the Vietminh. (265) Giap sent out scouts to collect information on each of the French bases. He “had the initiative, choosing not only the site but the timing and cadence of the battle. His strategy was to pick off the strongpoints one at a time, engaging in a series of small battles, sibling away at the French perimeter rather than taking it in one big but costly bite.” (266) On March 13, 1954 the Vietminh attacked the French at DienBienPhu. (267) Colonel Piroth, the French artillery commander “had prepared a series of targets uncovered on the aerial photographs, but as his intelligence officer Lieutenant Verzat pointed out, there were no Vietminh batteries among the targets. The Viets had changed their emplacements.” (269) Following the war the French established a commission to investigate what went wrong. There were many recriminations. But there was also admissions to the limitations of western analysis. An air force general states “We tortured our brains to find ways to locate their artillery. Some guns were in tunnels six meters from the embrasure. They were moved up to fire, then pulled back.” (272) “At around 7P.M., the artillery [of the Vietminh] stopped and the infantry assault began upon the four Beatrice strongpoints simultaneously.” Due to the disarray caused by the artillery bombardment the Vietminh were able to take Beatrice.(276) As a result of the failure of his artillery Piroth committed suicide. (288) Minister of Defense for France Rene Pleven did not believe there were suitable targets for a nuclear attack. (306) “A study was made by the U.S. Army and Air Force on the feasibility of using atomic weapons in Indochina. The army’s Office of Psychological Warfare warned that even if they were effective there would be adverse effects on the reputation of the United States and on existing alliances. Intelligence officers in both services were also opposed to their use, prompting the army chief of staff, Matthew B. Ridgway, and one of his assistants, General James M. Gavin, to order a second study. The planners concluded that any such intervention would eventually lead to the commitment of ground troops and perhaps Chinese retaliation.” (306) Matthew B. Ridgway, the American army chief of staff, opposed U.S. support for a war which the French did not take seriously, in his mind, and “with no chance of winning?” He also did not believe that Admiral Radford’s reliance on air strikes would not work. (316) French disorganization became more apparent on the second day of the battle, March 15. The French had not counterattacked because “the forces involved in the counterattack could not be assembled in time.” (333) Giap recreated the battle at Maastricht in 1673. He surrounded “the fortress. Cut off supples and reinforcements. Prevent sorties by the garrison. Assault the weakest points o defense under cover of artillery.” (355) “On March 27, Giap summoned his commanders and deliverers his instructions” Destroy the entire eastern sector. Occupy the heights to the west and turn them into attack positions from which we can threaten the centers of resistance Claudine and Huguette on the left back of the Nam Yum. . . . Until now, our army has limited its battles to a single night. . . . The attack on Eliane will be part of a coordinated attack on all easer strongpoints, as well as an indirect attack o the central command post.” (355) The Vietminh were protected by the night from “planes, tanks, and artillery.” (357) Castries begged for reinforcements which did not come. Until Dien Bien Phu “Giap’s army had never fought a battle for more than a single night. Night meant protection from planes, tanks, and artillery. The goal was to destroy French strongpoints, take the equipment, remove the wounded, and fall back.” (357) U.S. Marine Corps commandant, General Lemuel C. Shepherd opposed using air forces at Dien Bien Phu. “Air intervention would be an unprofitable adventure. We can expect no significant military result from an improvised air offensive against guerrilla forces. They simply do not offer a target which our Air Force will find remunerative. They are nowhere exposed at a vital point critical to their continued resupply and communications.” The U.S. would have to deal with a failure. (398) U.S. Admiral Robert Carney, chief of naval operations believed, “American air power would improve the French tactical situation, but not that it would be decisive. Intervention had to be weighed against the potential consequences of U.S. involvement in the Indochina War.” General Nathan Farragut Twining, air force chief of staff, whose family military history dated back to the French and Indian War. As bomber commander in World War II he was in charge of the unit that dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. He believed in “massive air retaliation.” In 1965 Twining stated that “three small tactical A-bombs could have saved the day. . . . no great towns there, only Communist and their supplies.” (399) Admiral Radford and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles argued that, “If Indochina went, America would be forced back to Hawaii.” Dulles wanted Eisenhower to obtain Congressional backing so that he could use air and sea power in the area if he felt it necessary in the interest of national security.” (403) Other senators opposed this because it meant that the U.S. would provide most of the troops, as in Korea. (403) Further president and then senator John F. Kennedy that the people of Indochina must be “granted independence. To pour money, material, and men into the jungle of Indochina without at least a remote prospect of victory would be dangerously futile and self-destructive. But the French persisted infusing independence for Indochina.” (417) Dulles feared that the French would “turn Indochina over to the Communists” at the Geneva Conference of 1954. “If Indochina collapsed . . . Thailand, Malay, Burma, and Indonesia might also be absorbed by the Communists. Dien Bien Phu was at a crucial phase, and the United States did not think much of its chances. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had suggested a naval and air intervention. (In fact, all but Radford had been against intervention.) Dulles said that, “Our military leaders say that if Indochina goes, the only effective deterrent measures open to us would be those directed at Communist China itself.” (475) Many scholars doubt that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles offered the French atomic bombs during the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. However, French sources show that Dulles did offer two atomic bombs to the French. These according to Jean Chauvel, the French ambassador to Switzerland, Maurice Schumann of the French Foreign Ministry. French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault was shocked at the offer.”Schumann could not see how two atom bombs, which could have annihilated both armies, might save Dien Bien Phu.” (478-479) “General Ely wrote in his diary on April 25 that he had mixed feelings about the offer of two atom bombs. The psychological effect would be tremendous, but the effectiveness was questionable and it carried the risk of generalized warfare.” (479) In addition, the French received a “document on the history of French requests for aid to Indochina.” However, there was no mention of the US offer of atomic bombs; the US ambassador to France knew nothing of the offer. (479) Dulles did not remember making the offer. (480) However, Morgan concludes that Dulles used the threat to use atomic bombs. “This was central to his penchant for brinkmanship, which had become the answer to every crisis. It does not seem at all implausible that it would have come to mind with Bidault.” (484) When presented with “possibilities of using atomic bombs in Indochina” Eisenhower responded that, We can’t use those awful things against Asians for a second time in less than ten years.” (516-517) “The erosion of mind and body in a situation of permanent combat took its toll in strange ways. Lieutenant Dr. Madelaine of the 2nd BEP recalled that some of the men in his unit had died, though they had no wounds. These were war-hardened Legionnaires who had fought on the Russian front in the German army. You’d be chatting with them in the trenches, and after they’d eaten and rested, without anything seeming wrong, they were unable to finish the sentence they’d begun and they fell to the ground dead.” (461) The Vietminh experienced similar stress. There were "few doctors.” And, “wounds, such as skull fractures” went untreated. The trenches they had dug turned to mud during the monsoon season. “Their meals were often cold rice. The smoke from artillery shells and the corpses left rotting on the field of battle polluted the atmosphere.” (462) Giap told his commanders “that nothing could be done about the conditions, for this was the nature of trench warfare. . . . His great advantage was that the wounded did not pile up, and he could send most of them to field hospitals in the back country.” (462) On April 22, 1954, President Eisenhower invoked the domino theory when he told the American Newspaper Publishers Association that, “If Indochina fell, it would be a mere additional pawn in the machinations of a power-hungry group in the Kremlin and in China.” (465) A failed French counterattack against the Vietminh frightened Dulles who “cabled Eisenhower, The situation here [Geneva] is tragic. France is almost callusing before our very eyes.” (470) Admiral Radford believed that “airstrikes would stabilize the military situation, and that a limited Chinese intervention. Could be dealt with.” As the war escalated Radford believed that the Americans would then be in a position to take over the conflict.” Radford also believed that a Vietminh victory at Dien Bien Phu “would lead to growing defections from the Vietnamese army and the possible massacre of French civilians. The only way to stop that was to demonstrate that France had powerful allies on her side.” (475) Concerns over possible Chinese intervention in Vietnam were accepted as a cost the West should be willing to pay as U.S. air power would destroy their forces. (482) President Eisenhower lamented that the French displayed inconsistent emotions over Dien Bien Phu. One day they are confident and the next day they are gloom and doom. Eisenhower was concerned that American prestige "would be at stake” if U.S. soldiers were sent to Indochina. Vice President Nixon offered “whether to act without its [U.S.] allies. Eisenhower then suggested that the U.S. may have “to attack with everything we have” if they have to go it alone. (490) “Giap’s attack force of fourteen thousand men outnumbered Castries’ three thousand able-bodied men by nearly five to one.” (521) For all the French efforts to build a Vietnamese army to counter the Vietminh and to deflect accusations that this was a French colonial war the French admitted that their Vietnamese army was a “mirage because it lacked the will to fight.” In addition, most Vietnamese hated these soldiers. (531) Ted Morgan. My Battle of Algiers: A Memoir. In his memoir of his experiences in the Franco-Algerian War Ted Morgan quotes a French major as saying, “We’ll win battle after battle until we lose the war.” (64) Morgan, himself concluded that the French would lose the war. (264)

Lucien Bodard. French journalist. The Quicksand War: Prelude to Vietnam. While drinking at a bar in Hanoi Bodard noticed “a famous captain of paras who had survived Dienbienphu. It was all for nothing, he was saying. I let my men die for nothing. . . . In prison camp the Viets told us they had won because they were fighting for an idea, and we were not. I told them about my paras at Dienbienphu. I told them how they fought. And they said, Heroism is no answer. In prison camp we faced the reality of the Vietminh. And we saw that for eight years our generals had been struggling against a revolution without knowing what a revolution was. Dienbienphu was not an accident of fate, it was a judgment.” An American journalist in Hong Kong had a different Point Of View And Things. “We could have made you [the French] win at Dienbienphu, and I think we should have. . . . the Americans would never have fought as we did. They would have fought a different war. And by crushing the country and the people under a hail of bombs and dollars, they might very well have had more success than we.” (3)

The Viet-Nam Reader: articles and documents on American foreign policy and the Viet-Nam Crisis. Edited by Marcus G. Raskin, former U.S. government official and critic of the war and, Bernard B. Fall, scholar and Vietnam expert who initially supported the war. The Americans were concerned that the fall of Dien Bien Phu would leave the west coast of America vulnerable to invasion just as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 had. (58) However, as the great, one and only Michael Parenti said, quoting Walter Lippman, that was an insult to the United States Navy. A bombing mission titled, Operation Vulture, was offered by the United States to strike at Viet Minh supply lines and to relieve the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu. However, American military experts doubted it would be “effective against human porters in the jungle.” (338)

Jules Roy. The Battle of DienBienPhu. Roy served as an officer in the French Air Force. Neil Sheehan’s introduction. American generals trying to shore up the South Vietnamese government in 1963 and, defeat the Viet Cong, maintained “the same false optimism the French generals had professed during the first Indochina war.” (xi) General Navarre had little respect for General Giap. Navarre practiced “classic military axioms” believing that he would then defeat the Vietminh. Giap had no logistics. “French artillery and Air Power would pulverize any artillery the Vietminh.” This would be the final battle to crush the Vietminh. (xv) Navarre did not believe his intelligence units which told him of four Vietminh battalions moving into DienBienPhu. He accused them of “pessimism.” (xvii) Jules Roy Even a general questioned the reason for fighting in Indochina. Nobody cared about Vietnamese independence. Vietnamese could buy their way out of military service. New officers chose to be assigned to administrative positions so that “they could fill their pockets.” (5) A former classmate of Henri Navarre asked him,”what the hell have you come to this shit hole for?” (7) The war decimated the French officer class. In addition, over “twenty thousand soldiers were missing.” De Lattre asked, if the war against communism in Indochina is so important they why aren’t French soldiers volunteering; why are the French using mercenaries from the Foreign Legion? “Dienbienphu did happen all by itself. It was thought about. It was talked about. Tons of typing paper and pounds of gray matter were used to weigh pros and cons of the affair. Opinions were not alway unanimous. Discussions about it were even violent.” (23) The thought among some French officers was that Dienbienphu would be a “drain on manpower.” The French military leadership believed that the Vietminh were too far from their bases to continue a long battle. This turned out to be untrue. (30) French staff officers maintained that Dienbienphu would not be successful because its defense relied on European methods of warfare which were useless in Indochina. (31) In addition, Giap would be able to supply his forces with food from nearby villages instead of transporting it long distances as the French imagined. (32) DienBienPhu had a history of warfare and was taken over by the French in 1887. It is made up of about a “hundred or so villages and hamlets are occupied by about ten thousand inhabitants, who live on the rice from their fields, a few vegetables, poultry and pigs.” (37) Giap believed DienBienPhu extremely important. There was a Japanese airfield. The French wanted to use that. No French official evaluated the situation competently. (38) The French parachuting arrival in DienBienPhu terrified the peasants. (43) Roy describes Giap as unimpressive in appearance. Very confident. So confident that this former history teacher believed he could create an army to “stand up to a well-equipped European army. Followed the military dictates of Mao Zedong. And, he knew the land better than the French because it was his land. (51) Ariel Sharon argued the same as to why the Israelis were so successful. (See his autobiography) He created an army “ready to sacrifice themselves for the triumph of the revolution.” (52) Giap made sure he was never vulnerable to attack and when he attacked it was “from a position of obvious superiority.” He studied and he learned from his mistakes. (52) He vehemently hated the French for executing his wife. (52) The French army destroyed the houses of the Vietnamese villagers. (57) Generals Navarre and Salan would not believe that the Vietminh capable of massive mobilization of their forces and supplies. (60) Navarre and Giap believed they had to do battle at Dienbienphu. (68) In late 1953 the Vietminh could march 20 miles per day toward Dien Bien Phu. “Nothing distinguished officers from the troops. . . . simply men to whom certain functions had been given.” (71) “Each soldier carried his weapon, sometimes a non recoil gun or mortar tripod, a bag, a thirty-pound bundle of rice over one shoulder, his individual shovel, water bottle and a little salt in a bamboo tube. . . . Not all soldiers had footware . . . sandals cut out of tires.” (71-72) The base at “Beatrice” was considered incredibly strong. However, it was so “isolated” that determined enemy shock troops could take it. Nevertheless, the French believed their own mythology: “the superiority of the French genius, a blind faith in firearms and the invisibility of the Foreign Legion.” (78-79) December 31, 1953, General Navarre realized that the Vietminh had completely surrounded his bases at Dien Bien Phu. The French couldn’t even leave their camps. (94) Both Navarre and Giap faced difficulty obtaining fresh troops and supplies. (102) Dien Bien Phu would be the first large scale battle for the Vietminh. (104) The French High Command embraced the ideas that Giap had never attended a Staff College; “that the Viets never attacked when they found themselves equally matched”; that “Giap had no artillery, that if he had he would not know how to use it.” (104) “The bicycles [of the Vietminh], as Military Intelligence [French] had known for three years, served as transport. It was calculated that a bicycle could carry between two and two and a half times the weight of a man pushing it. . . . With these bicycles, it was no longer a question of counting in pounds, but in tons.” Navarre chose to ignore this. (105) Navarre was also frustrated that the French Air Force did not “stop Vietminh divisions from pouring toward Dien Bien Phu.” (110) By January 27, 1954, unknown to the French command, Vietminh artillery was already in place. (125) The French laughed at the idea that the Vietminh could have formidable artillery. Col. Piroth always said, if the Vietminh did have artillery, as soon as they fired their shell, Piroth would “smash it.” Navarre did not understand artillery and thought the French Air Force would compensate. In any event, a battle at Dienbienphu would be short. (139) Charles Wilson, Secretary of Defense for the United States, opposed American military intervention in Indochina. Interestingly, and to foretell the American disaster in Vietnam, General O’Daniel who led the American military mission in Indochina, told Washington that The French position was very good. (140) The strength of the Vietminh came from the shared belief in their desire to be independent and that their fathers had suffered to get them to the point of victory. (148) The French soldiers either hated Bao Dai or didn’t know who he was. But they fought for him. (149-150) The various bases, Beatrice, Isabelle, Gabrielle, and more, were miles apart and so they had a difficult time relying on each other. In addition, this made the Vietminh attack all the more complicated. The mountain bases sighted separately as the Vietminh penetrated the their defenses. Piroth’s much vaunted artillery had been destroyed by the Vietminh. (166) One of the attacks on March 13, 1954 destroyed some other French aircraft and made taking off from the airfield difficult. (163) The Vietminh did not stop. They destroyed ammunition dumps, airplanes, and the airplane tower. The French hospitals overflowed and the shelters collapsed under the Vietminh attack. (168) Only one day into the Dien Bien Phu battle the French found their airstrip “in chaos, pitted with holes and bristling with pieces of broken grids.” (169) Bigeard kept saying that the Vietminh were capable of anything. Piroth criticized any “praise” of the enemy.” In addition, Piroth did not know his enemy and had failed, despite claims he would, destroy Vietminh positions. Piroth finally recognized this as Beatrice fell. He committed suicide by exploding a grenade. (174-175) The French Army staff in Hanoi received hourly calls about the “disintegration” of their base at Dien Bien Phu. In addition, they were amazed at the ineffectiveness of their artillery. (177) French ammunition stocks ran low. (178) By March 15, 1954, Navarre began blaming everyone but himself for the disaster. He blamed the other officers for inept evaluations of the Vietminh. He referred to General Giap and “Schoolmaster Giap.” (178) While he credited Chinese aid to the Vietminh for their success he refused to acknowledge that he had received American aid. (179) Two days into the attack Vietminh fire already made “any progress impossible.” (176) At Anne-Marie soldiers of the 3rd Thai battalion fled or went over to the Vietminh. “The fall of Beatrice, and that of Gabrielle nearby, was too much for them.” (177) Following the conquest of Anne-Marie the Vietminh ate everything in sight. A French officer asked for a doctor which was denied. The officer asked why and the reply was “on our side we are not in the habit of asking questions.” (177) As noted throughout this essay Cogny did not get along with Navarre. He sent memos to him even though they were in the same building. (180) Paul Grauwin was the hero French doctor at Dien Bien Phu described “opened stomachs, slit thighs . . . orderlies smoked so as not to vomit at the nauseating odor of blood. . . . The shattered jaws, the blinded eyes, the blown-off legs, the spit shoulders, the groans . . . This was not a battle any more but a descent into hell.” (182) On March 16 Castries told a photographer, “If they attack tonight we’re done for.” (184) At Elaine no one understood that the heights of the surrounding hills could and were used by the Vietminh to place their machine-gun nests. No infantryman who knew his job would ever have agreed to install himself so close to such obstacles without being able to sweep their approaches with his own fire.” (186) General Cogny and Colonel de Castries believed that the Vietminh were vulnerable to being slaughtered by the French. However, the Vietminh were in such a position that “the French would have to use up all their ammunition in a single day to drive them away. The same blind faith in the universal virtues of artillery had created the great empty spaces between Beatrice, Gabrielle, and the central position, in which the enemy had rushed like a torrent that nobody could stop; contempt for the adversary had led the French Command to prefer theoretical concepts to common sense.” (186) Weather and Vietminh antiaircraft fire made bombing Vietminh sites impossible. (186-187) Roy at first writes that the Vietminh did fire on French planes with red crosses on them. The Vietminh claimed they had 105 and 120mm shells aboard. Later this would be confirmed by Roy. (189, 191) The French attacked the Vietminh who had raised a Red Cross flag. (192) Dr. Grauwin was at wits end as he walked through “broken bodies and blown off heads . . . amputated limbs.” (190-191) Dien Bien Phu compared to Stalingrad. Langlais admitted that the French command’s lack of organization regarding treating the wounded was more to blame than Vietminh attacks. (192) A Vietminh soldier they could not evacuate was thrown into a river by the French. (192) Six days into the Vietminh attack on Dien Bien Phu they had passed Dominique and Elaine and were prepared to attack Isabelle, Hugette and Claudine. The Vietminh daily dug pits for their weapons. They were on a roll to victory. How and why did they do this against tanks and aircraft from the all powerful West? Land reform. One of the most critical issues of the Vietnam Wars. The other was nationalism. These ideas were drilled into the minds of the Vietminh soldiers. “The army of the Vietminh was an army of peasants determined to conquer their land, and who would hold out for years, if necessary, joined to their earth as to their own flesh, minded with it in life as in death, one with the roots the trees, and the mud and excrement of the rice fields. How could the west have gone on stubbornly supporting a feudal regime and corrupt administration without seeing that its hegemony was doomed?” (192-193) A French official in 1894 complained that the French asserted that they brought freedom to Indochina and, through war, supported those who oppressed the Vietnamese. The goal of the Vietminh was “that their girls would no longer have to serve as prostitutes and their boys as house servants. Who hit on the idea of the first ricksha? The rich foreigner.” They did not want to answer to foreigners in their own country. The Vietnamese peasants were devoted to Ho Chi Minh because he represented them. Emperor Bao Dai preferred “tiger-hunting with French generals.”(193) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Radford was an ardent anti-communist who associated the Vietminh with Korean communists he had just fought. Roy describes Redford as having “lucidity” in his decisions. “Radford like to consider himself the defender of the western world.” He also “lifted the ban imposed by the Pentagon on the use of Packets to drop napalm .” (195-194) The French debated “the direct intervention of the American heavy bombers” but decided that the Chinese would retaliate. However, Roy asks, “why should the French fear Chinese intervention in reply to American intervention?” The Chinese gave nor more aid to the Vietminh than the Americans gave to the French. It was the weapons, American and included, that the Chinese gave to the Vietminh that “had tipped the scales in favor of the Vietminh.” (202-203) However, Roy points out that the use of atomic bombs by the Americans in Indochina would certainly provoke a Chinese military response. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, anti-communist extraordinaire, told the Overseas Press Club that this was a risk that needed to be taken. (203) Despite perceptions of failure and slaughter for the French the Vietminh suffered heavy casualties as well. On March 31st bodies of both armies were seen intermingled on the battlefield. (206) At Huguette the French cut to pieces attacking Vietminh soldiers. (207) “Cogny had made mistakes; he admitted that to himself. He had not scented the dangers posed by an adventure in a region which he did not know so well . . . he had deluded himself about the cavalry maneuvers he had planned; he had misjudged Giap’s logistical capabilities; and above all he had not come out strongly against the Dienbienphu adventure as soon as it had revealed risks out of proportion to its chances of success.” (208) Questions about the atomic bomb’s effectiveness were raised. (213) On April 4, 1953 the French Air Force dropped napalm. Reference to “the double breasts of Elaine 1 and Elaine 4, which were now known as the Lollabrigidas.” (219) French government officials hoped to save Dien Bien Phu but the plans “fell like the blade of a guillotine. (221) By April 6, 1954 Navarre believed that the “only hope of saving Dienbienphu . . . lay in atomic bombs dropped by the B-29’s of the United States Air Force. . . . How would the world accept this reign of Hiroshima? What hatred would be reaped by the nation which had burnt to death one hundred thousand men and women on the soil of their ancestors in order to rectify the error of judgement of one general?” (225) Prof. Ton That Tung the Vietminh medical professor who brought along fellow doctors to treat the Vietminh wounded at Dienbienphu. He was ordered there on March 27. By then the Vietminh thought they had a victory and the medical school celebrated. (226) The Vietminh medical staff suffered as much as the French; they were overwhelmed. Wounds dressed, broken bones set; yellow flies; maggots. “Dr. Tung experimented with all the pharmaceutical products at his disposal.” (226) He operated on head wounds. "He had learned how to remove foreign bodies by suction and then close the skull again.” (226-227) As other educated Vietminh thought, “Tung remembered the lessons of the French Revolution” which seemed to mean more to them than to the French Army. (227) No one took Bao Dai seriously. (229) After the Geneva Conference the French controlled Vietnamese Army disintegrated. “Mobilization notices were not enforced. . . . only those who couldn’t escape or students who, certain of becoming officers, hoped to obtain lucrative posts. . . . For whose sake should the troops of the Vietnamese Army get themselves killed?” (229) Vietnamese officers in service of the French “drove around in American cars and gave cocktail parties without suspecting that the fate of their country was being decided. Their hatred of Communism was governed by the advantages which capitalism offered them: medals, women, money.” (229-230) They would transfer military funds to their own bank accounts. (230) “What soldier in this army could be expected to fight to enrich the big landlords and the provincial governors, and what sacrifices could be demanded from sergeants who, on account of their birth, had become colonels in eighteen months? . . . When Cogny wrote that serious signs of weakness had been discovered in the thirty Vietnamese battalions in Tonkin . . . he meant that men were mutinying, deserting their posts or refusing to fight when the Expeditionary Corps was sometimes faced by bands of guerrillas aged thirteen to eighteen who fought until they were killed.” (230) Bao Dai’s army was trained by the French and paid by the Americans. So, who were the Vietnamese to be loyal to? “Who was the incarnation this people oppressed for centuries by its mandarins and kits invaders and consumed by the hunger for justice? H.M. (His Majesty) Bao Dai or Uncle Ho, Vo Nguyen Giap or General Hinh?” (231) By April 14 both sides were only years apart. (235) “The glory of Dienbienphu celebrated by the newspapers of the free world was that of fighting on the bloodiest dunghill in Asia, in the name of the West and for the love of the pretty girls who had given their names rot the peaks.” Even the mosquitos disappeared. (236) Contrary to the French if a Vietminh commander “suffered the slightest reverse [he] was relieved of his command.” (237) Langlais admitted that Dienbienphu was a “disaster.” (239) By April 23 the Vietminh mowed down the French at Huguette. (242) Giap sent his forces as close to the French as they could be in order to pick up parachuted supplies. (242) The French Foreign Minister M. Georges Bidault told the American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that if American forces were not used at Dienbienphu the French would be defeated there. (244) April 24, 1954 Dulles told the French government that “a massive air attack would probably make no difference to the fate of Dienbienphu.” (245) Emperor Bao Dai was more interested in protecting “his mansion and tiger hunts at Dalat” and “his cut of the takings in the gambling houses and brothels in Cholon.” (254) “The equivalent of three annual classes of officers had been killed in two years in a war which the French government knew it could not win, which it had refused to stop in time and which was going to swallow up the whole French empire.” (254) Dr. Tung arrived in a “hamlet which had been given the napalm treatment and of which only a few burnt beans remained. All the inhabitants had disappeared.” “Uncle Ho’s” admonition that “we must win” kept him going as he operated on head wounds.” (255) On April 28, 1954 the French recognized “the complete independence and full sovereignty of Bao Dai’s Vietnam.” (255) On April 29 Giap sent a message to his forces that the coming monsoon rains would for the French to “leave their flooded trenches and . . . victory will be ours.” (256) Once the Vietminh took Anne-Marie they “installed a powerful searchlight which pinpointed the Dakotas with its brilliant ray and enabled the antiaircraft batteries to take better aim.” (258) French soldiers from all nationalities, including Vietnamese parachuted into Dienbienphu knowing the odds for their survival were slime to none. (259) The officers had been drilled with the virtues of Saint-Cyr and military glory. (259-260) Giap believed that, “the stupidity of our fathers and our fathers’ fathers had turned him and the men of the Vietminh into rebels to begin with and Communists later, and they had so many injustices, so many prisons and so many dead to avenge that they would not stop - and we would do the same in their place, provided we had the blood of free men flowing through our veins.” (260) Dr. Tung found that “quinacrine solution drove flies away.” (262) At Elaine the French dug underground passages which the Vietminh attempted to destroy. (263) Dr. Tung compared the Battle of Dienbienphu with the Battle of Stalingrad. (264) Another statement from the war: “You’re a para. You’re there to get yourself killed.” (268) After the French surrender The Vietminh who took Elaine “began piling up the corpses from both sides and covering them with earth.” French prisoners were relaxed and did not appear frightened by the Vietminh who were lax in their control. (281) They told the French, “the war is over.” (282) The announcement of their defeat at Dienbienphu shocked the French government in Paris. (286) “About one’ o’clock in the morning of May 8, a small group of French speaking Viets waving a white flag advanced toward the command post of Isabelle. Let us pass, they told the soldiers who stopped them. We want to see your commander, Colonel Lalande. Colonel Lapland agreed to see these envoys, who told him, All further resistance is useless. Don’t be stubborn. Lalande then gave the orders for a cease-fire.” (287) The word of the victory for the Vietminh spread throughout Vietnam. The Vietminh took French supples of “soap, flashlights, and canned foods. Lights were shining in the basin, where there was no longer any fear of air raids which would kill as any French as Viet.” (287) The Vietminh victory at Dienbienphu ranks alongside Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo. (287) Roy’s conclusion - the war was fought for economic reasons with the excuse that the French were fighting against communism. (290)

Bui Tin. Following Ho Chi Minh: the memoirs of a North Vietnamese Colonel. 1995. The Viet Minh originally “attacked French positions for a few minutes before withdrawing. By 1954 the Viet Minh were able to fight division level battles against the French. The French build up at Dien Bien Phu in late 1953 led Viet Minh and Chinese generals to visit the area. The Chinese advised the Viet Minh to attack as soon as possible so that the French could not strengthen their positions. But just as the January 1954 attack was ready to being Giap called it off. “This decision almost led to a mutiny. Even his top generals opposed this decision. One of the reasons Giap gave for postponing the attack was that the analysis of the situation was two months old and the French obviously improved their bases. To attack without further preparation could mean losing the war. (20) Porters were organized to transport up to 550 pounds on bicycles. To avoid attack by the French Air Force the Viet Minh “created mock targets for them to attack by lighting fires in places of no tactical value - the rising smoke was simply a decoy.” (21) The Viet Minh had the advantage of remaining hidden while the French could always be seen. (21)

Robert J. Donovan. Eisenhower: the inside story. 1956. Following Eisenhower’s inauguration the U.S. increased aid to the French and “set in motion the Navarre plan.” There would be increases in French and French Union forces but also “major increase in the strength of the Vietnamese army.” This would, according to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles “smash the organized body of Communist aggression by the end of the 1955 fighting season and thereby [reduce] the fighting to guerrilla warfare, which could in 1956 be met for the most by the native Indo-China forces.” This is a fantasy that has no basis in reality. The so-called communist aggression originated in Vietnam. It is the conquering French and its ally the United States who were the aggressors. And, it had been a guerrilla war which will change only for the battle at Dien Bien Phu. Nevertheless, the plan failed. (260) On April 7, 1954, President Eisenhower set forth the “domino theory.” This meant that “Indo-China was the first domino, and if the Communists knocked it over, the next to collapse might be Burma, Thailand, Malaya, and Indonesia. . . . Japan, Formosa, the Philippines . . . Australia and New Zealand.” This is a total misrepresentation of the political situation of the time.” (261) However, by February 1954 the Eisenhower administration seriously considered the “possibility of American intervention.” However, Eisenhower did not like “America’s being sucked into a war in Indo-China.” (262) Democratic Senator John Stennis of Mississippi, an arch conservative segregationist, expressed concern that U.S. involvement in Indochina could begin with the several hundred technicians we sent there. (263) As the battle at Dien Bien Phu raged on Admiral Redford supported limited use of American air power. Army Chief of Staff Matthew Ridgway disagreed. “Believing that ground troops sooner or later would have to be committed, he felt . . . that the jungles, rice paddies, and poor roads, harbors and communications would have made it a tragic adventure for the United States.” (263) By April 1954 American air intervention would have been a disaster as the combatants were too close together. (264) President Eisenhower refused to authorize an air strike for fear of Chinese intervention who he refused to continue to fight in Korea. (266)

Arthur W. Radford. From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: the memoirs of Admiral W. Radford. Stephen Jukrika, ed. 1980. Radford was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Reports from the American military in Saigon “were depressing.” The appointment of General Navarre had not improved the situation. The Americans were concerned that the French could not hold out at Dien Bien Phu. “The Navarre plan” for aggressive action was proving to be a repeat of General Salan’s defensive tactics but General Navarre was more difficult to deal with.” French requests for more military aid had “little or no justification.” (336) President Eisenhower opposed sending American ground forces but “did not rule out U.S. air and naval intervention.” (383) There was a belief among the American military that the communists fought on a “regional basis.” This would mean that communism is monolithic. A major mistake of U.S. foreign policy. (384) In January 1954 conservative columnists Joseph and Stewart Alsop revealed a secret that the U.S. had “agreed to send maintenance personnel to Indochina.” The press interpreted this as a forerunner to American military intervention in the French-Vietnamese war. (386) “The French failed to demonstrate tactical initiative. Instead, they were content to let 6 Vietminh battalions tie down 20 French Union battalions rather than capitalize on the chance to defeat the Vietminh forces decisively. The Attache gave as his opinion that General Navarre had been directed by his government to conduct a minimum-casualty holding operation . . . with a view to eventual negotiations. The Vietminh seemed to be fighting a clever war of attrition, with time running in its favor.” The lack of political support from the French government, “inadequate training of combat units and staffs, and a defensive philosophy, the Americans believed led to the French being unsuccessful. No amount of American military aid would help. (387) General Navarre appeared to look for “miracle solutions instead of forthright and energetic action.” (387) General O’Daniel disagreed and believed that General Navarre would launch a successful attack in 1954-1955. That would be too late. (387) General Giap began his attack at Dien Bien Phu on March 13, 1954. He concentrated “on one sector at a time. . . . Employing horde tactics” they conquered one position at a time. (391) Radford believed that the French did not use their aircraft efficiently. (391) There appeared to be miscommunication between the American and the French military. (395) For the U.S. to militarily intervene at Dien Bien Phu the Americans required the French to grant “independence for the Associated States” and British sending troops as well. The French would not agree and the British did not want to do this.” (417)